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Existing National System of Innovation (NSI) literature mainly focuses on the impact of 
NSI on national-level or sectoral-level innovations. Whether and how NSI impacts firm-
level innovation still lacks comprehensive theoretical exploration. This study aims to 
address the knowledge gap by developing a theoretical framework to analyse and evaluate 
how two aspects of institutions in China’s NSI might contribute to the development of a 
firm’s innovation through bottom-up learning (BUL). The two aspects of institutions in 
focus are corporate governance and the firm’s access to capital.  
This research adopts a multiple case study method. 37 in-depth interviews in seven 
leading firms in China’s automobile and railway equipment sectors were carried out. The 
case samples included central State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), local SOEs and private 
firms. The author performed multiple case analyses to identify and examine the impact 
of corporate governance along with the firm’s access to capital, and how these factors 
influence the likelihood of the firm’s adoption of BUL practices.  
This study fills the research gap in three ways. First, by expanding the Corporate 
Governance and Financial (CG&F) framework by Tylecote and colleagues (Tylecote and 
Conesa, 1999) this study establishes how NSI shapes a firm’s BUL choices for innovation 
depending on four institutional factors: (1) whether the top manager of a firm is an insider 
or outsider, (2) the length of employment of the top manager, (3) the firm’s access to 
capital, and (4) the level of competition faced by the firm. Second, based on the analysis 
of the above four factors, a new finding is that central and local SOEs should be separately 
considered because the institutional conditions they face for BUL for innovation are 
 
 
different. Third, to support the analysis between NSI and BUL, the study operationalises 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Motivation 
A recent change amongst developing countries has been the increasing focus on the 
innovation and the development of a strong national system of innovation (NSI) that 
allows catch up. Developing countries like China also decided to use innovation as an 
engine to drive economic growth and to help catch up with those developed countries by 
2020 (Serger and Breidne, 2007). Therefore, a key challenge is what is an effective NSI 
for China and how might it be developed?  
The NSI is a widely regarded approach for analysing innovative actors and interactions 
amongst them that is shaped by institutions within national boundaries (Freeman, 1987; 
Lundvall, 1992). The NSI, in a developing country approach, focuses more on studying 
technological learning, diffusing and improving activities of developing countries who 
import technologies from developed countries (Freeman, 1987; Freeman, 1988; Lall, 
2000; Viotti, 2002; Lundvall et al., 2009).  
Although China has proposed its national strategic plan to become an innovative country 
by 2020 (Serger and Breidne, 2007), how to develop the innovation capability of China’s 
firms, and how China’s NSI formulates an appropriate institutional environment to help 
firms develop their innovation capability, are two critical questions that needed to be 
addressed.  
Developing indigenous innovation in China requires a significant amount of effort. It is 
argued that China lacks the relevant abilities to develop indigenous innovations (e.g. Gu, 




either highly dependent on imported foreign technologies (i.e. the entire production line, 
machinery, etc.) or predominantly rely on imitating products from the foreign market 
through reverse engineering (Xiao et al., 2013). Taking the Chinese automobile sector as 
an example, a growing body of literature (e.g. Lee et al., 1997; Harwit, 2001; Wang, 2003; 
Liu and Tylecote, 2009) shows that large-scale firms in China’s automobile sector, most 
of which are SOEs, are incapable of developing cars without some reliance on foreign 
technologies.  
The low capability of China in developing indigenous innovations could be explained by 
their lack of bottom-up innovation (OECD, 2008; Lundvall et al., 2009). Many 
researchers have suggested that an employee’s personal knowledge repository is an 
important source of knowledge (Gibbons and Johnston, 1974; Pavitt, 1984; Bessant et al., 
1994; Bessant and Caffyn, 1997), and formulating a receptive environment that allows 
employees to actively propose suggestions to both product and process innovation, is a 
key approach to improving the innovation performance of a firm (March, 1991; Lam, 
2002; Mom et al., 2006; Andersen, 2008; Aoki, 2008; Wei et al., 2011).  
Following previous work, a “bottom-up learning (BUL)” approach for innovation is 
proposed in this research as a potential route to proliferate the technological innovation 
capability in China’s firms. This approach emphasises the importance of gathering and 
using knowledge from the “bottom (shop floor)” level of firms, as an important source of 
knowledge for developing the innovation capability of firms.  
In this research, “Bottom-up learning” is defined as knowledge creation, learning and 
sharing activities by shop floor employees to produce creative solutions to problems, or 




1.2 Research Aim and Questions 
The research objective is to understand the impact of China’s NSI on innovation activities 
in firms. This research fills two knowledge gaps, namely: 1) how institutions influence 
firm-level practices and 2) to operationalise the concept of BUL.  
This research aims to fill these two knowledge gaps by studying how two aspects of 
institutions of China’s NSI, which are a corporate governance system and a firm’s access 
to capital, influence a firms’ adoption of BUL practices. This objective has been further 
translated into three research questions that will be addressed in this research including:  
Research question 1: “Do China’s firms have bottom-up learning (BUL) practices to 
develop their innovation capability, and how embedded are BUL practices?”  
Research question 2: “How does the level of firms’ BUL embeddedness vary amongst 
firms with different ownership?”  
Research question 3: “How does China’s corporate governance system, and firms’ access 
to capital, influence the adoption of embedded BUL practices in firms?”  
To address these three research questions, this research formulates a theoretical 
framework consisting of three institutional factors to analyse and evaluate the impact of 
China’s corporate governance system and firms’ access to capital on their adoption of 
BUL. The three factors include: 1) whether the top manager of a firm is an insider or an 





1.3 Knowledge Gaps 
Based on a systematic literature review in the relevant topics, two main research gaps are 
identified to be addressed in this thesis.  
Firstly, the NSI approach provides a useful framework to study how national institutions 
shape the technological specialisations of countries (Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992). 
However, how NSI impacts firm-level innovation still lacks comprehensive theoretical 
exploration. Because national technological innovation capability is an aggregation of all 
innovation activities of firms in that country (Lundvall et al., 2009), it is very important 
to understand why and how firms’ innovation activities are shaped by institutions at the 
national level.  
Therefore, this research aims to bridge the gap between studies of NSI and management 
studies that focus more on firm-specific practices. In this light, it is possible to discover 
how national institutions influence firms’ behaviour when engaging innovation.    
Second, although the concept of BUL has been widely suggested as an important 
approach to develop innovation capability (March, 1991; Bessant and Caffyn, 1997; Lam, 
2002; Mom et al., 2006; Andersen, 2008; Aoki, 2008; Høyrup, 2010; Wei et al., 2011), 
the volume of literature that focuses on how BUL is implemented in firms, and how to 
evaluate the embeddedness of those BUL practices, is considerably limited. This is 
because the concept of BUL is new and modern, and has not yet been operationalised by 
academics. Therefore, this research will initiate the effort to operationalise the concept of 
BUL to make it a useful tool, or approach, for developing firms’ innovation capability. 
This research aims to fill these two research gaps by studying how China’s corporate 




practices. Corporate governance and firms’ access to capital are two important aspects of 
institutions in China’s NSI. The adoption of the BUL practice is a form of innovation 
activities that are crucial for developing the innovation capability of firms.  
To support the analysis between NSI and BUL, this research will operationalise the 
concept of BUL by identifying BUL practices from literature in knowledge management 
(KM), organisational learning (OL), human resource management (HRM) and operation 
management (OM).  
Moreover, this research evaluates the level of embeddedness of BUL practices in firms 
according to criteria developed from the available literature. In this research, an 
embedded BUL practice means that the practice is effective and thus helps the firm to 
facilitate BUL activities. Not embedded BUL practices are not effective in facilitating 
BUL activities, so they only exist on paper.  
After each of the BUL practices adopted by seven cases has been evaluated, a rating of 
the level of BUL embeddedness will be given to each case. The level of BUL 
embeddedness is a relative measure of how many embedded BUL practices have been 
adopted by cases in comparison to others. Three levels of ratings are given to those cases 
studied: good BUL embeddedness, moderate BUL embeddedness, and poor BUL 
embeddedness.  
1.4 Research Method and Design 
This research uses the multiple case study method to study four firms in China’s 
automobile sector and three firms in its railway equipment sector. The seven firms in 
focus include four state-owned enterprises (SOEs) owned by the central government, two 




Empirical data are qualitative data collected from 37 in-depth, semi-structured interviews 
with interviewees from seven companies between late 2015 and early 2016. Interviews 
were mainly high and mid-level managers in charge of R&D, quality management and 
HRM. These interviewees were chosen because they have sufficient knowledge of a 
firm’s management practices including BUL practices so that they could provide 
appropriate information needed to answer the research questions. Some employees were 
also interviewed, when possible, to triangulate information given by managers.  
1.5 Research contribution 
Based on empirical findings, this research proposes two theoretical contributions to fill 
the knowledge gaps identified above.  
Contribution to studies on China’s NSI 
This research formulates a theoretical framework consisting of four institutional factors 
to analyse and evaluate the impact of China’s corporate governance system, firms’ access 
to capital and market competition on firms’ BUL. The four factors include: 1) whether 
the top manager of a firm is an insider or outsider, 2) the length of the top manager’s 
employment, 3) the firm’s access to capital, and 4) the level of market competition.  
The first three factors are based on combining the finance and corporate governance 
(F&CG) model developed by Tylecote and his colleagues (e.g. Tylecote and Conesa, 
1999; Miozzo and Tylecote, 2001; Tylecote et al., 2002; Cai and Tylecote, 2005; Tylecote 
and Ramirez, 2006; Liu and Tylecote, 2016) with the network-based resource capital 




During the data analysis, it was found that the research findings could not be fully 
explained by the first three factors. Further analysis found that the level of competition 
faced by firms has a significant influence on the level of BUL embeddedness of firms. 
By adding a market competition factor, the research findings could be fully explained.  
Therefore, this research contributes to the existing literature by adding a market 
competition factor to the F&CG framework, to explain the level of BUL embeddedness 
of firms. This four-factor framework contributes to studies on the interaction between 
China’s NSI and firms’ innovation activities by explaining how CG, firms’ access to 
capital and market competition influence firms’ BUL.  
Contributions to the literature on corporate governance and firms’ innovation 
performance 
This research contributes to studies on China’s SOEs by distinguishing between the 
central SOEs and local SOEs in terms of how China’s NSI influences their BUL practices. 
Existing studies on China’s SOEs tend to group central SOEs and local SOEs into one 
category, which suggests their management and innovation activities are under the same, 
or similar, influences from China’s NSI. However, this research argues that China’s NSI 
has a distinctive impact on central SOEs and local SOEs which leads to different levels 
of BUL embeddedness.  
Contribution to BUL literature 
This research contributes to the BUL literature by initiating efforts to operationalise the 
concept of BUL to make it a practical management tool for developing an innovation 
capability in firms. This research identified five types of BUL practices from seven cases 




criteria for evaluating the embeddedness of BUL practices have been developed from the 
literature, which can be used in future research.  
1.6 Research method and conceptual framework 
This research uses a multi-case study method to address the research questions with 
qualitative data collected from in-depth semi-structured interviews. 37 respondents from 
seven Chinese firms were interviewed.  
A conceptual framework is developed based on the literature to guide this research. (See 
Illustration 1-1) 
Illustration 1-1: Conceptual framework based on literature 
 
Link 1a and link 1b denote the impact of government plans on what capital is provided to 




will receive both financial and human resource capital from the government, but to 
different levels.  
Link 1c denotes that the ownership of a firm influences the firm’s access to capital.  
Link 1d denotes that the level of the firm’s access to capital could influence the firm’s 
BUL. Link 2a denotes that government plans influence the corporate governance of SOEs 
by appointing a top manager directly by SASAC.  
Link 2b denotes that the government could appoint either an insider or an outsider as top 
managers to SOEs. If the top managers do not have firm-specific knowledge before he/she 
is appointed, he/she is considered as an outsider. On the contrary, if the top manager has 
rich firm-specific knowledge when he/she is appointed, he/she is considered as an insider.  
Link 2c denotes that the level of the top manager’s firm-specific knowledge could 
influence their tendency to adopt embedded BUL practices. Firms with outsider top 
managers are likely to have a low level of BUL embeddedness. Conversely, firms with 
insider top managers are likely to have a high level of BUL embeddedness.  
Link 2d denotes that the government could appoint the top manager for either short-term 
or long-term employment. If the top manager remains in position for more than ten years, 
he/she is considered as being appointed for the long-term.  
Link 2e denotes that the length of a top manager’s employment could influence the firm’s 
BUL. This link explains whether top managers have the incentive to adopt BUL practices. 
Firms with short-term top managers are likely to have a low level of BUL embeddedness. 





It needs to be noted here that, the government cannot appoint top managers to private 
firms. However, private firms still have the problem denoted by links 2c and 2e. An 
insider or outsider top manager in private firms, being appointed by shareholders for 
short-term or long-term, are still likely to face similar problems as indicated by links 2c 
and 2e.  
The focus of the analysis is on constructs marked by the bold boxes and the interaction 
amongst them marked by bold arrows in Illustration 1-1.  
1.7 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on topics including 
innovation, BUL in different disciplines and NSI in developing countries. Based on the 
literature reviewed, a conceptual framework is developed and explained in detail.  
Chapter 3 states the philosophical stance in this research and justifies why critical realism 
is an appropriate epistemology position for this research. In addition, the choice of the 
multiple case study method, and the case study research design, are discussed and justified. 
Moreover, the data analysis method, research validation tests and ethical considerations 
are discussed.  
Chapter 4 addresses the first two research questions by using a cross-case analysis method 
to identify and evaluate the BUL practices adopted in those firms studied.  
Chapter 5 addresses the third research question by using the group-case analysis method 
to investigate the impact of two sets of institutions of China’s NSI on firms’ adoption of 







Chapter 6 discusses the key research findings in the context of relevant literature and 
proposes three contributions to current knowledge. Moreover, the implications of this 
research to policymakers and management practitioners are proposed. Finally, the 
research limitations are discussed, and recommendations for future research are proposed 
accordingly.   
 
Updated conceptual 
framework based on 
findings in this 
research.  
CH 2: Literature review and conceptual 
framework 
CH 3: Research methodology 
CH 4: Cross-case analysis to identify and 
evaluate BUL practices 
CH 5: Group-case analysis to study the 
impact of institutional factors on firms’ BUL 
CH 6: Discussion and conclusion 
Structure of this thesis 
CH1: Introduction 




Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction  
To develop a theoretical foundation for this research, this chapter discusses the existing 
literature on the relevant topics, namely technological innovation, bottom-up learning for 
innovation, and the national system of innovation. Moreover, this chapter develops a 
conceptual framework based on the literature in order to address the research objective.   
This chapter is organised according to the fields of the literature reviewed as follows. 
Section 2.2 reviews studies on how the innovation is developed. Section 2.3 defines the 
concept of bottom-up learning (BUL) by discussing literature on what BUL is and how it 
contributes to innovation in firms. Section 2.4 discusses studies on China’s national 
system of innovation (NSI) to develop a better understanding of how national institutions 
influence innovation activities at national, sectoral and firm levels. Section 2.5 develops 
a conceptual framework, based on existing literature, to investigate the impact of China’s 
NSI on firm’s BUL activities for innovation. Section 2.6 concludes this chapter by 
drawing useful insights from the current literature to guide this research in the following 
empirical investigation.  
2.2 Innovation 
The term “innovation” has various definitions in relevant literature. Schumpeter (1934) 
establishes the foundation for innovation studies by making a distinction between 
invention and innovation (Freeman and Soete, 1997). In the book Business Cycles, 
Schumpeter (1939) argues that innovation is the key driving force for the growth of 
capitalist economy because firms (mainly entrepreneurs) actively compete on developing 




Following Schumpeter’s work, Freeman and Soete (1997) define innovation as a new 
product or a new process of production that has been commercialised. (Edquist, 1997:1)  
proposes that innovation could be entirely new to the world but is, more commonly, “a 
new combination of existing elements” that lead to economic development. Definitions 
made by Freeman and Soete (1997) and Edquist (1997) stress the commercial value and 
economic significance of innovation.  
Thus, innovation literature mainly focuses on studying innovations that have a significant 
commercial and economic value. The focus of innovation studies was mainly towards 
new product development (NPD) and new ways of production. Terms like “product 
innovation” and “process innovation” have been used to describe those two types of 
innovation (Tidd et al., 2005; Henderson and Clark, 1990). The process innovation refers 
to the introduction of new technologies and machinery into the original production 
process. 
Furthermore, Edquist et al. (2001) recognise that a new way to organise the production 
process is also an important type of innovation, which could have a significant impact on 
economic development. Famous examples include Taylorism in Ford and Lean 
production in Toyota. Therefore, a clearer classification of innovation has been proposed 
(Edquist et al., 2001). In this new classification of innovation, innovation includes 
product and process innovation. Process innovation includes technological process 
innovation and organisational process innovation. Product innovation includes goods 
and service (ibid).  
However, not all innovations have significant economic value even though they are 




product design are commercialised innovations, but their economic value is less likely to 
be high. Therefore, such incremental innovations have not been widely studied in 
innovation studies until recently.  
Fagerberg and Godinho (2005) defines innovation as the initial attempt to introduce a 
new idea into practice. This definition stresses the practical value of innovation instead 
of its economic value. It also suggests that innovation studies should pay more attention 
to understanding how innovations are developed.  
Therefore, the following subsections review the innovation literature on studying the 
source of innovation, characteristics of innovation, and modes of innovation to develop a 
better understanding of how innovations are developed.  
2.2.1 Source of innovation  
Knowledge is widely recognised as the fundamental resource of innovation, and 
interactive learning is the key method to accumulate that knowledge (Dosi, 1988a; 
Lundvall, 1992; Freeman, 1994; Tidd et al., 2005; Lundvall, 2010).  
Knowledge used in innovation could be divided into three groups, namely external (to a 
firm) knowledge, internal (to a firm) knowledge and personal knowledge (Gibbons and 
Johnston, 1974). External knowledge is scientific knowledge acquired from the external 
environment including the purchasing of new product designs, introducing new 
technologies, collaboration with universities and so on. Internal knowledge is information 
managed within the firm including work-related records, blueprints, production manuals 
and so on. Personal knowledge is knowledge possessed by individuals including their 




Based on a study of 30 technological innovations in the UK around the 1970s, Gibbons 
and Johnston (1974) argue that only around 30% of information used in technological 
innovation is external knowledge.  
Subsequently, a decade after Gibbons and Johnston’s work, Pavitt (1984) points out that 
around 60% of knowledge input in technological innovations is from within firms. In 
addition, further research points out that around 40% of innovation activities are outside 
of formal research and development (R&D), especially in mechanical engineering sectors 
(Patel and Pavitt, 1994). Dosi (1988a) and Nelson (2004) also make similar arguments. 
Internal and personal knowledge play crucial roles in innovation because innovation is 
fundamentally a problem-solving activity (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Bessant and Caffyn, 
1997; Jensen et al., 2007). Workers and engineers need to solve problems on a daily basis. 
Therefore, their knowledge repository will constantly update from daily trial-and-error. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that making good use of a company’s internal and 
personal knowledge is critical to successful technological innovations.  
One of the research interests in this thesis is to study how firms could use internal 
knowledge (e.g. production manuals, records, and so forth) and personal knowledge (e.g. 
education, training, experience, and so on.) to improve their innovation capability. To 
study these areas, this research identified a learning approach that focuses on facilitating 
employees to create and learn from internal and personal knowledge within a firm aiming 
to develop its innovation capability. This learning approach is labelled “Bottom-up 
learning (BUL)” and will be discussed comprehensively later in Section 2.3.    
The recognition of the vital role played by internal and personal knowledge in innovation 




External knowledge remains crucial to success in innovation as it provides experience 
from other firms (also from the academic system and government research centres) in 
introducing contemporary technologies, and developing internal and personal knowledge 
(Patel and Pavitt, 1997).   
2.2.2 Mode of innovation 
To understand how innovations are developed within the organisation, Jensen et al. (2007) 
propose two modes of innovation. First, the “science, technology and innovation (STI) 
mode of innovation” (ibid: 680) that is to develop innovations by conducting R&D 
activities, or deliberate purchasing of codified knowledge. Second, the “doing, using and 
interacting (DUI) mode of innovation” (ibid: 680), which is to develop innovations by 
acquiring and accumulating knowledge from conducting daily operations, solving 
problems, operating machinery, and communicating internally between departments and 
externally with other firms and consumers.  
The STI mode of innovation mainly creates new to the world and radical innovations. It 
features a high amount of R&D investment and intensive use of scientific knowledge 
(Jensen et al., 2007) like biology and chemistry in the pharmaceutical industry. Therefore, 
the primary source of the STI mode of innovation is the development of the sciences. 
Indicators of the STI mode of innovation are the intensive R&D activities within firms 
and their collaboration with external research institutes (ibid). For example, the 
pharmaceutical industry spends an enormous amount of investment in laboratories to 
develop new medicines.  
The DUI mode of innovation mainly creates incremental innovations. This mode of 
innovation is critical because Ettlie (1999) argues that the vast majority of modern 




the technological knowledge of how artefacts work (Nelson, 2004). Technological 
knowledge is accumulated from trial-and-error efforts in problem-solving by workers and 
engineers, at work, on a daily basis (Nelson, 2004; Nelson and Winter, 1982).  
Experience and knowledge accumulated at work are mainly tacit, hard to articulate, 
difficult to transfer, easy to lose and highly embedded in the workforce (Freeman and 
Perez, 1988; Smith, 2001; Johnson et al., 2002). Some research reports that about 90% of 
knowledge inside firms are embedded in their workforce (Wah, 2000; Lee, 2000; Smith, 
2001). Moreover, innovation studies widely recognise the importance of knowledge 
developed at work by employees for developing innovations (Gibbons and Johnston, 
1974; Pavitt, 1984; Patel and Pavitt, 1994; Dosi, 1988a; Nelson, 2004). For example, Lam 
(2002; Lam and Lambermont-Ford, 2010) argues that success in using tacit knowledge 
embedded in the workforce is one of the main reasons that explains the excellence of 
Japanese firms in engineering industries. 
The DUI mode of innovation is of particular importance to this research because of its 
strong emphasis on the importance of employees’ knowledge in developing innovations. 
The DUI mode of innovation is an important theoretical base of bottom-up learning for 
innovation (Andersen, 2008; Wei et al., 2011).  
2.2.3 Characteristics of innovations  
The existing innovation literature shows that innovation has four characteristics 
(Fagerberg and Godinho, 2005). Firstly, novelty, the innovation is, to a certain extent, 
new. Secondly, cumulativeness, to innovate, knowledge accumulation is necessary. 
Thirdly, systemic, the process of developing the innovation is systemic (“collective” in 




innovation activities are uncertain. The four characteristics of innovation will be 
discussed further in the following subsections.  
2.2.3.1 Novelty of innovation and importance of incremental innovation 
The novelty of innovation raises debate in economic studies in two admissions. First, the 
level of novelty of innovation. Second, the context of innovation (new to whom).   
In the beginning, some scholars define the innovation as a new product, a new process 
that didn’t exist before, or a new combination of existing components (Freeman, 1982; 
Edquist, 1997; Freeman and Soete, 1997). At this stage, innovation mainly accounts as 
being a radical and new to the world innovation (i.e. electricity and ICT technology). This 
is because economists mainly focus on evaluating the economic significance of an 
innovation to analyse how those innovations contribute to economic growth (Fagerberg 
and Godinho, 2005).  
Therefore, most of the economic studies do not study an incremental innovation, which 
is mainly developed gradually in the production process and in the daily operation of 
organisations (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Examples of incremental innovations include 
improved production equipment, an improved production process, modification to tools, 
modification to existing products, and so on.  
There could be two reasons for the lack of interest in studying incremental innovation. 
First, economists do not consider the incremental innovation to be valuable to economic 
growth (Johnson et al., 2002). Secondly, because the incremental innovation is difficult 
to measure (Fagerberg and Godinho, 2005), being beyond the capability of the economic 




mathematical models, and they are not good at dealing with un-measurable 
(unquantifiable) factors (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
However, it is argued that incremental innovations are equally important as radical 
innovations (Lundvall, 1992) since the technological development following a radical 
innovation is still largely based on continuous incremental innovation in its production 
process and product design (Fagerberg and Godinho, 2005). Back in the 1930s, 
Schumpeter’s work on economic growth also implied this phenomenon, although not 
explicitly. Schumpeter (1939) points out that radical innovation opens a new field of 
continuing improvement, which includes both radical and incremental innovations. 
Subsequently, this proposition is confirmed by Rosenberg (1994) based on the historical 
study of the development process of several industries.   
Before a radical innovation can be used in practice, a series of incremental innovations 
are required in the production and design of the radical innovation (Kline and Rosenberg, 
1986). It demonstrates that the vast majority of innovations in the modern economy are 
incremental innovations (6%-10% are radical innovations) (Ettlie, 1999). Historical 
evidence shows that production efficiency gained from continuous incremental 
innovations is usually much higher in the long run than what can be achieved through 
introducing radical innovation into the production line (Hollander, 1965). Moreover, 
radical innovation also requires the development of related technological fields 
(Fagerberg and Godinho, 2005), and changes in the institution where the innovation is 
embedded (Edquist, 1997; Edquist, 2005; Johnson, 2010). 
Therefore, incremental innovations are crucial to both the economic growth and the 




Another question is to whom the innovation is new. Developing countries generally focus 
on absorption, adaption, and diffusion of technologies imported from industrialised 
countries, so traditional innovation theories, that focus on studying new to the world 
innovations, must adopt the broad meaning of innovation in order to study innovation and 
knowledge creation activities in developing countries (Lall, 2000; Viotti, 2002; Lundvall 
et al., 2009). Therefore, “narrow” and “broad” definitions of innovation have been 
proposed (Lundvall et al., 2009: 3). “Narrow” innovation means new to the world 
innovation (Pack and Westphal, 1986; Kim, 1997; Tidd and Bodley, 2002). Thus, the 
“narrow” definition is applied in studies of developed countries where radical innovations 
are normally developed. “Broad” innovation is what is new to the country or firm (ibid).  
This research adopts the “broad” definition of innovation because this research studies 
China, which is a developing country. Based on the “broad” definition of innovation, 
innovation in this research represents the first attempt to learn, adapt, improve, and diffuse 
existing technologies by subsequent countries and firms.  
The debate around the novelty of innovation is of particular importance for developing 
the concept of bottom-up learning for innovation. This is because the incremental 
innovation, that adapts and improves existing technologies, is the underlying objective of 
the BUL approach (March, 1991; Lam, 2002; Mom et al., 2006; Andersen, 2008; Aoki, 
2008; Wei et al., 2011). Because radical innovation is largely based on advancements in 
science (Dosi, 1988b), it is not likely to be developed by individual employees. However, 
employees could exploit their personally embedded tacit knowledge for developing 
incremental innovations during daily problem-solving processes at work (Andersen, 2008; 
Aoki, 2008; Wei et al., 2011). Due to the cumulative characteristics of innovation, skills 




innovation for firms (Poell and Van der Krogt, 2003; Jensen et al., 2007; Zoghi et al., 
2010; Lorenz and Lundvall, 2010). The cumulativeness of innovation will be further 
discussed in the following subsection.  
2.2.3.2 Cumulativeness of innovation 
The cumulativeness (path-dependency) of innovation describes the evolving process of 
innovation development over time (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1997). The innovation is 
cumulative because the current innovation is usually developed based on other 
innovations that preceded it (Rosenberg, 1994; Pavitt, 1987; Dosi, 1988b).  
Existing literature suggests that the cumulativeness of innovation could be explained from 
two standpoints, namely: 1) the innovation developed in response to a company’s demand 
for change and problem-solving in its daily work, and 2) the cumulative development 
process of innovation based on learning, which is a continuous and cumulative process. 
These two explanations will be further discussed in the following paragraphs.  
Demand for change and problem solving The first standpoint is to understand why 
innovation emerges in relation to the demand for change in product and production 
processes. It points out that innovation emanates from the demands for change, which 
usually arise from encountering problems and failures in current product portfolios and 
production processes, so that firms initiate research activities to find solutions (Andersen, 
1992).  
This topic has been extensively discussed in a book by Nelson and Winter (1982) which 
reveals how creative solutions to problems become organisational routines, and how 




this proposition by pointing out that the innovation process is fundamentally a problem-
solving process. Jensen et al. (2007) also make a similar argument.  
In addition, the need for change could also be triggered by firms’ who are ambitious to 
update existing products and gain efficiency in their production processes through 
introducing new technologies (Andersen, 1992). Another reason for a firm to search for 
innovations will arise from its market position being threatened, which leads to a search 
for new products, more efficient production processes and new markets (ibid). 
It is proposed that the direction of technological innovation is usually guided by the range 
of technical opportunities defined by the characteristics of existing technologies (Pavitt, 
1987; Dosi, 1988b). This is because introducing technical changes into existing setups is 
not a costless process. It requires considerable investment by firms in terms of modifying 
their current technological designs of products and processes, as well as costs to acquire 
new knowledge around new technology for assimilation (Pavitt, 1987; Pavitt, 1999). 
Therefore, a firm’s innovation is usually developed gradually through taking many small 
steps in upgrading its current technology base to avoid sudden and heavy investment. In 
addition, it is also important to introduce new technologies gradually because, Rosenberg 
(1994) proposed, that to understand and to effectively employ currently available 
technology (knowledge), people need to know how certain technology developed, which 
is the technical knowledge around this technology. If firms introduce radical, new 
technology into their production and new product development, they run the risk of 
lacking a sufficient knowledge base to understand and to assimilate the new technology 




Rosenberg (1994) also proposed that ideas for innovations are generated from previously 
accumulated scientific and technological knowledge bases. The knowledge base enabled 
innovators to develop multiple possible utilities or combinations of current technologies, 
within their capabilities (Dosi, 1988b). 
Therefore, firms tend to fulfil the demand for change by searching for alternative 
technologies that are already close to its existing knowledge base (Lundvall, 2010). It is 
because of the assimilation of new technologies, based on its existing competency, that 
can accomplish more in a cheaper and faster manner when compared to introducing 
entirely new technologies that are far from those with which they are familiar (Pavitt, 
1987). They will try to find alternatives far from their knowledge base if they are unable 
to find a satisfactory solution close to what they have already known (Lundvall, 2010).   
Continuous Learning  The second starting point to explain cumulativeness of innovation 
is to understand how innovation is developed. Lundvall (2010) argues that learning is the 
dominant process to acquire knowledge, and knowledge is an essential source for 
innovation (Tidd et al., 2005). In addition, it is argued that innovation is a “ubiquitous 
phenomenon” (Lundvall, 2010: 8) because learning takes place all the time, knowledge 
is accumulated gradually by learning throughout time (Pavitt, 1987; Dosi, 1988b).  
Moreover, the “technological trajectory” theory created by Dosi (1982: 154) proposes 
that the technological trajectory represents a group of potential directions of technology 
development that are not separable from the common technological base shared in one 
sector. This argument suggests that the direction of innovation, especially that of 
technological innovation, is usually guided by the range of technical opportunities defined 




an employee’s daily experience of the present technology influences the direction of their 
technological opportunities regarding research activities (Lundvall, 2010; Tidd et al., 
2005). What is more, the experiences from the shop floor also serve as an important 
source of knowledge for innovation (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Freeman and Perez, 1988; 
Lundvall, 2010; Freeman and Soete, 1997; Tidd et al., 2005). Therefore, the product and 
process innovations that can be developed by firms depend heavily on previous 
achievements (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Pavitt, 1987; Teece, 1988).  
Daily experience is a major knowledge base for innovation acquired from three sources, 
namely “learning by doing” repetitive work to improve efficiency (Arrow, 1962). 
“Learning by using” and operating complex machinery and equipment (Rosenberg, 1982), 
and “learning by interacting” with customers and suppliers (Lundvall et al., 1988). The 
experience embedded in workers is very important because “much of the practice in most 
fields remains only partially understood, and much of the engineering design practice 
involves solutions to problems where professional engineers have learned ‘work’ without 
any particularly sophisticated understanding of why” (Nelson, 2004: 458).  
To sum up, cumulativeness of innovation emphasises the importance of having a 
continuous learning approach, like BUL, that could integrate employees’ experiences and 
knowledge into innovation development. Such a learning approach, which uses 
employees’ experience as one of the primary sources of knowledge, could help the firm 
to develop its technological innovation capability by allowing low-level employees to 
contribute their daily experiences into those processes, such as in creative problem 





The systemic feature of innovation means that innovations are not developed 
independently. Innovation is systemic for two reasons. Firstly, innovation is an outcome 
of interactive learning, which is a collective process, it requires interaction across 
different organisations at sectoral level, and amongst employees at the firm level (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982; Lundvall, 1992; Fagerberg and Godinho, 2005; Tidd et al., 2005; 
Lundvall, 2010). Secondly, innovation is usually generated within a domain of 
intrinsically related technologies, as an accumulation of innovation and “technology 
trajectory” (Dosi, 1982) theory suggested, innovation is usually closely linked to old 
technologies. 
Collective learning  As discussed previously, innovation is the outcome of learning (Dosi, 
1988b; Freeman, 1994; Tidd et al., 2005; Lundvall, 2010). Because learning is a social 
and interactive process, it is difficult to understand it in isolation from its context, whereas 
learning and innovation processes are embedded (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Fagerberg 
and Godinho, 2005; Lundvall, 2010).  
Invention requires sufficient “knowledge, capabilities, skills and resources” (Fagerberg 
and Godinho, 2005: 5) before it transforms into innovation in practice. In addition, the 
process of innovation not only requires the input of technical knowledge regarding 
existing innovations, but also requires a collective effort from various parties (Van de 
Ven et al., 2008). Furthermore, the development of innovation is also highly dependent 
on the characteristics of the technology, the industry (Freeman, 1982), and other causes, 
such as institutions where those innovation activities are located (Johnson, 2010; 




The interrelation between innovation and old technology  Studies of innovation often 
apply a systemic perspective because innovation is also an accumulative process and, 
much of which, gradually emerges from existing interrelated innovations. As suggested 
by the “technological trajectory” theory, the vast majority of new technical advancements 
have inextricable linkages to old ones (Dosi, 1982: 148; Fagerberg and Godinho, 2005; 
Lundvall, 2010: 9). Therefore, to develop a firm’s innovation capability, the firm needs 
to accumulate a sufficient base of scientific and technological knowledge before it can 
either understand new technological innovations in the market, or develop its own 
(Fagerberg, 2005).  
The systemic perspective of innovation is the foundation for national systems of 
innovation (NSI) studies (Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Edquist, 1997). 
The NSI literature primarily studies innovation activities by various actors (organisations) 
(e.g. firm, university, and so on), and relationships amongst actors that are shaped by 
institutions (Lundvall, 2010; Fagerberg and Godinho, 2005; Edquist, 1997; Freeman, 
1987). This group of NSI literature will be discussed in detail later, in Section 2.4.  
The systemic nature of innovation suggests that innovation requires an environment of 
collective learning and a good knowledge base of existing technology. The collective 
learning process is critical since it facilitates learning either from other parties externally, 
or amongst employees internally, to develop a firm’s knowledge base.  
For collective learning amongst employees, it is important to consider who will be 
included in this learning process. In the late 1950s, collective learning from experience 
was already being considered as an important organisational activity that influences a 




on the collective learning process amongst managers. Later in the early 1990s, Best (1990: 
134) suggested “non-managerial” employees should also be included into the collective 
learning process, because the advantage of firms originates from its employees’ 
“teamwork and knowledge creation” based on successful experiences in Japanese firms. 
Furthermore, Lazonick (1990) argues that sustainable competitive advantage is 
determined by a firm’s capability of collective learning at the shop floor level, which is 
critical in the development of knowledge of how to combine and use resources in ways 
that rivals cannot. Thus, it is important to include both management and non-management 
employees in the collective learning process. 
This argument is crucial to justify the BUL approach for developing innovation capability, 
because the BUL approach particularly stresses the demand for involving shop floor 
employees into the knowledge creation and innovation process in firms.  
2.2.3.4 Uncertainty 
During the innovating process, outcomes of research activities are unknown (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1988a). Because the process of innovation has a strong randomness 
within it (Lundvall, 2010), firms tend to avoid heavy investment in R&D due to risk 
avoidance of the decision makers. O'Sullivan (2000) argues that innovation has two types 
of uncertainty. First, “productive uncertainty” which reflects the high risk of making a 
loss on investment in any R&D projects if they fail (ibid: 19). It is because the returns on 
the innovation can only be generated after success has been achieved in such projects. 
Secondly, “competitive uncertainty” which means that although a firm has successfully 
developed innovations, its new outcomes could potentially be outperformed by what 
rivals have developed at the same time (ibid). Therefore, the firm still could not generate 




Although the innovation has inherent risks, it is required for firms to survive, especially 
in a capitalist economy where competition forces firms to develop competitive advantage 
through continuous innovation (Rosenberg, 1992; Freeman, 1995). In a capitalist 
economy, firms constantly face pressure from rivals to improve their product quality and 
lower their production costs (O'Sullivan, 2000).  
Another insight from understanding the uncertain nature of innovation is that firms should 
not rely solely on formal R&D activities to develop innovations. First, the success of any 
formal R&D activities is not guaranteed, but the cost is high. Second, sectors differ in 
their technological base, so some sectors rely more on radical innovation (advancement 
in science), while others rely more on incremental innovation (Pavitt, 1984). Therefore, 
firms need to have different learning approaches according to the characteristics of their 
technological base. For high-tech sectors, such as the pharmaceutical industry, science-
based research in formal R&D projects are more important (O'Sullivan, 2000; Tylecote 
and Ramirez, 2006). However, in mid-high-tech sectors, like the automobile industry, 
innovations are mainly developed from the employees’ learning along with the problem-
solving process (Tylecote and Visintin, 2008; O'Sullivan, 2000).  
Therefore, firms need to have management practices in place to manage and utilise 
employees’ work experience and personal embedded knowledge (mainly in the form of 
tacit knowledge) as a source for innovation, because learning and knowledge creation 
happens all the time but can easily pass unnoticed (Freeman and Perez, 1988). The BUL 




2.2.4 Remarks on the innovation literature 
This section reviews innovation literature in three topics, namely 1) source of innovation, 
2) mode of innovation, and 3) characteristics of innovation. A review of innovation 
literature shows three research gaps.  
It is found from the literature that the importance of incremental innovation has been 
widely recognised by scholars, especially in the study of engineering sectors. This finding 
underpins one of the research interests in this thesis, that of promoting the bottom-up 
learning (BUL) approach, which aims mainly to develop incremental innovations in 
engineering sectors.   
Moreover, it is found in the literature that engineering sectors primarily rely on the DUI 
mode of innovation. This mode of innovation mainly produces incremental innovations 
using technological knowledge about how artefacts work. It is also found that 
technological knowledge develops, primarily, through problem-solving activities at work 
by workers and engineers and on a daily basis. This finding shows that the BUL, which 
aims to facilitate interactive learning amongst employees and encourages creative 
problem-solving activities on the shop floor, is an appropriate learning approach for 
sectors that rely on incremental innovations in the production process and in product 
design.  
In the next section, the literature on bottom-up learning will be reviewed to define this 




2.3 Bottom-Up Learning for Innovation  
The concept of “bottom-up learning” (BUL) proposed in this paper is defined as: 
knowledge creation, learning and sharing activities by shop floor employees to produce 
creative solutions to problems, or to develop process and product innovation. 
This definition is developed based on summarising existing literature (March, 1991; 
Bessant and Caffyn, 1997; Lam, 2002; Mom et al., 2006; Andersen, 2008; Høyrup, 2010; 
Wei et al., 2011; Lee and Walsh, 2016) relevant to this topic, all of which will be 
discussed in detail in the Section 2.3.1.6.  
Section 2.3.1 reviews the literature on the importance of BUL in firms’ innovation process 
to discover the theoretical foundation of BUL. Based on this selection of literature, the 
concept of BUL will be defined for further analysis in this research. Section 2.3.2 reviews 
literature from four disciplines including knowledge management (KM), organisational 
learning (OL), human research management (HRM), and operation management (OM) to 
identify BUL practices. Section 2.3.3 discusses the literature that studied the interplay 
between BUL and the innovation capability of firms. Section 2.3.4 draws insight from the 
literature to guide the empirical investigation in this research of studying BUL in firms.  
2.3.1 Define Bottom-up learning 
As discussed in Section 2.2.1 the personal knowledge repository of employees is a major 
source of innovation (Gibbons and Johnston, 1974; Pavitt, 1984; Bessant et al., 1994; 
Bessant and Caffyn, 1997). Advocates of this argument state that developing a receptive 
environment for employees to actively propose suggestions on product and process 
innovation is a key approach to improve firms’ innovation performance (March, 1991; 
Bessant and Caffyn, 1997; Lam, 2002; Mom et al., 2006; Andersen, 2008; Høyrup, 2010; 




approach from various angles, they used different terms. Terms used in the BUL literature 
are summarised in Table 2-1.  
Table 2-1: Summary of terms used in the BUL literature 
Author/s Year Term Focus of research Background 
March 1991 Exploitive 
innovation 
Develop innovation using 
internal resources and 







Involve all employees in 
continuous improvement 
events to develop 
incremental innovations in 
a costless manner.  
Operation 
management 
Lam 2002 J-form 
organisation 
Innovation developed from 
collective problem-
solving. Disseminate 
personal knowledge across 
workforce to develop 





Mom et al. 2006 Bottom-up 
knowledge 
inflow 
Use suggestions from 
employees to identify 
innovation opportunities to 
develop product and 
process innovation.  
Strategy 
Anderson 2008 Bottom-up 
perspective 
on innovation 
Develop innovation by 
recombining existing 
resources, knowledge, and 
capabilities within the 
firm.  
Organisational 




Incremental and radical 
innovations developed by 
employees at work 
through the DUI mode of 
innovation.  
HRM 




Information gathered from 
shop floor employees for 
managers to identify 






Innovation based on the 





The summary of BUL related literature shows that scholars studied the topic of utilising 




literature could be identified based on their disciplines, namely strategic management, 
knowledge management (KM), organisational learning (OL), human resource 
management (HRM), and operation management (OM). These five groups of BUL 
literature will be discussed in the following sub-sections.  
2.3.1.1 Bottom-up learning in strategic management    
The strategy of firms is defined by Nelson (1991: 61-74) as “the set of broad commitments 
made by a firm that defines and rationalises its objectives and how it intends to pursue 
them”. Following his argument, the strategy has a profound influence on the development 
of innovation activities in the firms. It is because the strategy determines where firms 
invest their resources and how resources are allocated to different innovation activities 
(O'Sullivan, 2000).  
Aiming to address the dilemma of allocating a limited resource into refining existing 
competence or exploring new technology, March (1991) proposed the concept of 
exploitation – refining and improving current competence to develop incremental 
innovation, and exploration – searching for and experimenting with new technologies to 
develop more radical innovations. It is suggested that firms need to exploit current 
competence to maintain competitiveness in the short-term, whilst at the same time, 
exploring new technological opportunities for long-term survival (March, 1991; O'Reilly 
and Tushman, 2013). However, being an ambidextrous organisation that masters both 
exploitation and exploration is not an easy task for firms, as it requires sufficient capacity 
to carry out structural changes to be able to embrace new technologies (Tushman and 
O'Reilly III, 1996).  
O'Reilly and Tushman (2013) suggested that in order to develop ambidexterity, structural 




al. (1997) and Teece (2007). Dynamic capability theory argues that firms’ competitive 
advantage depends on their capability to restructure an existing resource or to develop 
new capabilities to address rapid changes in technology and customer demand (Teece et 
al., 1997; Teece, 2007). It has been argued that firms maintain their competitiveness 
through exploitation at an early stage and transform towards exploration at a later stage 
(O'Reilly and Tushman, 2013). Two major approaches for firms to develop ambidextrous 
capability have been proposed (ibid).  
First, the structural change approach – firm maintains current competitiveness and 
achieves flexibility to adapt to market and technological changes through introducing new 
management structures/practices, such as decentralisation, to form autonomous 
innovative sub-units to encourage experimentation with new technologies (Eisenhardt 
and Martin, 2000; Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2003; O'Reilly and Tushman, 2013).  
Second, the cultural change approach - firm maintains current competitiveness and 
achieves flexibility to adapt to market and technological changes through developing an 
organisational culture that encourages risk taking and decision making in improving old 
work routines and introduces small-scale, new technologies at individual (worker) level 
(Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). In this approach, the culture of firms allows individuals, 
rather than innovative sub-units as mentioned in the structural approach, to make the 
choice between exploitation and exploration at work (O'Reilly and Tushman, 2013). The 
Toyota Production System is an excellent illustration of the cultural change approach to 
ambidexterity as it develops a widely shared culture within the firm that encourages 
workers to become increasingly competent in routinised tasks (exploitation), at the same 





Both the structural change approach and the cultural change approach toward building 
ambidextrous firms emphasises the importance of the transformation of the firm from a 
top-down, centralised, decision-making system, to a more bottom-up, decentralised 
decision-making system. In the structural change approach, decision-making and risk-
taking, when engaging in new technological fields, are delegated from top management 
to innovation sub-units. Therefore, the innovation outcome, either those radical 
innovations from exploitation. or incremental innovations from exploitation, generated 
by the innovative sub-unit at the lower level of the firm, will eventually feedback to firm 
level. In the cultural change approach, the power endowment went even further down to 
the level of the individual, which allows everyone to actively engage in exploration within 
his, or her, competence at work.  
Individuals are limited from carrying out too much exploration and are unable to make 
any significant changes in the firm due to their lack of expertise in any new technological 
fields, and any power they might otherwise have is handicapped by their low ranking in 
the firm. In this situation, sufficient training for the workforce in any new technological 
fields, and having supportive top management who can provide legitimacy for change, 
are critical in ambidextrous firms (O'Reilly and Tushman, 2013).  
To sum up, in order to develop innovation capability through exploitation and exploration, 
firms need to delegate decision-making for making change to the lower levels of 
organisation.   
However, one drawback of the strategic management literature is that it only provides 
abstract suggestions stating that structural and cultural changes are needed to develop 




change (O'Reilly and Tushman, 2013). How do firms manage to solve the conflict 
between exploitative and exploratory activities? What resources are required for 
developing exploitative (incremental) and exploratory (radical) innovations? Answers to 
these questions are found mainly in the strategic literature. Therefore, the literature 
concerning knowledge management (KM) and organisational learning (OL) needs to be 
explored in the next sub-section, because knowledge is the key resource for innovation 
(Dosi, 1988b; Lundvall, 1992; Freeman, 1994; Tidd et al., 2005). KM and OL research 
precisely studies how knowledge is developed, shared and managed within firms.  
2.3.1.2 Bottom-up learning in Knowledge Management  
Knowledge management (KM) does not have a unified definition amongst academics. It 
is usually described in a variety of ways across many papers. Several papers define KM 
as a series of knowledge acquiring, developing, managing, diffusing and applying 
activities (Coombs and Hull, 1998; Probst et al., 1999; Alavi and Leidner, 2001). Some 
researchers consider knowledge as an asset and try to maximize the return from it (Wiig, 
1997).  Davenport and Prusak (1998) pointed out that KM aims to process knowledge and 
makes it available to people who need it (King, 2009) and facilitate the exploration and 
exploitation of the knowledge repository (Swan et al., 1999). Although many definitions 
of KM exist, various definitions of KM propose some common features of the KM 
process that are the creation, storage and diffusion of knowledge within the organisation.  
In addition, the linkage between successful KM practice and strong innovative 
capabilities of firms have been found in much research through quantitative methods 
(March, 1991; López-Nicolás and Meroño-Cerdán, 2011; Cantner et al., 2011) and 
qualitative case studies (Hoegl and Schulze, 2005). However, most of the studies that 




increase the efficiency of knowledge utilisation during innovation development. They 
consider KM practices as the main tool for sharing knowledge, but fail to recognise such 
KM practices could also facilitate the generation of innovative ideas at the individual 
level through BUL. As discussed previously, personal knowledge and internal (within the 
firm) knowledge are the largest components of knowledge used in successful innovation 
(Gibbons and Johnston, 1974; Pavitt, 1984; Dosi, 1988b; Nelson, 2004). It is important 
to encourage employees to actively explore their personal and internal knowledge base 
and to come up with creative solutions to problems or ideas for new products, in which 
case the knowledge management practice plays a critical role in allowing for efficient 
knowledge sharing and utilisation. Therefore, in this research, KM is recognised as a 
critical tool for developing bottom-up learning for innovation in firms. In addition, KM 
theories also provide a strong theoretical background for bottom-up learning for 
innovation by identifying what types of KM approach promote knowledge sharing and 
utilisation at the individual level, and also promote innovation. 
Based on Hansen et al. (1999), two approaches to KM could be distinguished. The first 
approach is the codification strategy (ibid) (the system-oriented approach in Choi and 
Lee, 2003). This approach focuses very much on using explicit knowledge (Davenport 
and Völpel, 2001; López-Nicolás and Meroño-Cerdán, 2011) and the intensive use of 
information technology (IT), the technology (Martini and Pellegrini, 2005) to extract 
knowledge from its developer and to carefully codify and sort it into a database for other 
members to use (Armstrong, 2006). The second approach is personalisation strategy 
(Hansen et al., 1999) (the human-oriented approach in  Choi and Lee, 2003). This 
approach is more concerned with the use and sharing of tacit knowledge (Davenport and 




conversations or face-to-face meetings, are the main methods of sharing knowledge in 
this setting. Knowledge seekers are encouraged to make direct contact with the original 
knowledge developer through formal (i.e. meeting, workshop, etc.) and informal (i.e. 
organisation’s day out, personal relationships, etc.) events (Armstrong, 2006).  
Choi and Lee (2003) have proposed another two types of KM approach, which is the 
passive approach and the dynamic approach. The Passive approach simply means no 
formal knowledge management system has been applied in the firm. A dynamic approach 
is a combination of system-oriented and human-oriented approaches in order to balance 
the use of codified and tacit knowledge within the organisation for better effectiveness of 
knowledge management (Piorkowski et al., 2013). It is found that the dynamic approach 
produces the best innovation performance over any other KM approaches (Choi and Lee, 
2003). The dynamic approach by Choi and Lee (2003) is developed based on the dynamic 
spiral of knowledge creation developed by Nonaka (1994), which transfers knowledge 
from tacit to explicit and back to new tacit knowledge through a continuously improving 
and refining process.  
The book The Knowledge Creating Company by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) is based 
on case studies of successful Japanese engineering and manufacturing firms in the 1970s 
and 1980s. The most famous model in this book is the knowledge creating spiral model 
(Armstrong, 2006), which explains how Japanese firms successfully transfer personal 
embedded tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge shared by others and creates new tacit 
knowledge after an internalisation process (“learning-by-doing”) (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 





Illustration 2-1: Knowledge creation spiral  
 
Source: Adapted from Nonaka, 1994 
 
The “spiral model of knowledge creation” contains four steps to convert knowledge 
(Nonaka, 1994: 15) (as shown in Illustration 2-1). Firstly, tacit knowledge is shared with 
others still in tacit form through the socialisation process. This idea is developed based 
on organisational cultural studies (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). In addition, this 
socialisation process is mainly in the form of informal events (Hoegl and Schulze, 2005) 
that encourage face-to-face interaction between employees to transfer tacit knowledge. 
At this stage, knowledge is transferred through direct “observation, imitation and 
practices” with other members of the organisation (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995: 69) like 
apprenticeships and on-the-job training.  
The second step is to convert tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge through the 
conceptualisation of ideas into language. In this way, employees are forced to express the 
ideas in their minds using words to articulate the tacit knowledge. This stage could have 
serious problems in low-context countries where the language expresses precise meaning 
























However, in high context countries like Japan and China, much hidden meaning exists 
behind what has been said (ibid). This is one of the main reasons why Japanese firms 
successfully conceptualise their personal tacit knowledge into personal explicit 
knowledge through using metaphors and analogies to describe the ideas they have in mind 
(Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). The key challenge here is to ensure that the learner 
understands what the storyteller is saying by having a shared mental model amongst 
employees (ibid).  
The third step is to share explicit knowledge amongst organisation members and to further 
improve the value of it by a combination process. Combination process means an 
employee combines explicit knowledge from various sources or domains to create a 
working solution for the problem encountered (ibid). This step would facilitate 
incremental innovations by combining any existing knowledge in a new way to produce 
creative solutions to a problem.  
The final step is to link explicit knowledge acquired to the learner’s tacit knowledge base 
through internalisation. Consequently, new tacit knowledge is produced at work via 
learning-by-doing and is transferred through socialisation (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995: 
69), which also starts another round of the knowledge creation spiral.  
In the Knowledge Creation Spiral, knowledge is shared in multiple ways at various stages. 
It ensures that knowledge is neither possessed by individuals nor top managers, but 
collectively owned by all members of the organisation.  
This model emphasises the importance of exploiting the tacit knowledge on the shop floor 
and using it for further product and process innovation. Given this, the Knowledge 




innovation in the way that it proposes a way of utilising shop floor knowledge to benefit 
a firms’ innovative performance, instead of purely focusing on using formal R&D to 
develop innovation.  
The review of KM literature provides two implications to this research. First, the literature 
suggests that firms need to have a dynamic KM system to have the best innovation 
performance by utilising both explicit and tacit knowledge (Choi and Lee, 2003). Thus, 
firms should not overwhelmingly rely on a codification strategy, which mainly uses and 
produces explicit knowledge. Instead, the firm should also pay more attention to adopting 
practices that encourage the creation and sharing of tacit knowledge through adding a 
personalisation strategy to their KM system. Second, firms need to encourage and manage 
the creation and sharing of personal embedded tacit knowledge to make it collectively 
embedded in the firm. This allows firms to retain and exploit their precious tacit 
knowledge base, which is the key to the excellence of the Japanese in engineering sectors 
(Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). Thus, firms need to have KM tools to facilitate personal 
interaction and face-to-face learning to help the individual employee to share tacit 
knowledge to other workers.   
2.3.1.3 Bottom-up learning in Organisational learning  
According to King (2009), organisational learning (OL) and knowledge management 
(KM) studies are complementary to one another. It proposes that KM aims to ensure that 
knowledge-related assets are well managed and deployed in such a way as to achieve the 
best efficiency of knowledge transfer (King, 2009), while OL is an extension of KM by 
studying how to ensure what has been learnt becomes organisational (collective) 
knowledge shared by members of an organisation to guide their behaviours (Levitt and 




knowledge within an organisation, but OL focuses more on the process of knowledge 
sharing amongst members of the organisation (Easterby-Smith and Lyles, 2003). 
Various literature on organisational learning has studied how management styles 
(organisational structure) affect the innovative capability of the company. Leading work 
in this area include Lorenz and Lundvall’s work on measuring the creativeness of 
European countries (Lorenz and Lundvall, 2010; Arundel et al., 2007), Lam’s works on 
knowledge sharing and organisational learning (Lam, 2000; Lam, 2005; Lam and 
Lambermont-Ford, 2010).  
With the development and wide diffusion of the Japanese management style, the linkage 
between organisational forms and innovation became a popular topic in management 
studies. Various research has been conducted in order to reveal the relationship between 
how companies are managed and how innovative they are. In general, the work by Lorenz, 
Lundvall and Lam proposes four types of organisational structures based on work by 
Mintzberg (1979) and Mintzberg (1993).  
The first type is the “Machine Bureaucratic” form of organisation (Lam, 2000: 494), 
which standardises and specialises work having clear job design and routines (Arundel et 
al., 2007) to achieve efficiency in production (Lam, 2000). This form of organisation aims 
to minimise the disruption from its environment and its employees since all tasks are pre-
set and the only role of the workers is to follow the code-book (Mintzberg, 1979). 
Therefore, this form of organisation relies heavily on codified knowledge and stores it 
centrally within the management structure, then develops standardised and shared 
routines across the organisation (Bonora Elda and Revang, 1993). However, because of 




information in tacit knowledge is lost during the codification process (Lam, 2000). Not 
all information is codifiable, and not all the codified knowledge can be understood by 
subsequent users of that knowledge (Johnson et al., 2002). In addition, because this form 
of organisation is designed to minimise the influence of the employee, workers’ opinions 
and creativeness are not encouraged as they pose potential disruption to the efficiency of 
production. Therefore, these organisations are criticised as not having a high level of 
employee involvement and are not innovative, thus are only suitable for low-tech sectors 
such as the textile industry (Lorenz  and Lundvall, 2010).  
The second form is the “Professional Bureaucratic” organisation (Lam, 2000: 494). This 
features relatively high levels of autonomy for the employee at work, but their jobs are 
still governed by routine and professional standards (Arundel et al., 2007). Employees in 
this type of organisation usually have a high level of professional qualification, such as a 
degree in law, before joining the company. Thus, their behaviours are normally regulated 
by professional, standardised routines, despite any other managerial roles of their 
employers (Lam, 2000). Examples of this form of organisation could be professional 
consultancy companies in law, accounting and so on. Employees in this type of company 
are highly flexible as long as they follow general routines (e.g. the paperwork) because 
the content of their work is solving problems based on their professional knowledge and 
according to a client’s requirement, which is rarely the same each time. Therefore, they 
have a relatively high chance of developing new knowledge due to this extensive and 
continual problem solving (ibid). Although there are great opportunities for those 
employees to develop new knowledge through daily work, there are issues with 
centralising and sharing that knowledge, especially tacit knowledge. This is because their 




and this non-standardised (tacit) knowledge is difficult to share directly with others (ibid). 
Consequently, this type of organisation is not that innovative because a large amount of 
knowledge is kept to the employee, which is not going to help the organisation as a whole 
to improve its innovativeness. Companies would easily lose their knowledge repository 
if key employees left.  
The third form of organisation is the “Operating Adhocracy”, in which the company 
forms temporary teams based largely on the nature of the assigned project (Lam, 2000: 
494; Lam and Lambermont-Ford, 2010). This type of organisation usually has a much 
more level management hierarchy, so employees have more autonomy in the problem-
solving process (Lam, 2000). In addition, because the team is composed of many experts 
with a mixture of skills and backgrounds, they are capable of solving problems 
collectively with their spread of expertise (Lam, 2000; Arundel et al., 2007). In 
comparison to the former two types of organisation, operating adhocracy organisations 
are more creative because their employees are given a higher degree of autonomy to 
experiment with their own ideas to accomplish the project. Also, because they work in 
project teams, they would have interactions with other team members. Consequently, 
those interactions between team members and the creative trial-and-error activities could 
see the development of a great deal of tacit knowledge (Lam and Lambermont-Ford, 
2010). However, that knowledge is hardly retained because the project teams will be 
dismissed at the end of each project (Lam, 2000). To sum up, the operating adhocracy 
form of organisation is very creative because of its interactive problem solving by team 
members with a range of expertise. However, a significant amount of tacit knowledge is 
lost because the project team will be dismissed team after the project is completed (ibid). 




small contractors to work together on a large project. After the project is finished the 
contactors will leave. 
The fourth type of organisation, which is also the most important one for the engineering 
sector, is the J-form (Japanese form) organisation proposed by Lam (2000, 2005, 2010). 
The knowledge base of the J-form organisation is stored across different task teams, 
which are formed by members having diverse functional capabilities. It is slightly similar 
to the operating adhocracy organisation that has different teams. However, the J-form 
organisation manages to maintain its valuable tacit knowledge. In the J-form organisation, 
knowledge is not held by individuals or by the central management hierarchy.  
The knowledge has been transformed into shared values, cultural, common sense and 
routines widely shared across the entire organisation (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Lam, 
2000). It is achieved by making employees work in different divisions to solve problems 
interactively with team members to create and absorb knowledge (both codified and tacit) 
and then return to their original positions after they have finished the ad hoc project (ibid). 
Thus, the tacit knowledge, which is usually possessed by individuals, is transformed into 
shared tacit knowledge in the J-form organisation, even though it may not remain 
codifiable. In addition, the life-long employment in Japan enables the company to retain 
the knowledge base for later use (Johnson  et al., 2002). Because the J-form organisation 
specialises in generating tacit knowledge through daily problem solving and the DUI 
mode of innovation, it outperforms other forms of organisations in developing continuous 
incremental innovation through improving its old knowledge repository (Lam, 2000). It 
is one of the main reasons why Japanese companies excel in the engineering sector 




This is due to the continuous improvement in product design, production processes and 
quality that are crucial in the engineering sector.  
Both Operating Adhocracy and J-form organisations use multi-disciplinary teams at work. 
The difference is that team members in the J-form organisations will remain in the firm 
after the team is dismissed. Whilst teams functioning in an operating adhocracy rely on 
temporary teams of experts who will leave the firm after the project ends.  
From the review of the OL literature, it is found that the superior capability of the J-form 
organisation in creating, utilising and managing employees’ knowledge is of particular 
interest in this research.  
Although this area of the literature did not focus particularly on studying “bottom-up” 
issues. However, how firms utilise knowledge from their employees and what the impact 
is on the creation of codified and tacit knowledge, is an important part of the research 
objectives. Therefore, this area of literature provides theoretical support for understanding 
how and why BUL works in firms. It also helps with rationalising the importance to adopt 
BUL as an important part of a firm’s knowledge creation and innovation activities. J-form 
organisations have a special advantage in creating tacit knowledge, and further retain this 
part of knowledge for future use (Lam, 2000, 2002, 2005).  
Because tacit knowledge is difficult to transfer into explicit knowledge, J-form 
organisations transfer individual tacit knowledge into collective tacit knowledge by 
letting workers solve problems in teams so that they might develop shared norms amongst 
the workers (ibid). Then those workers rotate to other groups to allow other parts of the 
organisation to learn from them, thus enabling them to learn what has been developed in 




Since bottom-up innovation requires active employee engagement in problem-solving, 
and creation and use of tacit knowledge, the J-form organisation would be the most 
favourable form of management style that promotes the development of BUL for 
innovation. This is because the J-form organisation could not only encourage knowledge 
creation, but also retain it and use it for improving products or for refining production 
processes. Although, professional bureaucratic and operating adhocracy organisations 
encourage tacit knowledge creation through problem solving in a similar way to the J-
form organisation, these two types of organisation fail to maintain and utilise that 
knowledge in their daily operations.    
However, the J-form organisation also has its limitations because it is not suitable for 
firms in high-tech sectors.  
As discussed earlier in Section 2.2.2, sectors rely on different forms of knowledge and 
different modes of innovation. High-tech sectors primarily rely on explicit scientific 
knowledge, whilst mid-high-tech sectors rely more on tacit and technological knowledge. 
Therefore, the J-form organisation is preferred in engineering sectors, which are mostly 
mid-high-tech sectors.  
However, the J-form organisation has limited capability to develop radical innovations. 
The J-form organisation relies primarily on tacit knowledge created by employees at work. 
In addition, it uses lifetime employment as a tool to retain its knowledge base. These types 
of organisation may have a superior performance in innovation when the technological 
base of their sector is relatively stable. In an environment where technology evolves 




As discussed in Section 2.3.1.1, firms need to develop a dynamic capability to respond to 
rapid change in the industrial environment (Teece et al., 1997; Teece, 2007) otherwise 
they will lose their competitive advantage. With a large amount of knowledge embedded 
within the workforce, and using lifetime employment to retain its knowledge base, a J-
form organisation is likely to be rigid in structure and therefore is not capable of coping 
with rapid change in the knowledge base of its sector. For example, electric vehicle 
technology poses a significant threat to conventional car manufacturers because the 
underlining technology of the automobile sector is shifting from the internal combustion 
engine to electronic motors. These two technologies depend on different scientific 
knowledge bases, which could make the embedded knowledge of J-form car 
manufacturers obsolete.   
2.3.1.4 Bottom-up learning in Human Resource Management  
The HRM literature stresses the importance of the role played by employees in innovation. 
It is argued that because the key contributor of BUL is the workers, how workers are 
managed and supported by top managers has a direct impact on the effectiveness of the 
bottom-up learning process (Kesting and Parm Ulhøi, 2010; Høyrup, 2010). 
As discussed in various sections before this, the core foundation of innovation is learning, 
which is knowledge creation within the workforce (Dosi, 1988; Lundvall, 1992/2010; 
Freeman, 1994; Tidd, Bessant and Pavitt, 2005). This points out that any technological 
innovation of firms is mainly developed internally by employees who, effectively, learn 
at work (Pavitt, 1990; Li et al., 2006). Building an active learning environment inevitably 
requires high involvement of employees in the innovation process which is the foundation 




Employee involvement and participation in general means to also increase the level of 
employee involvement in decision making (Doeringer et al., 2003; Lorenz and Wilkinson, 
2003; Armstrong, 2006) and gives workers more autonomy in the workplace (Lorenz and 
Lundvall, 2010; Lam, 2000; Lam and Lambermont-Ford, 2010). It is widely considered 
as a practice to improve the innovation capability of the company (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
1995; Lam, 2000; Doeringer et al., 2003; Lorenz and Wilkinson, 2003; Armstrong, 2006; 
Lam and Lambermont-Ford, 2010; Lorenz and Lundvall, 2010).   
However, a high involvement of employees and power endowment to them does not mean 
employees could disregard a company’s overall plan in their technology development. 
Delegating power to employees without an appropriate level of management control 
would result in disorder of the firm’s operation. Doeringer et al. (2003) argue that high 
levels of delegation decrease the efficiency of the firm because employees’ decisions can 
disrupt the normal production process. This argument has two implications.  
First, employee involvement and power delegation are essential to improve employees’ 
engagement in innovation activities. It is the goal of BUL to promote knowledge creation 
and interactive learning on the shop floor.  
Second, management control over BUL is necessary. Similar to the argument made by 
Doeringer et al. (2003) and Wei et al. (2011) argue that BUL has a reverted U shape 
influence on the firm’s innovation performance. Having some BUL increases the firm’s 
innovation performance, but having too much BUL will have the opposite effect.  
Therefore, it is reasonable to propose that an appropriate level of management control 





2.3.1.5 Bottom-up learning in Operations Management 
Japanese Kaizen (also known as continuous improvement in Western literature) is a very 
popular topic in operations management in the 1990s (Bessant et al., 1994). It is a very 
important management tool in Toyota Production System (TPS) (Ohno, 1988) as it is 
dedicated to involving all members of a company to make continuous changes to 
production processes and the working environment in order to reduce production costs, 
to improve production efficiency, to increase the quality of its products (Imai, 1986) and 
ultimately to learn from daily failures in order to develop innovation (Kajiwara, 2002; 
Aoki, 2008). In addition, because correcting past mistakes involves searching for 
solutions through testing new possibilities (March, 1991), learning from past failures aims 
to improve existing processes or products is the spirit of Kaizen when pursuing innovation 
(Aoki, 2008).  
As mentioned previously, Kaizen activities involve all members of the company to make 
an effort concerning continuous improvement (Imai, 1986; Bessant et al., 1994). It 
includes senior managers making front-line operators develop solutions to improve 
production efficiency or to eliminate waste through enforcing discipline, which is a top-
down fashion of management in nature (Bessant et al., 1994). It also includes bottom-up 
activities, which when initiated by operators, by reporting possible improvements to their 
superiors, for example, the re-designing of tools or adjusting machines, which may lead 
to changes if agreed by managers. It has been pointed out that top-down style Kaizen 
activities serve as guidelines to make sure improvement solutions align with company 
goals, whilst bottom-up self-reporting improvement opportunities by operators are the 




Kaizen procedures should include a balanced top-down and bottom-up fashion of 
problem-solving (ibid). 
However, a strong contextual limitation has been noticed when Western companies are 
trying to copy Kaizen practices from successful Japanese companies to integrate with 
their own management systems (Bateman and David, 2002; Bessant et al., 1994; 
Doeringer et al., 2003). This problem not only appears in countries that have great cultural 
differences like the UK and the US, but also exists in countries that have a similar culture, 
historically, like China.  
China and Japan are often placed into the Eastern countries group for having distinctive 
culture to the Western countries group represented by European countries and the United 
States (Pakdil and Leonard, 2017; Begley and Tan, 2001; Ronen and Shenkar, 1985). 
However, countries within each group also have distinctive cultures from each other 
(Triandis et al., 1990). According to a study by Ralston et al. (1997), China and Japan are 
only similar at the societal culture level as both being collectivist countries, but 
significantly different at the individual ideological level where the Japanese are 
individualist and the Chinese are collectivist.  
The distinction between individualist and collectivist cultures is widely used by scholars 
in cultural studies, for example, Hofstede (1984) and Triandis et al. (1988). An 
individualist culture is reflected by a high degree of self-reliance at the societal level, and 
less concern for others at the individual level, whilst a collectivist culture is represented 
by a high level of group support at the society level, and concern for others at the 





Illustration 2-2: Comparison of cultures of Japan, China, USA and Russia 
 
Source: Adapted from Ronen and Shenkar (1985) 
Ralston et al. (1997) point out that because the Japanese are individualistic at the 
individual level, they can easily propose critical suggestions to superiors without 
worrying that such activities could lead other co-workers to feel that they are being 
criticised or penalised. Moreover, because the Japanese have less concern for others’ 
feelings, they are also more open to change (ibid).  People with an individualistic culture 
are more open to change because they are encouraged to pursue their own interest 
regardless of the cost of such activity to others (Schwartz, 1992). This is a crucial reason 
as to why Japanese firms have been successful in implementing Kaizen practices. The 
Japanese are more open to change, and are not afraid of proposing suggestions to make 
such changes (Aoki, 2008).  
On the contrary, the Chinese are collectivistic at the individual level so they are reluctant 
to propose suggestions to superiors to avoid hurting the feelings of co-workers, and are 
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also unwilling to change existing work (Ralston et al., 1997; Aoki, 2008). Therefore, 
although China and Japan have a similar culture at the societal level, some Japanese firms 
find it very difficult to implement Kaizen practices successfully in their subsidiaries in 
China (Aoki, 2008).   
A case study research by Aoki (2008) on how Japanese parent companies transfer their 
Kaizen practices in China points out that most of those Chinese subsidiaries only involve 
members from the management level into Kaizen activities, instead of involving all 
members. Thus, Kaizen in China is conducted only in a top-down fashion. This is because 
the Chinese front-line operators, in general, do not have initiatives in place to report 
improvement possibilities to their superior manager, unless a significant amount of 
management effort associated with motivating, rewarding and disciplining measures are 
employed (Aoki, 2008).  
Therefore, from previously discussed Kaizen studies, it is evident that the top-down style 
of management is relatively easy to copy across contexts. However, having bottom-up 
Kaizen initiatives amongst operators is the key to successful Kaizen procedures, which is 
the key to Toyota’s success in its TPS (Aoki, 2008).  
It is reasonable to doubt that Chinese firms have adopted BUL strategies, given that it is 
so difficult to promote Chinese employees to actively participate in bottom-up learning 
activities based on the case study by Aoki (2008) in China.  
2.3.1.6 Define Bottom-up learning in this research 






Table 2-2: Summary of definitions of BUL in literature 
Author/s Year Terms of BUL Definition of Term 
March 1991 Exploitive 
innovation 
Develop innovation using internal resources and 




1997 High involvement 
innovation 
Innovation developed from continuous 
improvement activities with the involvement of 
all employees.  
 
Mom et al. 2006 Bottom-up 
knowledge inflow 
Use suggestions from employees to identify 
innovation opportunities to develop product and 
process innovation.  
 
Anderson 2008 Bottom-up 
perspective on 
innovation 
Develop innovation by recombining existing 
resources, knowledge, and capabilities within the 
firm.  
Høyrup 2010 Employee-driven 
innovation 
Incremental and radical innovations developed 
by employees at work through the DUI mode of 
innovation.  
 
Wei et al. 2011 Bottom-up learning  Information gathered from shop floor employees 





2016 Non-R&D learning Innovation based on the knowledge develop at 
work through problem-solving  
As can be seen from  
Table 2-2, BUL has been defined in various ways. By summarising the literature, the 
concept of “bottom-up learning” (BUL) in this paper is defined as:  
Definition of Bottom-up Learning: 
Knowledge creation, learning and sharing activities by shop floor employees to 
produce creative solutions to problems, or to develop process and product innovation. 
 
2.3.2 BUL practices 
Because the concept of BUL is a recent notion, it has yet to be operationalised by 
academics. Therefore, this research tries to identify BUL practice from relevant KM, OL, 




2.3.2.1 BUL practices in Knowledge Management  
A review of the strategy and KM literature underpins the importance of having BUL in 
firms to develop innovation capability. Reviews on the KM literature further suggest that 
BUL relies on creating, learning and sharing tacit knowledge within the workforce.   
Based on Hoegl and Schulze (2005), several KM practices could be identified that 
promote BUL.  
The first KM practice (ibid) is the informal event. This method is meant to encourage 
informal conversation and build personal relationships amongst employees to facilitate 
tacit knowledge transfer during or after the event (ibid). It is pointed out that personal and 
informal conversation is an effective way to facilitate active tacit knowledge transfer 
(Leonard and Sensiper, 1998). An example of a successful case using this practice is 
Phonak, a world leading hearing instruments manufacturer, who organises various 
companies to attend a paid group event, like a day trip, to encourage employees to get to 
know each other and to build a strong personal network for knowledge sharing at a later 
stage (Hoegl and Schulze, 2005). A personal network is an essential knowledge base of 
“know-how” – i.e. personal connections with people who have the expertise (Jensen et 
al., 2007), which is crucial for knowledge seekers (i.e. shop level workers who have 
initiatives to modify the current product design) to find the right person with the right 
skill. A good personal relationship amongst employees will also increase the possibility 
of the skilled workers’ willingness to share their knowledge with others. This type of 
knowledge sharing culture based on a personal network would be an ideal environment 
to foster bottom-up learning for innovation. However, this practice requires a huge 




Therefore, firms may not organise such events very frequently, which could be 
complemented by using the second KM practice.  
The second KM practice is expert mapping. This KM practice produces a database that 
serves as a “yellow pages” to allow knowledge seekers to search for the people with the 
desired expertise (Hoegl and Schulze, 2005; Armstrong, 2006) in order to build contact 
with them to ask for help with solving problems in their daily work, or for realising certain 
new ideas about current product improvement. This method shares the same advantage 
of an informal event approach, which provides a know-how network without organising 
a lot of social events. However, in the absence of “good personal” relationships among 
employees from informal events, exporters might be reluctant to share knowledge with a 
knowledge seeker due to a lack of a personal relationship, or in other words, shared values 
or culture. Consequently, knowledge might not flow smoothly between shop floor 
workers even if there are people who have the initiative to contribute to innovation. 
Therefore, a shared value, or a knowledge sharing environment, is essential for promoting 
BUL. 
The third KM practice is the record keeping on problem-solving activities at work. It is 
an important practice for employees to reflect on their tacit knowledge created at work 
explicitly to allow others learn from them (Nonaka et al., 2000).  
2.3.2.2 BUL practices in Organisational learning  
Based on works by Lam (2002, Lam, 2005; Lam, and Lambermont-Ford, 2010) and her 
colleagues, the J-form organisation is the most suitable form of organisation that 
promotes BUL. BUL relies on employees’ knowledge, which is mainly in the form of 
tacit knowledge (Bessant et al., 1994). However, tacit knowledge is very difficult to 




into collective tacit knowledge by letting workers solve problems in multi-disciplinary 
teams to develop shared norms amongst workers. Then those workers rotate to other 
groups to allow other parts of the organisation to learn from them, and enables them to 
learn from the new teams as well.   
Therefore, two key BUL practices could be identified from these groups. First, the multi-
disciplinary team for problem-solving. This practice has been widely proposed by 
scholars as the key for employees to develop creative solutions to problems that lead to 
innovation (e.g. Bolton, 1993; Bessant et al., 1994; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; 
Doeringer et al., 2003; Aoki, 2008). Second, the job rotation of employees. This practice 
is also widely recognised for improving employees’ knowledge and skill sets (e.g. Coşgel 
and Miceli, 1999; Lorenz and Wilkinson, 2003; Arundel et al., 2007; Preenen et al., 2017).  
2.3.2.3 BUL practices in Human Resource Management  
Empirical study by Shipton et al. (2006) show that the innovation capability of firms 
could be reflected from within their HRM practices, including 1) training given to 
employees on both work-related and non-work-related topics, 2) appraisal systems that 
promote knowledge sharing with co-workers, and 3) a contingent reward system that is 
based on employees’ contributions in terms of creative ideas rather than volume of output. 
It is argued that these four HRM practices are crucial for firms to develop an innovation 
capability (ibid).  
Internal training is of particular interest for BUL because it relies on employees’ personal 
knowledge to give workshops to colleagues. It is widely recognised as an important 
practice for developing a firm’s innovation capability (Lau and Ngo, 2004; Shipton et al., 
2006; Sung and Choi, 2014; Caloghirou et al., 2018; Dostie, 2018). In internal training 




colleagues. It facilitates sharing of tacit knowledge because it asks employees to articulate 
their tacit knowledge into teaching materials so that others could learn from these at 
internal workshops.  
2.3.2.4 BUL practices in operation management 
As already discussed in detail in Section 2.3.1.5, Kaizen is an important approach for 
firms to develop continuous, incremental innovation in their production processes and 
product designs based on suggestions from employees (Bateman and David, 2002; 
Bessant et al., 1994; Doeringer et al., 2003).  
Kaizen relies on suggestions proposed by employees for making changes to production 
processes and product design. Therefore, a key BUL practice being identified from 
Kaizen is the proposal system where employees make suggestions on production 
processes and product design (Bessant et al., 1994). This practice is widely recognised as 
crucial for developing a firm’s innovation capability by relying on the knowledge base of 
its employees (Bessant and Caffyn, 1997; Aoki, 2008; Aoki et al., 2014; Lasrado et al., 
2015; Laviolette et al., 2016; Lasrado et al., 2017). 
A summary of a list of BUL practices is produced and presented in Section 2.5.4 on page 
105. This list of BUL practices will be used to identify the BUL practices that have been 
adopted by China’s firms studied in this research.  
2.3.3 Why Bottom-up learning helps technological innovation 
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, a company’s internal and personal knowledge constitutes 
nearly 60% of its knowledge input in successful innovations (Patel and Pavitt, 1994; Dosi, 
1988b; Nelson, 2004). It is reasonable to believe that that company will have a greater 




internal and personal knowledge. From the discussions concerning the bottom-up 
learning (BUL) literature in previous sections, BUL is a viable method for this task.  
BUL helps firms develop technological innovation in three main ways: 
1) It improves the efficiency and effectiveness of problem-solving activities. As an 
important source for BUL, employee education and training, and work experience 
provide initial guidance on how to conduct experiments and knowing what to 
adjust at various stages according to the results at different stages (Patel and Pavitt, 
1997; Pavitt, 1998). The more knowledge they have, the higher the chance they 
will produce a positive experiment outcome, such as successful innovation.  
2) It generates practical solutions to problems from trial and error. Nelson (2004) 
argued that scientific knowledge is useful in mapping out the general direction of 
viable solutions to the problem but cannot help with finding actual solutions to 
particular problems. Thus, it is important to use internal and personal knowledge 
to work out practical solutions to problems on a daily basis, whilst having general 
technological trends in mind.  
3) It is complementary to top-down R&D as a new route to carry out innovation. 
BUL not only motivates employees through a high level of participation and 
involvement in proposing ideas but also allows managers to have an overall 
control of the company’s technology development through idea evaluation and 
appraisal systems (Berman and Kim, 2010). Therefore, the company could open 
up a new route of innovation with BUL without disrupting its mainstream R&D 
and productions.   
Various sectors would rely on different modes of innovation because each sector has a 
commonly shared technological regime, which defines the direction of technological 
advancement (Dosi, 1982). Therefore, high-tech sectors, such as the pharmaceutical 
sector, relies more on the STI mode of innovation (O’Sullivan, 2000; Tylecote and 




the automobile sector, the DUI mode of innovation is crucial (O’Sullivan, 2000). 
Therefore, it is reasonable to propose that BUL is important to mid-high-tech sectors.   
This study has a particular interest in the mid-high-tech sector because it is relatively 
R&D intensive. For example, in the automobile sector, radical innovation in engine 
technology requires mainly formal R&D activities in labs using the STI mode of 
innovation. However, the automobile sector also relies heavily on incremental 
innovations in the production process and product designs to lower production costs and 
to improve product quality (O’Sullivan, 2000).  
Therefore, the mid-high-tech sector needs a balance between the STI mode of innovation 
through formal R&D, and the DUI mode of innovation.  
This characteristic makes the mid-high-tech sector particularly valuable for this research 
because it would be difficult to study the BUL in high-tech sectors because they rely more 
on formal R&D. Thus, this research specifically studies how the BUL works in the mid-
high-tech sector.  
2.3.4 Remarks on BUL literature 
This section reviewed the BUL literature in five disciplines in an effort to develop a better 
understanding of BUL and proposes a definition of BUL for this research. Based on the 
literature reviewed, the concept of “bottom-up learning (BUL)” proposed in this paper is 
defined in Section 2.3.1.6 as: knowledge creation, learning and sharing activities by shop 
floor employees to produce creative solutions to problems, or to develop processes and 
product innovations. 
The first area of BUL literature comes from a strategic management leading by the 




which underpins the important role of BUL in developing a firm’s exploitive (incremental) 
innovations. However, this BUL literature is mainly concerned with firms’ innovation 
strategies by proposing that firms need to master developing both exploratory innovation 
and exploitation innovation. However, it does not provide many insights on why and how 
successful firms developed such ambidexterity, what management practices help firms to 
develop both types of innovations, and how. (See Section 2.3.1.1 for discussion). 
Therefore, BUL literature from knowledge management (KM) and organisational 
learning (OL) is reviewed.  
The second and the third group of BUL literature come from knowledge management and 
organisational learning fields. They both provide insights on how knowledge is managed 
and utilised in organisations. Leading works in this area include Lorenz and Lundvall 
(2010; Lorenz and Lundvall, 2011; Arundel et al., 2007) on measuring creativeness of 
European countries, and Lam’s work on studying knowledge sharing and organisational 
learning in Japanese firms (Lam, 2000; Lam, 2005; Lam and Lambermont-Ford, 2010). 
These two groups of literature propose that innovations are developed through collective 
learning and problem-solving activities at work. Also, they stress the crucial role played 
by multidisciplinary problem-solving teams in developing knowledge and disseminating 
personal knowledge across the organisation.  
The fourth group of BUL literature centres around human resource management (HRM) 
studies. This group of literature proposes that employee involvement in innovation 
process (Doeringer et al., 2003; Lorenz and Wilkinson, 2003; Armstrong, 2006) and 
delegation of power to employees (Lorenz and Lundvall, 2010; Lam, 2000; Lam and 
Lambermont-Ford, 2010) contributes to the innovation performance of firms. However, 




because excessive employees’ ideas disturb the original plan of the firm, Doeringer et al., 
(2003). Therefore, an appropriate level of management control over BUL is needed.  
The fifth group of literature comes from an operational management (OM) background. 
Kaizen is discussed because it involves a great deal of employee initiative to report 
possible improvement opportunities to their superior managers (Ohno, 1988; Bessant et 
al., 1994). It argues that having BUL initiatives is pivotal when having a Kaizen situation 
but developing such initiative is a challenging task for firms (Aoki, 2008). It implies that 
the BUL practice could not work in firms when employees do not want to participate in 
BUL for a variety of reasons. For example, lack of rewards, fear of being penalised by 
the supervisor, and so on. This problem would render BUL practices to only exist on 
paper.  
Therefore, it is important to evaluate the level of embeddedness of BUL practices during 
data analysis to distinguish between embedded and not embedded BUL practices in firms.  
Because the concept of BUL has only recently developed, it has not been operationalised 
yet. Therefore, this section identifies nine BUL practice from the available literature. The 
nine BUL practices are summarised later in Table 2-8. The level of embeddedness of 
BUL practices will be studied in firms in this research to investigate what BUL practice 
firms have and how and whether the BUL practice is embedded.  
In this research, an embedded BUL practice means that the practice is effective and thus 
helps the firm facilitate BUL activities. Not embedded BUL practices are not effective in 
facilitating BUL activities, so they only exist on paper.  
Lastly, based on the literature it is found that it is valuable to study BUL in mid-high-tech 




need a balance between formal R&D and BUL and rely on both ways of learning and 
problem-solving.  
Therefore, this research will focus on studying the BUL practices adopted by firms in 
mid-high-tech sectors. Moreover, the level of embeddedness of the BUL practices will be 
evaluated during data analysis.  
Reviews of BUL literature develops the first research question:   
Research question 1:  
 “Do China’s firms have bottom-up learning (BUL) practices to develop their 
innovation capability, and how embedded are BUL practices?” 
 
2.4 National System of Innovation and Developing Countries  
The national system of innovation (NSI) is widely regarded as an approach focusing on 
analysing innovative actors and the interactions among them that are shaped by 
institutions within national boundaries (Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson and 
Rosenberg, 1993; Edquist and Lundvall, 1993; Niosi et al., 1993). This approach explains 
how national institutions foster the “national technological capability” (Lall, 2000: 14). 
In addition, the NSI approach explains why certain sectors could achieve a better 
performance in one country than in others, by pointing out that different national 
institutions form different market conditions that favour different types of technologies, 
which encourage the development of different industries (Malerba, 2002; Chaminade et 
al., 2009).  
Among the different ways that scholars use NSI approach in their work, two major routes 




(Lundvall et al., 2009). The fundamental difference lies in the way innovation is 
understood by scholars. 
The scholar who took the narrow perspective of NSI equals innovation merely to science 
and technology (S&T) advancement (Lundvall et al., 2009). Therefore, the main focus of 
their work is on how S&T policies cultivate new to the world technological innovations, 
the majority of which are radical innovations that have a significant impact on both 
economic growth and the existing technology base of some industries (Lundvall, 1992; 
Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993; Edquist and Lundvall, 1993; Niosi et al., 1993). These sorts 
of radical innovations were mainly developed in developed countries.  
Thus, the narrow perspective of NIS approach is applied when studying NSI in developed 
countries, such as the United States (Nelson, 1993; Niosi et al., 1993; Kim, 1997; Kim 
and Nelson, 2000). 
The scholars taking the broad perspective of NSI not only recognise the importance of 
radical innovations in economic growth, but also include diffusion and the improvement 
of existing technologies in the innovation process (Freeman, 1987, 1988; Lall, 2000; 
Viotti, 2002; Lundvall et al., 2009). The broad perspective of NSI becomes critical when 
studying NSI in developing countries that mainly have a low innovation capability 
(Lundvall et al., 2009). Most innovation efforts in developing countries are still limited 
to imitation and to making improvement to those technologies developed in developed 
countries (Viotti, 2002).  
Therefore, as already discussed in Section 2.2.3.1, the innovation in the broad perspective 
also includes incremental innovation that build on existing technologies new to the firm, 




Given this, to analyse innovative activities in developing countries, the broad definition 
of the term “innovation” needs to be used, which is fundamentally learning (Viotti, 2002; 
Lundvall et al., 2009).  
Taking China as an example of a developing country that is trying to become an 
innovative country by 2020, various researchers (e.g.: Lu and Lazonick, 2001; Cai and 
Tylecote, 2005; Liu and Tylecote, 2009; Xiao et al., 2013) pointed out that China still has 
a relatively low innovation capability to develop indigenous innovation, and their reliance 
on foreign technologies is still considerably high, at least in some sectors. 
As the focus of this thesis, the China’s NSI will be discussed further in the following sub-
section.  
2.4.1 China’s NSI 
Amongst developing countries studied by scholars, most of them study capitalist 
economies, including Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, and India. Only a limited number 
of scholars have focused on understanding the NSI of China, which is a socialist economy 
that has a different institutional set up from developed, and most of the other developing, 
countries.  
There are two leading scholars who focus on studying China’s NSI, namely Xielin Liu 
(Liu, 2009; Liu and White, 2001) who studied China’s innovation capability using 
statistical data, and Lan Xue (Xue, 1997; Xue et al., 2011) who studied China’s NSI 
through an historical analysis of China’s innovation policies. In addition, some 
international organisations, including OECD and the World Bank, also produce reports 
on China’s R&D expenditure and technological development. However, there is one issue 




figures and other quantitative data to represent the level of innovation capability and by 
comparison with other countries. It makes the incremental innovation unrepresentative in 
most of the static data because they are difficult to measure and quantify (Pavitt, 1999). 
Moreover, it has been pointed out that around 40% of innovation activities are outside of 
formal R&D, especially in mechanical engineering sectors (Patel and Pavitt, 1994). 
Therefore, the innovation capability of China could not be accurately represented by only 
calculating formal R&D expenditure, at least not in the mechanical engineering sector.  
Moreover, by only looking at statistical analyses of China’s NSI with R&D figures, 
education statistics, number of patents, and so on, it is difficult to understand how 
institutions influence innovation activities at firm level. As mentioned above, the NSI 
approach studies innovation actors in a country and interaction amongst actors (Freeman, 
1987; Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993; Edquist and Lundvall, 1993; Lundvall, 2010). 
Without in-depth investigation of innovation activities by the innovation actor like a firm, 
it is difficult to understand the impact of China’s NSI on innovation activities of 
innovation actors.   
Therefore, this research aims to develop the understanding of China’s NSI by studying 
the impact of institutions on a firm’s innovation activities.   
2.4.1.1 Role of the state in China’s NSI 
China is a distinctively interesting case because government intervention in the economy 
plays a more significant role in China than in other countries (Liu, 2009; Liu and White, 
2001). 
Historical cases suggest that government intervention in the market has been a widely 




instance, the government of South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore have played important 
roles since the early stages of their economic reforms to establish market infrastructures, 
increase educational standards, create protective policies for domestic industries and 
encourage exports (Lall, 2000).  
However, the Chinese government controls the economy indifferent ways compared to 
the previously mentioned developing countries. Instead of solely developing market 
infrastructures and investing in education, the Chinese government has directly 
established many state-owned enterprises (SOEs)in nearly all industries, and manages 
them through central planning during the planned economy era before the late 1980s (Xue, 
1997; Liu and White, 2001; Motohashi and Yun, 2007; Liu, 2009). Example of central 
plans include the five-year plans, industrial strategies, quota for production and so on. 
Although China has transformed itself to a more market economy since the late 1980s, 
the central and local governments are still strongly intervening in the economy because 
they still own a high number of large companies in mid-tech, mid-high-tech and high-
tech industries (Boeing and Sandner, 2011). It has been argued that the powerful role of 
the government is useful when concentrating limited resources to quickly catch-up with 
the development of certain technologies (Fagerberg and Godinho, 2005; Liu, 2009) 
because a liberated market cannot effectively promote the development of new 
technology due to unpredictable returns and the high risk of R&D investment (Lall, 2000). 
Therefore, the establishment of SOEs in many sectors, and the centrally-made plans by 
the government have helped the Chinese economy to proliferate to some extent.  
Nonetheless, because the state both owns and manages a large number of enterprises, 




“bottom-up” initiatives in innovation. This argument could be interpreted at two levels. 
First, at the national level, because China’s economy is largely controlled by large SOEs 
whose R&D is guided by industrial plans, SOEs do not have sufficient autonomy to 
respond to the market, thus are unable to develop innovation with bottom-up initiatives. 
Second, at the firm level, because the government manages those SOEs in a top-down 
fashion, the way how top managers of SOEs manage innovation activities inside firms is 
likely to be in a top-down fashion as well. Therefore, innovation activities in SOEs are 
likely to be planned by top managers, while innovative ideas and suggestions proposed 
by people at the lower levels of the organisation are often neglected. Therefore, the 
bottom-up initiative in innovation amongst employees is likely to be low in China’s SOEs.  
Since the Chinese economy is still state-owned and centrally managed (Boeing and 
Sandner, 2011), the decision about what to develop within a state-owned company is 
made in a top-down format by top managers, in response to government plans. This type 
of management style is similar to the machine bureaucratic form discussed in previous 
sections and there being a lack of autonomy in the working units (Shleifer, 1998; Lam, 
2000). Therefore, at the national level, the innovation direction of China is set by 
policymakers and executed by top managers in SOEs. At the firm level, the direction of 
innovation is decided by top managers of SOEs without involving employees in any 
decision-making processes. Thus, the bottom-up initiative in innovation is likely to be 
low at both levels.  
To sum up, China is still a “state-owned and centrally planned” country to some extent, 
where the government is still playing a strong role in the market in a “top-down” 
instructive fashion. In addition, it has been argued that old fashioned “top-down” 




at different stages of the Chinese economy’s development, particularly in terms of 
government protection on SOEs from competition, and the provision of easy financial 
capital to SOEs (Yam et al., 2004).  
From the discussion above, it is found that SOEs play critical roles in China’s NSI. Thus, 
SOEs in China will be further discussed in the next sub-section to develop a better 
understanding on how SOEs innovate under China’s NSI.  
2.4.1.2 SOEs in China  
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China dominate most of important sectors which the 
Chinese government have classified into two main groups, namely “Strategic and Key 
Industries” and “Basic and Pillar Industries” (Liu and Tylecote, 2016: 343) that are all 
considered as critical to Chinese market stability, economic growth and/or national 
security (Mattlin, 2009). Therefore, state ownership has been used as a tool to increase 
government control over them even though the percentage of government share is 
reducing in some sectors (ibid).  
At its initial stage, the technology development of China overwhelmingly relied on help 
from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the form of direct technology 
transfer, building turnkey factories in China (e.g. First Automobile Works), sending 
Chinese engineers to USSR for training, and sending scientists from the USSR directly 
to China (Xie and White, 2006; Liu and White, 2001). This helped China significantly in 
developing the foundation of its technological capability. However, from the late 1950s 
to the early 1960s, the relationship between China and USSR quickly took a downward 
turn, and all help from the USSR immediately withdrawn in 1960 (Quested, 1984). This 
incident taught China an important lesson on the dangers of relying solely on foreign 




announced a new S&T strategy emphasising “self-reliance” for its technological 
development (Zagoria , 1962: 320). This strategy has had a profound influence on the 
routine of Chinese S&T development which still has some influence on the innovation 
activities of Chinese SOEs and universities today. It could partially explain why China 
tends to domestically develop and produce almost everything, often regardless of whether 
or not it can be purchased from abroad.  
After the Chinese central government launched its open-door policy in the 1980s, the 
number of SOEs in China has decreased dramatically through privatisation (Liu and 
Lundin, 2007). Moreover, the decision-making power has been delegated by central 
government to top managers of SOEs through two responsibility mechanisms, namely the 
“enterprise responsibility system” – delegating some of the decision-making power from 
the government to SOEs, and “director (or manager) responsibility system” – allowing 
SOEs to operate independently from government intervention between 1985-1988 (Child 
and Lu, 1990: 321). After several rounds of SOEs reforms, the remaining SOEs are 
mainly concentrated in two groups of strategic industries nowadays (Liu and Lundin, 
2007).  
For “Strategic and Key Industries”, most of the SOEs are owned by the central 
government directly in sectors like energy, defence, aerospace, railway, 
telecommunication service, and so on. Those sectors mainly represent a high entry barrier 
in terms of fixed costs along with a difficulty to generate profits in the short-term. On one 
hand, this group of SOEs faces intensified intervention from the central government. On 
the other hand, they receive a tremendous amount of domestic protection, technological 




The numbers of SOEs in those protected sectors are usually very small so that SOEs do 
not compete with each other (Liu and Tylecote, 2016). For example, there are only four 
SOEs in the telecommunication service sector, only three SOEs in the fuel sector, only 
two SOEs in the electricity generation business, only one giant SOE group in railway 
(train) production and only two large SOE groups in the defence sector.  
However, it is pointed out that private firms in China are still weak in innovation (Liu, 
2009). Therefore, amongst the best-performing companies in certain sectors, most of 
them are SOEs. Consequently, SOEs still dominate those sectors even though there are 
more private and FDI companies than SOEs.  
Table 2-3: Number of firms in Automobile, Railway, Shipbuilding, Aviation and Aerospace equipment 
production, by ownership type, 2012-2015 
Automobile production 2015 2014 2013 2012 
Number of SOEs 741 699 688 665 
 Number of private firms 7114 6767 6224 5414 
Number of FDI (include Hong Kong and 
Macau)  2953 2864 2721 2586 
Total 10808 10330 9633 8665 
     
Railway, Shipbuilding, Aviation and 
Aerospace equipment production 2015 2014 2013 2012 
Number of SOEs 519 505 507 493 
Number of private firms 2690 2665 2642 2511 
Number of FDI (include Hong Kong and 
Macau)  679 697 730 738 
Total 3888 3867 3879 3742 
Source: Adapted from China National Statistic Bureau (2017). 
Taking the automobile, railway, shipbuilding, and aviation and aerospace equipment 
sectors from “Strategic and Key Industries” and “Basic and Pillar Industries” as examples 
(see Table 2-3) the number of private firms and FDI are significantly higher than the 
number of SOEs in this sector. However, in certain industries, the best performing 




Table 2-4: Top ten Chinese bestselling automobile brands ranked by sales: Jan to Nov 2016 
Ranking Company Name Sales (million cars) Ownership 
1 SAIC 22.41 SOE 
2 Changan 15.73 SOE 
3 DFM 12.23 SOE 
4 BAIC 11.7 SOE 
5 Great Wall Motors 9.24 Private 
6 Geely 6.87 Private 
7 Jianghuai Motor 5.81 SOE 
8 Cherry 5.53 SOE 
9 FAW 4.64 SOE 
10 BYD 4.41 Private 
Source: Adapted from China Association of Automobile Manufacturers (2016)  
 
Table 2-5: Top ten Chinese bestselling commercial vehicle manufacturers ranked by sales: Jan to Nov 2016 
Ranking Company Name Sales (million car) Ownership 
1 BAIC 4.37 SOE 
2 DFM 4.29 SOE 
3 Changan 3.36 SOE 
4 SAIC 3.00 SOE 
5 Jianghuai Motor 2.51 SOE 
6 FAW 2.15 SOE 
7 CHNHTC 1.79 SOE 
8 Lifan 1.41 Private 
9 Brilliance Auto 1.17 SOE 
10 Shannxi Auto 0.99 SOE 
Source: Adapted from China Association of Automobile Manufacturers (2016)  
Taking the Chinese automobile industry as an example of “Basic and Pillar Industries”, 
only three out of the top ten best-performing companies in terms of sales are private (see 
Table 2-4). If narrowed down to the commercial vehicle sector, which the Chinese 
government did not allow much FDI came in initially in huge contrast with the passenger 
car sector, only one out of the ten best-performing companies is private (see Table 2-5). 




Industries” and “Basic and Pillar Industries”, SOEs holds most of the market share and 
so dominate those industries, at least in the Chinese automobile industry.  
In addition, the previous literature shows that the corporate governance (CG) of firms in 
China have a significant influence on firms’ innovation performance since SOEs are well 
protected and financed by the government. Therefore, the literature on studying the 
relationship between CG and the innovation capability of firms will be reviewed in the 
following sub-subsection.  
2.4.2 Corporate governance and innovation capability of firms 
Studies that specifically reveal how the corporate governance (CG) of firms improves or 
hinders their innovation capability development are mainly led by two groups of 
researchers, who both started focusing on this topic around the late 1990s, but addressed 
the topic from different angles.  
The first group of literature is led by Tylecote (e.g.: Tylecote and Conesa, 1999; Miozzo 
and Tylecote, 2001; Tylecote et al., 2002; Cai and Tylecote, 2005; Tylecote and Ramirez, 
2006; Tylecote, 2007; Liu and Tylecote, 2016) and his colleagues, who, from their first 
paper started to specifically focus on explaining how the national corporate governance 
and financial systems influence the advancement of various technological fields in 1999. 
They addressed the relationship between CG and innovation by identifying four different 
challenges that the national “Corporate Governance and Financial system (CG&Fs)” 
(Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006: 160) need to overcome before technological innovation can 
be developed in certain technological fields. Four challenges have been identified 
including (1) visibility of innovation activity and returns from a manager’s point of view; 
(2) novelty of innovation which questions either industry-specific knowledge or firm-




innovation requires more industry-specific knowledge (Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006) ; (3) 
appropriability of innovation, defines how easily firms could protect their innovation, and 
to what extent stakeholder inclusion is needed over shareholder priority (Tylecote et al., 
1998); (4) and reconfiguration needs of the innovation determines whether radical change 
in the organisation is needed to embrace new technology (Tylecote and Ramirez, 2005).  
The second group of literature is led by Lazonick and O’Sullivan (1996; O’Sullivan, 2000) 
who addressed the relationship between CG and innovation by identifying three types of 
conditions that CG of the firm needs to fulfil before developing innovation. Three 
conditions including (1) “financial commitment”, which means innovation requires long-
term, continuous and patient investment; (2) “organisational integration” which means 
the firm needs to have an inclusive collective learning system that involves both 
managerial and non-managerial employees; (3) “insider-control” which suggests that 
technological innovation requires the owner of firms to have a sufficient level of expertise 
in that sector, and preferably also has firm-specific expertise so that they are capable of 
evaluating and choosing amongst viable possibilities of technological development 
(O’Sullivan, 2000: 39).  
Both groups of literature will be discussed in the following two subsections.  
2.4.2.1 Challenges to CG for innovation 
As discussed in Section 2.2.3, innovation has four characteristics. First, novelty, 
innovation contains a certain degree of novelty for the world, country, sector or firm. 
Second, cumulativeness (path-dependent), new innovations are usually final products of 
cumulative, incremental innovations throughout years or even decades of development. 
Third, systemic, as innovation is usually developed within a larger system of interrelated 




regime to a different extent based on its novelty. Fourth, uncertainty, where the process 
of innovation development involves a risk of failure, and successful innovation may not 
outperform what rivals have already developed so that it is unable to generate returns.  
Each of these characteristics poses a significant challenge to the national level “Corporate 
Governance and Financial system (CG&Fs)” (Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006: 160) if the 
development of a certain technological field is desired, as current CG&Fs might be unable 
to cope with the challenges so fails to improve the innovation capability in the desired 
technological field. Because each sector has its technological basis, CG&Fs that fail to 
address challenges posed by innovation in certain technological fields would 
consequently cause a negative impact on the performance of relevant sectors.  
Tylecote (Tylecote and Conesa, 1999; Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006) and his colleagues 
identify four types of challenge posed by innovation that CG needs to address before 
firms can develop successful technological innovations. The four challenges posed by 
innovation include: 
First, the visibility of innovation activities. Top managers need to be able to appreciate 
innovation activities that are difficult for them to recognise at a distance, especially when 
top managers are “outsiders” who lack the industrial and firm-specific knowledge to 
know how technologies and other systems work in the firm (Tylecote and Ramirez, 2008). 
This requires that CG&Fs pose less “short-term-pressure (STP)” on top managers to allow 
the top managers to be patient with slow returns from investment in innovation projects 
(Demirag and Tylecote, 1992:7). This also requires top managers to engage in daily 
operations of firms to understand why certain slow, and less visible innovation efforts, 




Visintin, 2008). In addition, it is preferred that top managers have firm-specific 
knowledge as this helps them to understand better the process of low visible innovation 
activities (Tylecote and Ramirez, 2008).  
The requirement for managers to understand low visibility innovation activities varies 
considerably across sectors due to the difference in the technological base of sectors. It is 
suggested that the amount of invisible expenditures and efforts invested in innovation 
projects are very high in engineering sectors, whilst low in the pharmaceutical sector 
(Tylecote and Hirata, 1993; Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006).   
The visibility of innovation is highly relevant to this research. Because this research 
specifically studies low visibility BUL activities in the engineering sector, top managers 
in firms need to have a high level of firm-specific knowledge so that they can understand 
and appreciate low visibility innovation activities.  
Second, the novelty of the innovation to the firm. Developing or adapting radical 
innovations that are far from a firm’s present technology base requires managers to have 
industry-specific experts, so that they have a wider spectrum of valid choices of planning 
or strategy for future development (Tylecote and Conesa, 1999; Tylecote and Ramirez, 
2006).   
Although addressing the novelty of innovation is critical to developing innovation, this 
element of the CG&Fs model is less relevant in the context of this research. It is because 
the expected outcomes of BUL are incremental product and process innovations. Thus, 
managers do not have to have a high level of industrial-specific knowledge to adopt the 




Third, appropriability of innovation reflected in terms of whether a firm adapts a 
shareholder first or stakeholder first approach (Tylecote and Conesa, 1999). Shareholder 
first approach is suitable when developing technologies that are easily protected from 
spill over, the pharmaceutical sector for instance, where innovation outcomes can be 
easily articulated and protected with patents. A stakeholder first approach facilitates the 
development of technology that is hard to protect from imitation and spill over. For 
instance, it is difficult to protect an intricate mechanical engineering design and a 
worker’s tricks since they are based on the tacit knowledge possessed by individual 
workers. Such knowledge could easily be acquired by rivals if the key employees have 
been poached. In this situation, a stakeholder first approach is usually preferred to provide 
employees with a higher level of job security and appropriate welfare.  
The appropriability of innovation is particularly important in the context of this research. 
It has been pointed out that around 40% of innovation activities are outside the formal 
R&D functions, especially in the mechanical engineering sector (Patel and Pavitt, 1994). 
It is because the knowledge base of the engineering sector has a large amount of tacit 
knowledge embedded across the workforce. Workers develop tacit knowledge as a result 
of their daily problem-solving experiences at the shop floor (Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Bessant and Caffyn, 1997; Jensen et al., 2007). Thus, it is important that engineering 
firms adopt the stakeholder-first approach to maintain a stable workforce to protect and 
retain its knowledge for innovation.  
Fourth, reconfiguration capability when changes in an organisation is required to embrace 
a radically new technology or to be successful in developing radical innovations (Tylecote 
and Ramirez, 2006). It is, sometimes, vital for large and old firms who are already 




workforce, introducing a new robotic production line, under pressure from both 
“competence destroying” technological change - radical change in the technological 
regime of the sector, threats from rivals who are more flexible to make changes, and from 
new start-ups who do not yet need to reconfigure anything (Tylecote and Visintin, 2008). 
Apart from this, reconfiguration capability is also important if firms choose to engage in 
a new field of technology that is far from its existing knowledge base. It is argued that 
organisational re-structuring is often required before the new technology can be 
assimilated (Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006). Radically new technologies could make an 
existing workforce entirely obsolete. Thus, the ability to renew the workforce becomes 
critical in sectors where the technological regime frequently shifts, which is usually in 
high-tech sectors.  
Although it is crucial for firms to have reconfiguration capability to embrace and develop 
radical innovation, this element of the CG&Fs model is less relevant to the context of this 
research. This is because the focus of this research is on incremental innovations, which 
is close to the existing knowledge base of firms. Thus, firms do not have to have a high 
level of reconfiguration capability to adopt BUL approach to develop their innovation 
capability.  
To sum up, based on the arguments made by Tylecote and his colleagues (Tylecote and 
Conesa, 1999; Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006) technological innovations pose at least four 
challenges to CG&Fs, visibility, novelty, appropriability, and reconfiguration. The 
settings of national CG&Fs when addressing these four challenges will affect how firms 
behave in their innovation activities. Thus, the industrial structure varies amongst 




2.4.2.2 Conditions CG needs to fulfil needs of innovation 
The framework proposed by O’Sullivan (2000; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 1996) studies 
the relationship between CG and innovation in engineering sectors from a strategic 
management point of view. The fundamental nature of innovation is knowledge creation 
that requires efficient resource allocation into knowledge creation projects (O’Sullivan, 
2000).  
Managers allocate resources to innovation activities according to their strategies. Their 
decision-making is significantly influenced by both the internal and external 
environments to the firm. Whilst the external environment is usually shaped by 
competition and other institutions, the internal environment is mainly formed by its CG, 
meaning how firms are owned and controlled (O’Sullivan, 2000). Concerns are mainly 
twofold. First, any technological innovation, as an outcome of innovation activities of 
firms, requires an appropriate management structure to enable efficient resource 
allocation, in terms of what to invest, how resources are processed, and what outcomes 
are expected (solving problems, or anticipating the product to be developed) (O’Sullivan, 
2000). Second, since innovation activities naturally contain an element of risk meaning 
that the outcome is unknown (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1988), decisions on which 
technological prospect to pursue is also critical.  
With these two concerns in mind, Lazonick and O’Sullivan (1996; O’Sullivan, 2000) 
identified three conditions that CG needs to fulfil before innovation projects can be 
accomplished successfully. This model includes:  
First, a financial commitment to innovation activities, innovation projects require patient 
funding and a long-term plan to succeed (Pavitt and Patel, 1988). Therefore, it is critical 




This condition is important for this research as BUL mainly produces incremental 
innovations. It is a slow pay-off process which requires long-term and patient investment 
(Tidd et al., 2005). Thus, it is important that top managers of firms plan for long-term 
development of their innovation capability by using the BUL approach. The subsequent 
condition also stresses the importance of long-term planning by top managers.  
Second, “insider” control of the firm. To have a long term-vision and a dedicated long-
term plan for improving their innovation capability, top managers need to have a 
sufficient level of firm-specific and industry-specific expertise so that they can choose 
between many viable routes of technological prospects (O’Sullivan, 2000). Also, 
managers need to be motivated and rewarded in ways that allow them to secure greater 
gains from such long-term development of the firm because innovation requires patient 
investment. Otherwise, short-termism gain will have a harmful impact on the 
development of innovation capability of the firm in the long-run (Pavitt and Patel, 1988). 
Insider control of firms is critical to their success because those managers who have a 
more firm-specific knowledge. In addition, due to their long-term employment in firms, 
they have a higher stake in the good long-term performance of the firm. Thus, insider 
managers are more likely to plan for the long-term development of innovation capability 
and allow for patient investment on such slow-payoff innovation efforts.  
Third, organisational integration. The reasons here are two-fold. First, because 
innovation is a social process comprising interactive learnings that create knowledge 
(Best, 1990; Lazonick, 1990; Lundvall, 2010; Edquist, 1997). It requires active learning 
amongst workforce, apart from merely following instructions given by managers on what 




impossible to share its knowledge without close personal interaction in the knowledge 
sharing process (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Lazonick, 1990; Nonaka, 1994; Pavitt, 1999; 
Smith , 2001). Moreover, the knowledge required for changing products and processes is 
still mostly tacit (Senker, 1995; Senker, 2008).  
Moreover, evidence from economic history shows that the higher the level of complexity 
of technology, the lower the level of workforce need to be involved in the process of the 
technology development (Bell and Pavitt, 1997). Therefore, in order to develop 
innovations in sectors that have a complex technological base, a low level of the 
workforce needs to be involved in any decision-making, and in the formal and informal 
innovation process.  
This condition has particular implications in this research. The core participants in the 
BUL process are first-line workers who have rich tacit knowledge accumulated from 
problem solving activities at work (Lam, 2000; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). Therefore, 
BUL could be an appropriate approach to develop that innovation capability of firms in 
sectors whose knowledge base has a high number of tacit elements.  
2.4.2.3 Remarks on two CG and innovation models  
Both avenues of literature address a similar problem, which explores how the corporate 
governance of firms influences their innovation capability. Two models share some 
factors even though they are named differently. They also have some differences because 
those two models have been applied in different contexts. The underlying propositions of 
the two models are summarised and compared in Table 2 6. 
The model by Tylecote and colleagues (e.g. Tylecote and Conesa, 1999; Tylecote and 




country, or how one sector, globally, is influenced by national CG&Fs in different 
countries. An advantage of their works is that they have comparatively studied sectors 
who have distinctive knowledge base like the automobile sector (Liu and Tylecote, 2009), 
the equipment manufacturing sector (Xiao et al., 2013) and the pharmaceutical sector 
(Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006). They also studied different countries like China (Tylecote 
and Ramirez, 2006; Xiao et al., 2013), the UK and the USA (Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006).  
In terms of similarity, the two models share some similar arguments regarding how 
innovation could be facilitated by suitable corporate governance conditions. First, both 
models stress the importance of long-term perspective for developing innovation 
capability and continuous financial investment to support innovation activities. Second, 
both models propose that top managers should have firm-specific knowledge to 
understand how technology works, and to choose the direction of innovation. Third, both 
models argue that it is important to involve workers into the process of innovation.  
Comparing to the model by Lazonick and O’Sullivan, Tylecote’s model has two 
distinctive features that are highly relevant to this research. First, it builds macro-micro 
linkages between national institutions and the development of innovation capability in 
firms (Cai and Tylecote, 2008; Liu and Tylecote, 2009), by studying the challenges that 
innovative activities in different sectors pose to the national CG&F system. It also 
proposes that countries have different national CG&Fs that promote the development of 
different technological fields (Tylecote, 2007), which consequently explains the national 
specialisation in different technological fields. Second, Tylecote’s model has been widely 
applied in studies of innovation capability of various sectors in China, which include the 




et al., 2013) and the telecommunication sector (Cai and Tylecote, 2008). Therefore, 
Tylecote’s model has been proven suitable in studying innovation related issues in China.  
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Visibility  Firms need to have a 
long-term plan and 
patient financial 
capital; manager 
needs to engage to 
appreciate innovative 
activities that are 
difficult to observe at 
a distance  
Financial 
commitment  
Innovation requires long 




knowledge is needed 
for technologies with 
high novelty. Low 
novelty technology 
relies more on firm-
specific knowledge.  
Insider control  Managers of firms need 
to have sufficient 
industry-specific and 
firm-specific knowledge 
to evaluate and select 
viable technological 
possibilities to commit  
Reconfiguration Technology that is far 
from the existing 




the new technology 
can be assimilated.   
Organisation 
integration  
Innovation requires the 
high involvement of all 
employees in collective 
learning. The more 
complex the technology, 
the greater degree of 
involvement of shop-
floor worker is needed.  
Appropriability Shareholder-first 
approach could help 
with developing 
technologies that are 
easy to protect from 
spill over.  
Stakeholder-first 
approach facilitates 
the development of 
technology that is 
hard to protect from 
imitation and spill 
over.  
  
Tylecote’s model will be used as the framework for the corporate governance analysis of 




institutions and the development of innovation capability in firms; and 2) it has been 
proved suitable for studying innovation related issues in China.  
2.4.3 CG and innovation activities in China’s firms 
Although some challenges in Tylecote’s model are not relevant in the context of this 
research, his work has contributed greatly to studies on China. While, another model by 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan has not been applied in the Chinese context. Thus, based on 
Tylecote’s work, this sub-section will review the impact of China’s CG on innovation 
activities in Chinese firms. 
Tylecote and his colleagues have conducted various case studies studying corporate 
governance of Chinese firms in the auto sector (Liu and Tylecote, 2009, Tylecote, Cai 
and Liu. 2010), the telecom sector (Tylecote, Cia and Liu, 2010), the machinery sector 
and the TV sector (Xiao et al., 2013).  
As already discussed earlier in Section 2.4.1, state-ownership of firms is one of the major 
institutions of China’s NSI that have a significant impact on China’s economic 
development.  Moreover, SOEs have also been found to be dominating China’s mid-tech 
to high-tech sectors (Boeing and Sandner, 2011). Therefore, this section will review and 
discuss the work by Tylecote and his colleagues who mainly studied China’s SOEs in 
their case studies.  
In addition, this section aims to develop a workable framework for studying how CG, a 
key part of institutions in China’s NSI, influences firms BUL. Therefore, a conceptual 





It is found that state ownership of the firm in some sectors in China, and monitoring and 
management infrastructures of SOEs caused a major flaw in the process to build a 
technical innovation capability (Tylecote, Cai and Liu, 2010). A key weakness of China’s 
SOEs being identified is the management appointment of top managers to SOEs by the 
SASAC (State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission) (Liu and 
Tylecote, 2009, Tylecote et al., 2010; Xiao, Tylecote and Liu, 2013). Because top 
managers of SOEs were usually officials from government agencies, he/she lacks relevant 
professional knowledge and the time to monitor the SOE closely (Liu and Tylecote, 2009). 
In addition, because the director was appointed directly by central SASAC and would be 
likely to leave in the short-term of around five years, they do not have responsibility for 
the long-term development of the SOE (Liu and Tylecote, 2016). It is because their career 
development and personal gains are not linked with the long-term development of the 
SOE. Thus, they become disengaged with the SOE they are managing and are unlikely to 
appreciate the innovation activities that are low-visibility to high-level managers 
(Tylecote and Visintin, 2008).  
This causes a major weakness in Chinese SOEs, which is having disengaged top managers 
(Cai and Tylecote, 2005; Tylecote et al., 2010). Due to the disengagement of managers, 
they are reluctant to invest in any long-term capability building programmes because 
these are slow to payoff. At the same time, the management of the firm is very exclusive, 
which does not involve the participation of low-level worker (ibid, Liu and Tylecote, 
2009). This problem leads to major losses of knowledge embedded in employees and 
causes weaknesses in problem-solving and the development of any innovation capability 




In addition, it is pointed out that these conventional large-scale SOEs tend to purchase 
readymade, fully assembled and packaged technologies and equipment (entire production 
lines) because they are easy to understand and could have an immediate effect on 
improving production (Liu and Tylecote, 2009). This is because top managers of those 
SOEs are appointed for the short-term only, so they need to produce observable results in 
a short period to please their supervising officials so that they might be placed in a better 
position after their term in office ends (Tylecote, Cai and Liu, 2010). Developing 
innovation internally would be costly and time consuming, and could displease 
supervising officials if the innovation fails. Thus, they choose to buy readymade 
technologies that are faster in producing good outcomes, and less risky than in-house 
innovations.  
The drawback of using this method to acquire technology is that engineers do not 
understand the principle of how and why such technology bundles work. Consequently, 
engineers cannot modify or improve them (Tylecote et al., 2010). It is because using 
readymade technological bundles means engineers and work do not have the opportunity 
to fully understand how different machines work as a production system, Therefore, they 
become incapable of making further independent improvements to the production process. 
It is because the relevant technological knowledge (knowledge about how things work 
together) is usually accumulated gradually in the process of developing the technology, 
and is often tacit and embodied in the employees who were part of the development 
process (Pavitt, 1999). If firms choose to rely on technology bundles, this knowledge 
accumulation process is absent.  
Conversely, some new (some of them are transformed from old ones at a certain stage) 




The reasons for this are two-fold. First, top managers of these new SOEs are usually 
experts in the underlying technologies before they come to these SOEs. With such a 
knowledge base, they could understand the cutting-edge technology in the foreign market, 
and buy equipment separately to construct their production line (Liu and Tylecote, 2009). 
Thus, their innovation performance is much better than other SOEs because they have 
acquired knowledge accumulation during the process of constructing their production line.  
Secondly, because this type of new SOE is usually a pillar industry in certain small cities, 
officials of the city government believe them to be the major engines that drive the local 
economy. Thus, they are given more autonomy to operate independently away from close 
government intervention in the management (ibid). In addition, these local SOEs are 
given various privileges and benefits if they perform well; however, much depends on the 
discretion of the government officials (ibid).  
Based on the reviews of this literature, three useful insights could be identified.  
First, as an important institution in China’s NSI, state-ownership could strongly influence 
the technical innovation capability in SOEs. In addition, SOEs seems to be managed 
differently by the government in various regions. For instance, SOEs in small cities are 
found to be more innovative because the local government grants them autonomy and 
privileged access to capital (Liu and Tylecote, 2009). This phenomenon has also been 
noted by Child and Lu (1990) pointing out that after the control of SOEs is passed down 
to local government, the relationship between the SOEs and the government (local 
government) becomes ‘closer (or intimate)’ allowing SOEs to have access to favourable 




Second, government appointment of top managers to SOEs has a profound influence on 
firms’ development of innovation capability. It is because the government tends to 
appoint outsiders as top managers of SOEs (Tylecote, Cai and Liu, 2010) who are 
disengaged and lack understanding of the firms’ technological base. However, SOEs who 
have appointed insiders as top managers tend to have a higher innovation capability (Liu 
and Tylecote, 2009). Therefore, this research will include management appointment of 
insider or outsider by the government as a factor to explain the innovation activities in 
SOEs.  
Third, the literature also points out that top managers of SOEs stay for the short term only, 
and they will leave after their term ends (Tylecote et al., 2010). This means that the top 
managers only plan for short-term development of SOEs by purchasing technological 
bundles. However, empirical evidence shows that some local government allows top 
managers of SOEs to remain in position for extended periods of time if the SOEs have a 
good economic performance (Liu and Tylecote, 2010). Therefore, this research will 
include the length of top manager’s employment as a factor that could influence the 
firm’s innovation activities.  
Focusing on discussing CG of SOEs in China does not imply that private firms are not 
important in China’s economy. As shown in Table 2-3, the vast majority of firms in 
China’s “Basic and Pillar Industries” are private firms. Therefore, the importance of 
studying private firms should not be underestimated. Tylecote and his colleagues have 
conducted a few cases studies of private firms using their model (e.g. Tylecote, Cai and 
Liu, 2010; Liu and Tylecote, 2016). In the case study of a Chinese private telecom firm- 
Huawei, it is pointed out that the firm’s success could partly be owing to the long-term 




founders of the firm who has remained as the CEO until now. Being the CEO of the firm 
for nearly 30 years, there is no doubt that Mr Ren has developed a high level of firm-
specific knowledge making him an insider top manager. Moreover, the study on Delixi – 
a private tool manufacturer also illustrates that the insider manager and the long-term 
employment of the top manager contributes to the firm’s product and process innovations 
(Liu and Tylecote, 2016). Therefore, although private firms are not owned by government, 
it is reasonable to assume that they still face the other two CG factors, which is whether 
their top manager is an insider or an outsider, and the length of the top manager’s 
employment.   
Based on the literature reviewed, it is found that firms build their technical innovation 
capability in different ways, which is dictated by differences in their CGs. The differences 
exist in two areas. First, whether the top manager of a firm is insider or outsider. Second, 
the length of employment of the top manager.   
 
 
Because this research aims to study the impact of China’s NSI on BUL in China’s firms, 
these two differences are used as two factors within CG in this research to study how CG 
influences a firm’s BUL.  
Insider or outsider 
as top manager 
Length of employment 










The conceptual construct of corporate governance and a firm’s BUL is illustrated in 
Illustration 2-3. 
At this stage, the literature that discussed the diversity of SOEs in China needed to be 
addressed. The existing literature identifies some distinctions amongst firms owned by 
the government at different levels in China. Two types of firms are mostly discussed in 
the literature including SOEs owned by the central government (“central SOEs” in this 
thesis), and firms owned by township and village governments, which named township 
and village enterprises (TVEs) (Nee, 1992; Nee, 1996; Nee et al., 2007; Nee et al., 2010; 
Peng, 2001; Wong et al., 2004).  
TVEs in China represent a fascinating group of collectivist firms that are profit-driven 
and managed almost directly by officials in lower level governments. However, the TVEs 
are not “local SOEs” based on how the Chinese government classifies SOEs. Local SOEs 
in China are SOEs owned by city or provincial level governments, and managed by local 
SASAC (labelled as “local SOEs” from this point in this thesis). The local SOEs mainly 
emerged after 2004, time of which the central government has authorised provincial and 
city level governments to establish their own SASAC to manage SOEs in their locality.  
Compared to TVEs, local SOEs are often larger in size and produce more complex 
products including heavy machinery, automobiles, precision instruments and so on. 
Consequently, the local SOEs are more R&D intensive than the TVEs, which mainly 
produce agricultural products and fast-moving consumer goods. Therefore, the literature 
finds that Chinese government at different levels manages firms differently, yet fails to 




Local SOEs have distinctive nature from TVEs. This is because TVEs are often 
established by township or village governments directly to make use of local resources 
and the residual work force (often farmers). While, local SOEs often originate from 
central SOEs that were gradually decentralised by the central government to the 
provincial and city level government as a result of several SOE reforms since the 1990s 
(Krug, 2007).  
Although this group of literature did not specifically study local SOEs, it provides some 
insights on why SOEs are managed differently by the government at different levels in 
China. Four main explanations have been identified from the literature.  
First, the management ties (guanxi) between top managers of SOEs with the government 
gives SOEs easy access to capital (Peng and Luo, 2000). The management ties are easier 
to form between local government and local SOEs. The reasons are twofold. 1) This is 
highly related to how top managers of the local SOEs are selected. According to Ge et al. 
(2014) some governments tend to appoint industrial specialists as top managers of SOEs 
in their locality. 2) Such governments tend to maintain a close relationship with top 
managers of local SOEs giving them both financial and policy support. Therefore, the 
management tie between local SOEs and local officials grants the local SOEs with easy 
access to capital.  
Second, officials at the local government level have less SOEs to oversee in comparison 
to the central government, so they have the capability to manage them more efficiently 
(Nee et al., 2007). Local officials could manage and monitor SOEs in their locality more 
efficiently than officials in the central government because those local SOEs are already 




allows trust to be established more easily in a local environment. Decentralisation of 
SOEs in the 1990s transferred central SOEs to be owned and managed by provincial and 
city level governments (ibid). The local SOEs often have years of history of hiring local 
employees and interacting with the local governments. Once the ownership of some of 
SOEs transferred from the central to the local governments, the top managers of the SOEs 
are able to establish trust with the local officials easily. This is because those SOEs are 
locally embedded after years of interacting with the local governments. Thus, the local 
officials are willing to give more freedom to top managers of the local SOEs. 
Third, local officials are assessed by the speed of economic growth in their jurisdiction, 
they consider local SOEs as core economic drivers, thus, giving the local SOEs all the 
necessary freedom to generate profit (Nee et al., 2007). Such profit-driven local SOEs are 
the result of fiscal reforms that allow the local government to retain most of the profit 
made by the local SOEs apart from their taxation (Zhu and Krug, 2007). In addition, top 
managers of the local SOEs are often offered bonus if the company performs well, so 
their income is closely linked to the overall profit of the firm (Liu and Tylecote, 2009). 
Thus, both top managers of the local SOEs and the local officials have incentives to 
maximize profits and to efficiently run the local SOEs.  
Fourth, the local government is allowed to have its own industrial plans, some of which 
may differ from central government plans, local SOEs do not have to prioritise state 
objectives (Fuller, 2016). Therefore, the local SOEs are more market driven than central 
SOEs given that the local government tends to manage the local SOEs with profit-driven 
goals as mentioned above in point three. This could also explain why local officials 




Although a few explanations, as listed above, have been found in the literature that 
theoretically suggest local SOEs could be managed differently from central SOEs, there 
is still a lack of direct empirical evidences supporting this argument. Therefore, central 
SOEs and local SOEs will continue being grouped as a single construct labelled “SOEs” 
as shown in Illustration 2-2.  
2.4.4 Firm’s access to capital  
Another important part of the CG&Fs model (Tylecote and Conesa, 1999), which has also 
been recognised as crucial by Lazonick and O’Sullivan (1996) as a financial commitment 
condition, is the financial system within NSI. Therefore, this sub-section reviews the 
literature that focus on how a firm’s access to financial capital influences their innovation 
activities.  
Various studies found that China’s SOEs have privileged access to scarce capital in 
comparison to private firms (Liu and White, 2001; Boisot et al., 2011; Tylecote et al., 
2010; Xue et al., 2011; Okazaki, 2017). Studies by Peng and Luo (2000) and Yiu and Lau 
(2008) argue that SOEs in China receive cheap and easy financial capital, as well as other 
forms of capital.  
Peng et al. (2005) and Yiu and Lau (2008: 36) developed the “network-based resource 
capital model” which includes three types of capital that firms have access to in emerging 
economies like China, namely political capital – which represents government support, 
social capital – that is inter-firm collaborations, and reputational capital – where awards 
are issued by authorities and promotes collaboration within public research institutes. 
Two of the three forms of capital are of particular interest to this research, namely political 




two types of capital to firms. Social capital relies mainly on inter-firm connections so this 
is not the focus of this research. Therefore, social capital will not be discussed here.  
Political capital represents various types of favourable policies and resources provided by 
the government to firms (Yiu and Lau, 2008). Reputation capital is facilitated by the 
government to provide firms with advantages in the marketplace (ibid). The detailed types 
of capital within those two categories of capital is listed in Table 2-7.  
Although Yiu and Lau (2008) have listed detailed forms of capital under “political” and 
“reputational” capital, most of them are financial capital provided either directly or 
indirectly by the government. Amongst political capital, “easy loans from bank” is a form 
of financial capital provided by the government indirectly through the banks. “Tax relief” 
is a form of financial capital provided directly by local government. Amongst 
reputational capital, “government purchase”, “funding for R&D from government” and 
“award issued by authorities” are all financial capital provided directly by local 
government.  “Award issued by authorities” can be viewed as direct financial capital from 
the government because the government often gives financial rewards together with the 
award issued to firms.  
Since this research only aims to distinguish whether SOEs have access to a larger amount 
of financial capital provided by the government, the previously listed forms of capital will 
be grouped and labelled as “financial capital” regardless of whether firms receive it 
directly or indirectly from the government.  
Amongst the various forms of political capital, "technical training provided by the 
government”, “management knowledge provided by the government through training” 




firms. Thus, they will be grouped as “human resource capital”. This group of capital is 
included in this research because it is reasonable to propose that having access to high 
quality human resource could help a firm to adopt BUL. It is because BUL for innovation 
relies on the level of knowledge possessed by all members of the firm.  
“Information on market and technological trends” and “joint R&D projects with 
university and PRIs” are also important forms of capital that the government provides. 
However, the link between the two forms of capital with BUL is difficult to build. 
Therefore, these two forms of capital are not included in the analysis in this research.  
Table 2-7: Types of capital in Political capital and Reputational capital  






Easy Loan from banks (Easy loan)  Indirect 
Financial 
Financial  
Tax relief  Direct Financial Financial 
Technical training provided by 
government (Technical training) Human resource 
Human 
resource  
Management knowledge provided 
by government through training 
(Management knowledge) 
Human resource Human resource 
Information on market and 
technological trends  Irrelevant N/A 
Access to certain human capital 
(Human resource)  HR 
Human 
resource 
   
Reputational 
Capital 
Joint R&D project with university 
and PRIs Irrelevant N/A 
Government purchase  Direct Financial Financial 
Funding for R&D from 
government  Direct Financial Financial 
Awards issued by authorities  Direct Financial Financial 
Source: Adapted from Yiu and Lau, 2008 
The level of a firm’s access to capital has an impact on the firm’s innovation activities. 
Jiang et al. (2013) point out that private firms in China are mainly engaged in developing 




capital to invest in developing radical innovations. Therefore, with different levels of 
access to capital, SOEs and private firms are expected to have BUL. Because the BUL 
approach mainly develops incremental innovations, private firms may have more BUL 
than SOEs.  
Based on the literature, the level of a firm’s access to capital is used as an institutional 
factor that influences a firm’s BUL. It expands the financial system factor in the CG&Fs 
model by using financial capital and human resource capital.   
Moreover, various scholars argue that private firms in China have low levels of access to 
scarce capital in comparison to SOEs (Cai and Tylecote, 2005; Liu and White, 2001; 
Tylecote, 2010; Xue et al., 2011; Okazaki, 2017), which suggests that a firm’s ownership 
has an impact on the level of capital that the firms could access.  
In addition, based on the work by Yiu and Lau (2008), both financial capital and human 
resources capital are provided by the government so government plans influence what 
capital firms could have.  
Therefore, the conceptual construct of a firm’s access to capital is developed in the 
Illustration 2-4.  
 
 





Capital provided by 
government 
*Financial capital 
*Human resource capital 
BUL Firm’s 
ownership 




2.4.5 Remarks on NSI literature 
This section reviews NSI literature in five areas, namely China’s NSI, CG and innovation 
in general, CG and innovation in China’s firms, and a firm’s access to capital in China’s 
NSI.   
A few crucial insights are found that helps guide this research in the following empirical 
investigation on the impact of China’s corporate governance system, and a firm’s access 
to capital on the firm’s BUL.  
First, the literature on China’s NSI points out that China is still a planned and centrally 
controlled economy in the strategic sectors. It is because China’s government controls 
these sectors by establishing SOEs, and directs SOEs by making plans for technological 
development (Xue, 1997; Xue et al., 2011; Motohashi and Yun, 2007; Liu, 2009; Boeing 
and Sandner, 2011). Therefore, state-ownership within the corporate governance system 
is a key institutional factor of China’s NSI.  
Second, the review of the literature shows that the government’s appointment of top 
managers to China’s SOEs causes two CG problems. First, the government usually 
appoints outsiders as top managers to SOEs by. Because outsiders do not have the firm-
specific knowledge, they do not observe and appreciate low-visibility innovation 
activities (Cai and Tylecote, 2005; Tylecote and Visintin, 2008; Liu and Tylecote, 2016). 
Second, the government tends to appoint top managers for short-term employment, which 
makes them plan only for the short-term development of the firm and they avoid 
following slow-pay-off innovation activities (Liu and Tylecote, 2009; Tylecote, Cai and 
Liu, 2010). It is also found that private firms also face two corporate governance issues 




between SOEs and private firms is that top managers of private firms are appointed by 
the shareholders.   
Third, it is found that SOEs in China have privileged access to capital more than private 
firms (e.g. Cai and Tylecote, 2005; Liu and White, 2001; Tylecote et al., 2010; Xue et al., 
2011; Okazaki, 2017). It is proposed that SOEs and private firms in an emerging market 
like China receive political and reputational capital from the government, but SOEs 
receive more capital than private firms (Peng, Lee and Wang, 2005; Yiu and Lau, 2008). 
Political and reputational capital are mainly financial and human resource capital in 
nature. Furthermore, empirical evidence shows that private firms in China only develop 
incremental innovations due to lack of access to capital (Jiang et al., 2013). Because BUL 
mainly develops incremental innovations, private firms may have more embedded BUL 
practices than SOEs.  
From those insights found in China’s NSI literature, two more research questions are 
raised here to follow up on empirical investigations for understanding the impact of 
institutional factors in China’s NSI, namely corporate governance and a firm’s access to 
capital on its BUL.  
Research question 2:  





Research question 3:  
  “How does China’s corporate governance system and firms’ access to capital 




2.5 Conceptual Framework Based on Literature 
2.5.1 Research questions  
Based on insights drawn from the literature discussed in this chapter, three research 
questions have been proposed to address the overall research objective, which is to 
understand the impact of China’s NIS on a firm’s innovation activities.  
However, it is beyond the author’s capability to study all institutional factors within 
China’s NSI, two sets of institutions have been chosen, based on the literature review, to 
develop a better understanding of China’s NSI. Two sets of institutions are the corporate 
governance system, and a firm’s access to capital.  
In addition, BUL is studied as one form of innovation activity aiming to develop long-
term innovation capability firms based on the successful experience of Japanese firms in 
engineering sectors (Lam, 2002; Lam and Lambermont-Ford, 2010). BUL is crucial to 
firms in engineering sectors because the technological development of engineering 
sectors depends on continuous incremental innovation in product design and production 
processes (Nelson, 2004; Nelson and Winter, 1982).  
Therefore, the refined research objective in this research is to understand the impact of 
CG and the firm’s access to capital for the firm’s BUL. It could be further translated into 
three research questions as follows.  
Research question 1: “Do China’s firms have bottom-up learning (BUL) practices to 
develop their innovation capability, and how embedded are BUL practices?”  
Research question 2: “How the level of firms’ BUL embeddedness varies amongst firms 




Research question 3: “How does China’s corporate governance system and firms’ access 
to capital influence the adoption of embedded BUL practices in firms?”  
2.5.2 Conceptual framework  
Based on the conceptual constructs developed from the literature (See Illustration 2-3 and 
Illustration 2-4), a conceptual framework is developed as explained in the following 
paragraphs.  
It needs to be noted that, in order to identify patterns during data analysis, this research 
proposes a term named the level of BUL embeddedness of firms. The level of BUL 
embeddedness is defined as the number of embedded BUL practices a firm has adopted 
compared to other cases studied in this research. It allows the author to group cases based 
on the number of embedded BUL practices adopted by firms. (See Section 2.5.3 on page 











Link 1a and link 1b denote the impact of government plans on what capital is provided to 
firms with different ownership, namely central SOEs, local SOEs and private firms. 
Based on work by Yiu and Lau (2008) capital has been divided into financial capital and 
human resource capital. SOEs and private firms will receive both financial and human 
resource capital from the government, but to different levels.  
Link 1c denotes that the ownership of a firm’s influences the firm’s access to capital 
provided by the government. It is argued that SOEs have privileged access to capital 
provided by the government in comparison to private firms (e.g. Cai and Tylecote, 2005; 
Liu and White, 2001; Tylecote et al., 2010; Xue, Liu, and Mu, 2011; Okazaki, 2017). 
Therefore, the central and local SOEs are expected to have access to a high level of 
financial and human resource capital, but private firms would have limited access to 
capital.  
Link 1d denotes that the level of firms’ access to capital could influence a firm’s BUL. 
Jiang et al. (2013) point out that the private firms in China are mainly engaged in 
developing incremental innovations in product design and production processes due to 
the lack of capital to invest in developing radical innovations. Therefore, with a low level 
of access to capital, private firms are expected to have higher BUL embeddedness. 
Because the BUL approach mainly develops incremental innovations, private firms may 
have more embedded BUL practices. On the country, SOEs might have a low level of 
BUL embeddedness. Because they have access to a high level of capital, they could afford 
to develop radical innovations that do not rely on BUL. Therefore, this link explains 





Link 2a denotes that government plans influence the corporate governance of SOEs by 
appointing the top manager directly by SASAC (Liu and Tylecote, 2009, Tylecote et al. 
2010; Xiao et al., 2013).  
Link 2b denotes that the government could appoint either an insider or an outsider as a 
top manager to SOEs. If the top managers do not have firm-specific knowledge before 
he/she is appointed, he/she is considered as an outsider. On the contrary, if the top 
manager has rich firm-specific knowledge when he/she is appointed, he/she is considered 
as an insider.  
Link 2c denotes that the level of a top manager’s firm-specific knowledge could influence 
their tendency to adopt embedded BUL practices. An outsider lacks the firm-specific 
knowledge, so they are not capable of observing and appreciating low-visibility 
innovation activities (Tylecote and Visintin, 2008) like BUL. Therefore, firms with 
outsider top managers are likely to have a low level of BUL embeddedness. Conversely, 
firms with insider top managers are likely to have a high level of BUL embeddedness.  
Link 2d denotes that the government could appoint the top manager for either short-term 
or long-term employment. If the top manager remains in position for more than ten years, 
he/she is considered as being appointed for the long-term.  
Link 2e denotes that the length of a top manager’s employment could influence the firm’s 
BUL. This link explains whether top managers are given incentives to adopt BUL 
practices. It is argued that the short-term appointment of top managers to SOEs is one of 
the major issues to SOEs in China because it forces the top manager to make short-term 
plans in developing innovation capability (Tylecote, Cai and Liu, 2010). Because the 




long-term development of firms, short-term top managers tend to purchase readymade 
technologies since they could produce short-term benefits in increasing profit and 
boosting production rates (Liu and Tylecote, 2009). Consequently, firms with short-term 
top managers are likely to have a low level of BUL embeddedness. Because BUL is a 
slow-pay-off way of developing long-term innovation capability, the incentive of short-
term top managers to adopt embedded BUL practices is low. While long-term top 
managers, who normally plan for the long-term development of a firm’s innovation 
capability, are more likely to adopt embedded BUL practices. Therefore, the level of BUL 
embeddedness in firms with long-term top managers is likely to be high.  
It needs to be noted that, the government cannot appoint top managers to private firms. 
However, private firms still have the problem denoted by links 2c and 2e. Insider or 
outsider top managers in private firms, being appointed by shareholders for either short-
term or long-term, are still likely to face problems similar to those denoted by links 2c 
and 2e.  
The focus of analysis is on those constructs marked by bold boxes and the interaction 
between them is marked by bold arrows in Illustration 2-5.   
2.5.3 Research assumptions  
Based on the literature reviewed in this chapter, three assumptions are developed to guide 
this research. These three assumptions justify why firms should have BUL to develop 
innovation, why BUL requires long-term planning by top managers, and why BUL 
requires top managers to have firm-specific knowledge. The three assumptions are 




The literature shows that a firm’s internal knowledge and an employee’s personal 
knowledge help innovations (e.g. Patel and Pavitt, 1994; Dosi, 1988; Nelson; 2004) (see 
Section 2.3.3 for details). Moreover, utilising an employee’s knowledge repository results 
in the development of innovation capability and improved innovation performance 
(Bessant and Caffyn, 1997; Lam, 2002; Høyrup, 2010; Wei et al., 2011; Lee and Walsh, 
2016). Furthermore, it is argued that a firm’s competitive advantage depends on its 
innovation in a competitive market (O’Sullivan, 2000). Finally, Porter (2008) suggests 
that a firm’s sustained competitive advantage leads to its superior economic performance. 
Therefore, this research proposes that:  
Research assumption 1: 
BUL leads to improved innovation capability and better innovation performance, 
which consequently leads to improved economic performance. --- Thus, top managers 
of firms will adapt BUL practices if they want to have good innovation along with 
improved economic performance.  
It is argued that innovation is cumulative in its process because it requires continuous 
learning (Pavitt, 1987; Dosi, 1988; Tidd, Bessant and Pavitt, 2005; Lundvall, 2010). As 
a learning approach based on an employee’s daily working experience, BUL is likely to 
need time before its benefits could be observed. Therefore, this research proposes that: 
Research assumption 2: 
BUL practices require long term investment before their benefits can be perceived 
in terms of better innovation capability or performance. --- Thus, top managers who 




practices, as they are unable to anticipate the benefit of those practices within their period 
of employment. 
As discussed in Section 2.4.2, innovation activities in mid-high-tech sectors are less 
visible to outsiders due to their lack of firm-specific knowledge (Tylecote and Conesa, 
1999; Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006; Tylecote and Visintin, 2008). This is because radical 
innovations are developed slowly by the accumulation of continuous incremental 
innovations from problem-solving on the shop floor in some sectors (Tidd et al., 2005; 
Lundvall, 2010), such as the automobile sector (Tylecote and Visintin, 2008). Without 
sufficient firm-specific knowledge, top managers of firms are less likely to observe such 
innovation activities on the shop floor, therefore, they do not appreciate such activities 
(Tylecote and Conesa, 1999; Tylecote and Visintin, 2008). Therefore, this research 
proposes that:  
Research assumption 3: 
BUL is more difficult as it is less visible to top managers who do not have firm-
specific knowledge. This is because BUL tends to occur amongst employees on a 
daily basis. --- Thus, outsiders who do not have sufficient firm-specific knowledge are 
less likely to have an awareness of the BUL activities taking place on the shop floor. Even 
if they noticed such learning activities, they would not adapt BUL practices or facilitate 
them as they are unaware of the benefits of such learning efforts.  
2.5.4 List of BUL practices for this research 
Nine BUL practices have been identified from literature spanning four disciplines, 
namely knowledge management (KM), organisational learning (OL), human resource 




2-8. These BUL practices will be empirically investigated in firms at a later stage of this 
research.  
Moreover, these BUL practices will be evaluated in terms of whether or not they are 
embedded. It is of particular interest to this research because this research aims to study 
BUL practices in Chinese firms. As already discussed in detail in Section 2.3.1.5, having 
an effective Kaizen structure is a challenging task for firms in countries other than Japan, 
due to cultural differences (Bateman and David, 2002; Bessant et al., 1994; Doeringer et 
al., 2003; Aoki, 2008). This problem not only appears in countries that have broad cultural 
differences like in the UK and the US, but also exists in countries that historically have 
similar cultures to China (Aoki, 2008). It also suggests that BUL could face a similar 
challenge as firms could have some BUL practices, but these practices may not be 
managed well and thus do not benefit the innovation capability of those firms.  
Therefore, this research also evaluates the embeddedness of the nine BUL practices in 
firms. The level of embeddedness of a BUL practice means whether the BUL practice is 
an embedded (functioning) practice that help firms to develop their innovation capability, 
or not embedded (not functioning) practice that only exists on paper. Criteria used for 
distinguishing embedded and not embedded BUL practice will be developed based on the 
literature in the research methodology chapter to guide data analysis in the later stages of 
this research (see Section 3.6.1.1.).   
Moreover, in order to identify patterns that occur during data analysis, this research 
proposes a term named “the level of BUL embeddedness of firms”. The level of BUL 




in comparison to other cases studied in this research. It allows the author to group cases 
together based on the number of embedded BUL practices adopted by some firms.  
Table 2-8: Summary of BUL practices in the literature 
BUL practice  Discipline  Reference 
Informal event 
 
KM Hoegl and Schulze, 2005 
Expert mapping 
 
KM Hoegl and Schulze, 2005 
Record keeping of problem-
solving activities at work 
KM Hoegl and Schulze, 2005; 
Nonaka, Toyama, and 
Konno 2000 
Multi-disciplinary team for 
problem-solving 
 
OL Lam, 2002; Bolton, 1993; 
Bessant et al., 1994; Nonaka 
and Takeuchi, 1995; 




OL Coşgel and Miceli, 1999; 
Ortega, 2001; Lam, 2002; 
Lorenz and Wilkinson, 
2003; Arundel et al., 2007; 
Preenen et al., 2017 
Training employees on both 
work-related and non-work-
related topics,  
 
HRM Shipton et al., 2006 
Appraisal system that 
promotes knowledge sharing 
with co-workers, 
 




HRM Shipton et al., 2006 
Internal training 
 
HRM Lau and Ngo, 2004; Shipton 
et al., 2006; Sung and Choi, 
2014; Caloghirou et al., 
2018; Dostie, 2018 
Proposal system 
 
OM Bessant and Caffyn, 1997; 
Aoki, 2008; Aoki et al., 
2014; Lasrado et al., 2015; 
Laviolette et al., 2016; 





2.6 Chapter Conclusion  
This chapter began by reviewing innovation literature to develop a better understanding 
of how innovations are developed. It is found from the innovation literature that the 
knowledge repository of employees is a crucial source for a firm’s incremental 
innovations and that is of particular importance in engineering sectors.  
A further review of the literature on the bottom-up learning (BUL) approach proves it is 
a viable approach that promotes the utilisation of the knowledge repository of employees 
for developing incremental innovations.  
Moreover, on reviewing China’s NSI literature it is clear that a firm’s BUL could be 
influenced by two main institutional factors, namely its corporate governance system and 
the firm’s access to capital. The corporate governance factor is further divided into 1) the 
management appointment of an insider or an outsider as the top manager of a firm and 2) 
the length of employment of the top manager, according to literature (e.g. Tylecote and 
Conesa, 1999; Miozzo and Tylecote, 2001; Tylecote et al., 2002; Cai and Tylecote, 2005; 
Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006; Tylecote, 2007; Liu and Tylecote, 2016).  
Finally, a conceptual framework has been developed to study how CG and a firm’s access 
to capital (including financial capital and human resource capital) influences those firms’ 
BUL. Because CG and a firm’s access to capital are two major factors in China’s NSI, 
and BUL is an important form of learning activity in firms who rely on incremental 
innovations, like firms in the automobile sector. This research aims to develop a better 






Chapter 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter aims to identify an appropriate philosophical stance, research methods, and 
the research designs of the fieldwork. Three key questions in terms of the research 
methodology are answered in this chapter, namely 1) what is the philosophical stance that 
guides the development of knowledge in this research, 2) what research methods are 
selected to collect and analyse data to address the research questions, and 3) how research 
methods are operationalised with an appropriate research design for conducting fieldwork 
and empirical investigation.  
To answer the three questions listed above, this chapter is organised as follows: Section 
3.2 identifies the philosophical stance of this research to guide the development of 
knowledge. Section 3.3 justifies the choice of the case study as the research method for 
conducting fieldwork. Section 3.4, develops the research design to operationalise the case 
study method selected. Section 3.5, explains the data collection method. Section 3.6 
explains the data analysis method. Section 3.7 discusses the validity tests for this research. 
Section 3.8 discusses ethical considerations in this research. Section 3.9 concludes this 
chapter by summarising the key points discussed.  
3.2 Philosophical Stance  
Valid research findings are underpinned by underlying assumptions about reality and 
appropriate research methods (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). It is important to clearly state 
the philosophical stance of this research because it determines the underlying assumptions 
of what is reality, and how a knowledge of reality could be developed (Easterby-Smith et 




management research to identify the most appropriate example to address the research 
questions.  
3.2.1 Research Philosophies in management studies 
Various research into philosophical perspectives have been applied to management 
research, including two main contrasting ontological positions, namely objectivism 
advocated by positivists, and subjectivism advocated by social constructionists (Saunders 
et al., 2009). Positivists believe that social reality is objective and independent from 
interpretation by people (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). While, social constructionists 
argue that social reality is subjectively constructed by a collection of people’s 
interpretation and understanding (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). The two viewpoints of 
social reality are the foundations of positivism and social constructionism, which are 
epistemology positions concerning how a knowledge of reality could be developed 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Saunders et al., 2009).   
Thus, the positivistic management research tends to study social reality by using 
quantitative measures to objectively investigate causal-effect relationships within social 
phenomenon (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Cassell and Symon, 2004). However, social 
constructionist management research tends to study social reality by explaining different 
human experiences in a social environment (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). 
3.2.2 Philosophical stance of this research: Critical-realism  
Critical realism is an epistemological position sited between positivism and social 
constructionism. Critical realists admit the reality exists externally to its observer (i.e. the 




understood without human interpretation (Bhaskar, 1978; Bhaskar, 1986; Bhaskar, 1989; 
Blaikie, 1993; Fleetwood, 2014).  
Bhaskar (1978) argues that the reality of social phenomenon exists in three domains:  
The empirical domain consists of an observable part of the social phenomenon. 
Relating to this research, it could include the corporate governance of firms, BUL 
practices adopted by firms, the level of market competition, and a firm’s access to 
capital.  
The actual domain consists of observed and not observed parts of social 
phenomenon. In this research, it could be the top manager’s decision-making 
process regarding the adoption of BUL practices and their incentive to make long-
term or short-term plans to develop innovation.   
The real domain consists of the underlying mechanism that caused the social 
phenomenon (at the actual domain). Relating to this research, it could be the 
mechanism consisting of two elements of China’s NSI influence on a firm’s BUL 
for innovation activities.  
From the three domains of reality authored by Bhaskar (1978) it is evident to see that 
understanding the reality is difficult or unachievable without involving human 
interpretation. For example, observable parts of the social phenomenon are more 
objective and exist independently from researchers’ interpretations, like management 
practices, the firm’s structure, and so on (Chia, 2002). However, at the actual domain, the 
parts that are not observable would require the researcher to understand the wider 




process of managers, and how their personality, culture and religion influences their 
decisions.  
Understanding of the social environment is critical because critical realists aim to 
discover the underlying mechanism to social pheromones trying to explain “how” and 
“why” something happened (Ekström, 1992). 
This research aims to investigate the underlying mechanism of how two elements of 
China’s NSI influences a firm’s innovation activities. Three research questions have been 
raised, and all of them are “how” and “why” questions. Therefore, the critical realism 
epistemology position is in line with the objective and questions of this research.  
This research admits the corporate governance of firms, firms’ access to capital, the level 
of market competition, and BUL practices in firms, exist externally to the researcher. 
However, how each factor influences the top manager of firms in decision-making is a 
part of the social reality that is not observable. Thus, to discover and formulate the 
underlying mechanism that explains the interaction between factors, the author’s 
understanding of the social environment is necessary.  
3.3 Research Method: Case Study 
Yin (2009)summarises five most commonly used research methods in management 
research with corresponding situations and forms of research questions (see Table 3-1).  
This section justifies why the case study method is selected in this research and how it 






Table 3-1: Relevant Situation for Different Research Method 







Experiment How, why Yes Yes 
Survey Who, what, where, how 




Who, what, where, how 
many, how much 
No Yes/No 
History How, why No No 
Case Study How, why No  Yes 
Source: COSMOS Corporation cited in Yin (2009: 8). 
 
3.3.1 Nature of this research and the Case study method  
Yin (2009:18) defines the case study method as: “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.”  
This research aims to study the impact of two elements of China’s NSI on a firm’s BUL. 
All three research questions are “how” and “why” questions.  
The first research question is “Do China’s firms have bottom-up learning (BUL) practices 
to develop their innovation capability, and how embedded are BUL practices?” This 
question aims to investigate what BUL practices have been adopted by firms, how do 
they design their practices and how embedded are their practices.  
The second research question is “How the level of firms’ BUL embeddedness varies 
amongst firms with different ownership?” This question aims to analyse how the 
ownership of firms influences their level of BUL embeddedness.  
The third research question is “How does China’s corporate governance system and firms’ 
access to capital influence the adoption of embedded BUL practices in firms?” This 




of institutions of China’s NSI influence the level of BUL embeddedness of firms. This 
question aims to formulate a causal-explanatorily mechanism to explain relationships 
between two sets of institutions of China’s NSI and a firm’s BUL activity.  
Based on Table 3-1, experiment, history and the case study are considered to address the 
“how” and “why” research questions.  
This research studies a contemporary event that is currently how China’s NSI influences 
firms’ innovation behaviour in general. Therefore, the history method is not an 
appropriate method for this research.  
The experiment method is used when research could “manipulate behaviours directly, 
precisely, and systematically” often in a laboratory environment (Ying, 2009: 11). For 
this research, the manipulation of top managers’ behaviour is not needed. Therefore, the 
experiment method is also rejected.  
Therefore, this research uses the case study method to address its research questions.  
Yin (2009) proposes three types of case study research, namely descriptive, explanatory 
and exploratory. This research involves all three types of case study. The first research 
question investigates what BUL practices firms have adopted and how embedded those 
practices are based on their operational details. The findings would be both exploratory 
and descriptive. The research questions two analyses of how the adoption of BUL 
practices varies amongst firms with different ownership. The finding for this question 
would be exploratory. The third research question studies how China’s corporate 
governance system and a firm’s access to capital influences the level of BUL 
embeddedness. The findings will be explanatory. Therefore, the case study method is 




3.3.2 Critical realism and the case study method 
A deductive research strategy is often used in positivistic research when the aim is to 
develop generalisable theories objectively through testing the hypothesis developed from 
existing literature with quantitative methods, whilst the inductive research is often used 
by social constructionist research aiming to generate a theory by identifying patterns that 
emerge from social phenomena with qualitative data (Yin, 2009).  
This research is inductive in nature as it aims to build theories from the social phenomena 
studied. However, the research process also involves some elements of the deductive 
process when developing a conceptual framework from the literature to guide the 
empirical investigations.  
It is proposed that critical realism studies represent an underlying mechanism of social 
phenomena (Bhaskar, 1978) and aims to understand the not observable part of social 
reality that is not fully understood. It is suggested that a case study focus works well and 
precisely for studying research areas that have not yet been fully revealed (Bonoma, 1985; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). Therefore, the case study method is in line with the 
philosophical stance of this research.  
3.4 Research Design and Instrument Development  
Eisenhardt (1989) proposed a nine-step procedure for building theory from the case study 
research listed in Table 3-2.  
Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) suggest that Eisenhardt’s (1989) framework is in line with 
critical realism and is suitable for theory generation. Therefore, the instrument 





Table 3-2: Process of building theory from case study research 
 
Source: Eisenhardt, 1989: 533 
 
3.4.1 Case selection  
3.4.1.1 Number of case  
This research studies multiple cases. Eisenhardt (1989: 542) suggests using multiple cases 
for theory building because “each case is analogous to an experiment, and multiple cases 
are analogues to multiple experiments”. Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) suggest using 
multiple cases helps test and validate the emerging pattern of the relationship between 




Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) also suggest that 4-10 cases are suitable for theory building 
using the case study method. This research chose to study seven cases including four 
central SOEs, two local SOEs and one private firm.  
The rationale for case selection is discussed in the following sub-sections.  
3.4.1.2 Theoretical sampling  
This research adopts the theoretical sampling method that is widely used in management 
case studies (Glaser, 1978; Eisenhardt, 1989). This is because theoretical sampling allows 
researchers to select cases within categories that enable them to develop comparable and 
generalisable results within each category (Easterby-Smith et al. 2008).  
Moreover, Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that theoretical sampling helps identify patterns 
and relationships between constructs when purposely selecting cases with possible 
contrasting outcomes (like cases with possibly good BUL, and possibly bad BUL).  
3.4.1.3 Case selection criteria 
Because the theoretical sampling method is adopted in this research, a list of criteria is 
developed based on the research questions and existing literature. Three criteria are 
developed to guide the case selection process.  
a) Mid-high-tech sector. – As discussed in the literature review chapter, BUL is 
crucial to mid-high-tech sectors because these firms rely on continuous 
incremental innovation in their product design and production processes (Tylecote 
and Ramirez, 2006; Tylecote and Visintin, 2008). Based on OECD (2011) sector 
classification by R&D intensity, five sectors are classified as mid-high-tech 
sectors (see Table 3-3). Due to the limited time, resources and access to firms, this 




sector (“automobile” sector in the following text), and the railroad equipment 
sector.  
Table 3-3: OECD sector classification by R&D intensity, mid-high-tech sectors 
Mid-high-tech 
sector by R&D 
intensity 
Electrical machinery and apparatus 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals 
Railroad equipment and transport equipment 
Machinery and equipment 
Source: Adapted from OECD (2011: 5) 
 
b) Ownership of firms. –The literature suggests that a firm’s ownership has a 
significant influence on firms’ corporate governance and the level of firms’ access 
to capital. These factors lead to different innovation activities of the firms. 
Moreover, the literature suggests that private firms are more engaged with 
incremental innovations (Jiang et al., 2013) so they are expected to have more 
BUL practice. While SOEs are found to only be buying ready-made technologies 
(Liu and Tylecote, 2009) they are expected to have fewer BUL practices. 
Therefore, this study studies SOEs and private firms. Moreover, as discussed at 
the end of Section 2.4.3, some literature (Nee, 1992; Nee, 1996; Nee et al., 2007; 
Nee et al., 2010; Peng, 2001; Wong et al., 2004) suggests Chinese government at 
different level manage SOEs differently. This suggests that both central SOEs and 
local SOEs should be included in this research to avoid biases in the result. Thus, 
the researcher deliberately selected both central SOEs and local SOEs at the case 
selection stage.  
c) Market performance. – Because the literature suggests BUL leads to better 
innovation and economic performance (Bessant and Caffyn, 1997; Lee and Walsh, 




performance. Being able to find BUL practices in cases is important because one 
of the research interests in this study is to analyse how BUL practices are designed 
in China’s firms that are aiming to operationalise the concept of BUL. Therefore, 
cases are mainly selected from market-leading firms.  
3.4.2 Case selection results 
After several stages of negotiation with firms, seven firms have agreed to take part in this 
research. Four of them are central SOEs. Four of them in the automobile sector. Three of 
them are in the railway equipment sector. Brief details about the cases selected are listed 
in Table 3-4.  
One special case is Case G which is a 50/50 joint venture (JV) between a central SOE and 
a French company. This case is considered as a central SOE in this research because the 
CEO of Case G states that his company is not managed by their French parent company 
at all. Case G only reports to its parent company in China which is a large size central 
SOE. More detail about these cases is included in Appendix C.   
Table 3-4: Summary of case selection result 
Company 
code 
Sector Industry Ownership 
A Automobile Engine production Central  
B Automobile Commercial vehicle production  Local  
C Automobile Commercial vehicle production Local  
D Automobile Engine fuel supplying system production  Private 
E Railway equipment  Locomotive production  Central  
F Railway equipment Pantograph production  Central  
G Railway equipment Train coupler production Central 
 
3.5 Data Collection Method: Semi-Structured Interview 
37 in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted comprising respondents from 7 




level managers in charge of R&D, quality management and HRM. High-level managers 
were interviewed because they are responsible for making decisions on what BUL 
practices to adopt and how each practice is designed. Mid-level managers are interviewed 
because they would have more experience with the operation of BUL practices.  
Moreover, some shop floor employees were interviewed, when available, to triangulate 
information provided by their managers. 
Wengraf (2001: 5) suggests that a semi-structured interview design should “have a 
number of interview questions prepared in advance, but such questions are designed to 
be sufficiently open that subsequent questions cannot be planned in advance but must be 
improvised in a careful and theorising way”.  
Interview guidance is produced in this research based on the conceptual framework and 
research questions (see Appendix B). This interview guidance is provided to interviewees 
a week prior to the interviews to allow interviewees to gather necessary information for 
answering questions. However, the author deliberately asks questions in a different order 
based on the responses from interviewees to avoid them telling “beautiful” stories 
prepared beforehand. Moreover, this method is also used to allow the author to control 
the pace of the interviews to prevent the interviewee giving too much irrelevant 
information.   
3.6 Data Analysis Method  
At the preliminary stage of data analysis, interview data will be reduced according to the 
themes identified, like how a firm allows it employees to propose suggestions, and how 




Then data will be grouped into various tables according to themes, the type of BUL 
practices, the firm’s ownership, the firm’s access to capital, and the firm’s corporate 
governance, based on qualitative data analysis methods suggested by Miles et al. (2014). 
Such cross-case analysis allows the author to identify emerging patterns in the data. 
Because multiple interviewees have been interviewed in each of the firms studied, they 
often provide different information that are not in line with responses from other 
interviewees. Such information could be categorised into two groups. Two measures have 
been employed to eliminate information that are not supported by another source of data 
(Miles et al., 2014).   
First, information that has only been provided by one interviewee, and cannot be 
supported using others’ responses or secondary data. Such information will be considered 
as having a low level of validity due to potential biases of the interviewee. Only 
information that has been provided by two and more interviewees, or what could be 
verified by another source of data, have been used to identify patterns, and to generate 
findings from data analysis.  
Second, information that has been provided by multiple interviewees, but details are not 
in line with each other. Secondary data will be primarily used in this situation to verify 
the contradicting information. If secondary information is unavailable, such contradicting 
information will be excluded to avoid the bias of the researcher selecting information that 
fits the desired results.  
After data has been compressed and validated, data was re-organised to identify patterns 




3.6.1 Cross-case analysis 
The cross-case analysis addresses the first two research questions. All BUL practices in 
each case will be identified to explore what BUL practices firms have adopted. Then, the 
operational detail of each BUL practice will be discussed to evaluate how embedded are 
those practices.  
Aoki (2008) suggests that practices in China’s firms could not be effective. Therefore, all 
BUL practices in seven cases will be evaluated to determine whether they are embedded 
or not.  
In this research, an embedded BUL practice means that the practice is effective and thus 
helps the firm facilitate BUL activities. Not embedded BUL practices are not effective in 
facilitating BUL activities, so they only exist on paper. Criteria for the evaluation of BUL 
practices will be developed based on literature in the following sub-section.  
3.6.1.1 Criteria for the evaluation of embeddedness of BUL practices  
The criteria for evaluating each BUL practices are developed in the following sub-
sections. Because only five BUL practices have been identified in the seven cases in focus, 
only the criteria for these five practices will be discussed here.  
Proposal system 
It is widely suggested by scholars that the proposal system helps to improve firms’ 
innovation performance by collecting and utilising suggestions from employees (Bessant 
et al., 1994; Bessant and Caffyn, 1997; Bessant et al., 2001; Aoki, 2008; Aoki et al., 2014; 
Laviolette et al., 2016). Based on the literature (Lasrado et al., 2017; Lasrado et al., 2015), 




case, which includes 1) leadership support; 2) system capacity; 3) employee involvement; 
and 4) organisational encouragement (see Table Table 3-5).  
Table 3-5: Criteria for evaluating proposal system  
 Embedded Not embedded  
Leadership support   Top management support  Limited management support  
System capacity   Frequent (at least every six 
months)  
Infrequently (once a year or 
less)  
Employee involvement  All employees Limited employees  
Organisational 
encouragement   
Heavily rewarded  Poorly rewarded  
Problem-solving mechanisms  
As suggested by the literature, structured problem solving helps with enabling effective 
learning from problems (Marksberry et al., 2011; Tjosvold et al., 2004; Simon, 2012). 
Based on experiences from the success of Japanese firms in engineering sectors, problem 
solving mechanisms based on multidisciplinary teams is a more effective approach to 
tackle problems from different angles (Womack et al., 1991; Bessant and Caffyn, 1997; 
Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Lam and Lambermont-Ford, 2010; Lorenz and Lundvall, 
2010).  
Based on arguments from previous literature, two factors have been selected to analyse 
the embeddedness of problem-solving mechanisms in each case, which includes 1) 
whether problem-solving activities are carried out by multi-disciplinary teams; 2) whether 
the problem-solving process is governed by a structured problem-solving approach (see 
Table 3-6).  
Table 3-6: Criteria for evaluating problem-solving mechanism  
 Embedded Not embedded 
Form of problem-solving  Team-based  Individual-based  




Work-related record keeping system 
Although the importance of recording or documenting employees’ knowledge has been 
noted by various scholars, including Cyert and March (1963/1992), Nonaka and Takeuchi 
(1995: 64), Davenport and Prusak (1998), Nonaka et al. (2000), Earl (2001), and Jensen 
et al. (2007), there is a lack of literature showing how to evaluate record keeping systems. 
Thus, the criteria for evaluating the embeddedness of such practices are developed by the 
author based on general knowledge management literature.  
Two criteria are used to evaluate the embeddedness of a detailed work-related record 
keeping system. The first criterion is whether the record keeping system is based on ICT 
technologies. It is suggested that using OA software could increase the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the documentation system used to record and manage employees’ 
knowledge (Williams, 1996; Davenport, 1997). The second criterion is whether managers 
at different levels invest effort to review work records to identify problems and good 
practices. This criterion is important for distinguishing a record keeping system that only 
collects information from a system that facilitates managers learning from employees’ 
experiences. These two criteria are summarised in Table 3-7.  
Table 3-7: Criteria for evaluating Work-related record keeping system  
 Embedded Not embedded 
Record management tool Groupware or Office 
Automation software  
Paper-based, not integrated 
to office system  
Management review of 
records 
Regularly reviewed by 
managers 
Not or rarely reviewed by 
managers 
  
Internal training  
Although it has been widely recognised that internal training given to employees is one 
of the key drivers for facilitating knowledge creation (Lepak and Snell, 1999) and to 




and Choi, 2014; Caloghirou et al., 2018; Dostie, 2018), the studies on how to evaluate 
these training programmes are limited. Therefore, criteria for evaluating the 
embeddedness of internal training practices have been developed by the researcher based 
on previous literature on training in general and the notion of BUL.  
Three criteria have been selected to evaluate embeddedness of internal training practices 
adopted by the cases in focus. Firstly, whether the firm involves shop floor employees in 
their internal training. Secondly, whether the firm has programmes to develop trainers 
internally amongst its employees. Thirdly, how often this internal training is provided to 
the employees. These criteria are summarised in Table 3-8.  
Table 3-8: Criteria for evaluating internal training 
 Embedded Not embedded  
Employee involvement  Including all employees, or 
including at least production 
workers 




Have formal internal trainer 
development programmes  
Not have formal internal trainer 
development programmes 
Frequency of training  Frequently or regularly  Occasionally  
 
Job rotation of employees 
As suggested by the literature, job rotation for employees has a positive effect on a firm’s 
innovation performance (Coşgel and Miceli, 1999; Ortega, 2001; Lam, 2002; Lorenz and 
Wilkinson, 2003; Arundel et al., 2007; Martinez-Sanchez et al., 2008; Preenen et al., 
2017). One key success factor is to have well-planned job rotation routes (Triggs and 
King, 2000). In addition, it has also been suggested that job rotation should focus on 
young and new recruits as they have the highest potential to develop knowledge in 




Therefore, the job rotation scheme of cases has been evaluated in two dimensions, namely 
1) whether the firm has a well-planned route for employees to develop knowledge in 
different fields systematically through job rotation, and 2) whether job rotation is targeted 
to new and young employees (see Table 3-9).  
Table 3-9: Criteria for evaluating job rotation of employees 
 Embedded Not embedded 
Schedule of job rotation  Structured and planned  Unstructured and unplanned  
Employee involvement  Including junior employees  Only limited to managers 
 
3.6.1.2 Case groups and the definition of the level of BUL embeddedness 
After each of the BUL practices adopted by the seven cases has been evaluated, a rating 
of the level of BUL embeddedness will be given to each case. The level of BUL 
embeddedness is a relative measure on how many embedded BUL practices have been 
adopted by cases in comparison to others.  
Three levels of ratings are given to those cases studied: good BUL embeddedness, 
moderate BUL embeddedness, and poor BUL embeddedness.  
The cases will be grouped based on their level of BUL embeddedness into three groups 
for group case analysis, which will be discussed later in Section 3.6.2.  
3.6.2 Group case analysis  
The group-case analysis addresses the third research question. Based on the level of BUL 
embeddedness of cases, cross-case analysis has been developed, the cases are grouped 
into: Good BUL embeddedness group, Moderate BUL embeddedness group and Poor 




Each group of cases will be studied with three institutional factors trying to explain their 
current level of BUL embeddedness using a different combination of institutional factors 
that each case faces. Three institutional factors include 1) whether the top manager of a 
firm is an insider or an outsider, 2) the length of employment of the top manager, and 3) 
the firm’s access to capital.  
In such a way, patterns on how these three institutional factors influence firms’ adoption 
of BUL practice could be identified.  
Therefore, the group-case analysis addresses the third research question by identifying 
the impact of the three institutional factors on a firm’s BUL embeddedness.  
3.7 Research Result Validation  
3.7.1 Four validity tests 
Yin (2009: 40) proposed four validity tests to ensure the quality of the case study. These 
four validity tests are:  
a) “Construct validity” – defines the concept in focus and develops appropriate 
measures.  
BUL is defined in this research based on synthesising existing literature. Moreover, 
criteria for evaluating the level of embeddedness of BUL practices are also developed 
based on the literature (see Section 3.6.1.1).  





This research studies the impact of three institutional factors on BUL in firms by 
identifying the combination of institutional factors faced by each firm and compares firms 
in terms of their levels of BUL embeddedness.  
c) “External validity” – refers to whether the research findings could be generalised.  
The findings from these case studies could not be statistically generalised in the same way 
as quantitative studies. However, this research uses multi-cases and theoretical sampling 
to enable findings to become generalisable in similar contexts. This is because theoretical 
sampling allows researchers to select cases within categories that allows them to develop 
comparable and generalisable results within each category (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). 
d) “Reliability” – refers to whether the research process could be replicated by other 
research with the same data set.  
This research uses the same interview guidance with all interviews. Moreover, multiple 
interviewees are selected in each case to compensate any interviewee bias (Huber and 
Power, 1985).  
3.7.2 Triangulation 
Yin (2009: 116) proposes using “triangulation” as a method to verify findings from case 
studies by collecting data from multiple sources. This research triangulates the research 
results in three main ways. 
First, this research interviewed multiple respondents in each case to eliminate bias in the 
interview data (Huber and Power, 1985). Multiple interviewees have been interviewed in 
each of the firms studied. This allows the researcher to compare the information provided 




in conflict with what was provided by other interviewees will be used for further data 
analysis, and the generation of findings. 
Second, the researcher asked questions on the detailed implementation of BUL practices 
to avoid false information being given by interviewees. For example, when asking 
whether a firm has adopted an embedded proposal system, questions have been set to ask 
very specific details including, which part of the workforce is involved in this system; 
how suggestions are collected from the shop workers; how often could employees 
propose suggestions; what types of suggestion are expected from workers; who is 
responsible for assessing the usefulness of the suggestions; what is the background of the 
people who assess the suggestions; how are good suggestions rewarded, and so on. These 
detailed questions allow the researcher to know whether interviewees are telling the truth 
about what is really happening, or if they simply want to look good in public.  
Lastly, data from different sources are used in this research (Quinn, 2002). The researcher 
collected a significant amount of secondary data from online news, the company’s 
website, annual reports, documentaries, archives and so on. Moreover, the firm’s internal 
documentation such as meeting reports, Kaizen project reports, internal newspapers, 
departmental reports, etc. were also acquired when permitted. These secondary data were 
selected as they contain information that helps the researcher to understand the history of 
the company in question, to explore how BUL practices are implemented by employees, 
and to validate the information provided by the interviewees. Thus, these data play a 




3.8 Ethical Concerns  
Saunders et al. (2009) suggest that researchers should take ethical considerations into 
account in the research process. It is suggested that thorough ethical consideration makes 
respondents more cooperative (Zikmund, 2003). This research takes five steps to address 
ethical concerns. 
First, a formal statement of the research objective, the research process and the interview 
process are sent to interviewees with the aim of informing them that all data collected are 
only used for research purposes and will be securely stored under the relevant 
confidentiality regulations of the University of Birmingham. A sample of the informed 
consent form is attached in Appendix A.  
Second, during the interviews, all interviewees are notified again within the interview 
process, and data collection is based solely on the respondent’s willingness to participate. 
All interviewees can withdraw from the study during and after the investigation process. 
In such a case the relevant interview data will be deleted.  
Third, during and after the interview process, the private information of all interviewees 
will be protected and will not be disclosed to third parties.    
Fourth, during and after the interviews, all sensitive business information related to the 
data collected will be safely stored.  
Fifth, during and after the interviews all interviewees are formally advised that their views 




3.9  Chapter Conclusion 
Based on a critical realism philosophical stance, this chapter justifies that a qualitative 
study approach and a multiple-case study method should be applied to this research. The 
detailed research design, method and process that are going to be used are summarised as 
well. In addition, the research process is verified against four validity tests and 




Chapter 4: CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS:  
Analysis of Bottom-Up Learning in Firms  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to identify the BUL practices adopted by the seven cases studied. 
Moreover, this chapter evaluates the level of embeddedness of their BUL practices 
according to criteria developed from the literature. Furthermore, this chapter will analyse 
how the level of a firm’s BUL embeddedness varies amongst four central SOEs, two local 
SOEs and one private firm.  
This chapter provides empirical evidence for addressing the first two research questions: 
Research question 1: “Do China’s firms have bottom-up learning (BUL) practices to 
develop their innovation capability, and how embedded are BUL practices?” This 
question has been addressed in Chapter 5 through cross-case analysis.  
Research question 2: “How does the level of firms’ BUL embeddedness vary amongst 
firms with differing ownership?” 
From the data analysis, only five out of nine BUL practices identified from the literature 
have been found in those seven cases. Therefore, this chapter only analyses those five 
BUL practices to evaluate the level of embeddedness of the BUL practices. Five BUL 
practices that were found in the seven cases include:  
1. Proposal Systems for collecting and evaluating suggestions and solutions from 
shop floor workers to solve current technological problems (problems in existing 




2. Problem-solving mechanisms for technological problems at different levels of 
the firm in systematic ways. 
3. Work-related record keeping systems for documenting problem-solving 
activities. This is a key knowledge management strategy trying to articulate tacit 
knowledge developed during the problem-solving process. However, records 
need to be regularly reviewed by managers trying to identify good practices 
related to improving production processes and product design.  
4. Internal training for employees for professional skills based on internal trainers. 
This is an important mechanism for formal knowledge sharing between 
experienced employee and others.  
5. Job rotation of employees for developing firm-specific knowledge through 
working in different areas.  
The data analysis is organised as follows. Section 4.2 identifies BUL practices in the 
seven cases studied. In addition, the operational details of BUL practices will be 
summarised from the interview data. Based on the operational detail of each BUL practice 
provided by interviewees, the level of embeddedness of the practice will be evaluated 
based on criteria developed from the literature (See Section 3.6.1.1 for details). The BUL 
practice will be rated as either embedded - indicating it helps the firm to develop 
innovation capability through BUL, or not embedded that indicates the BUL practice only 
exists on paper. Section 4.3 evaluates the level of the firm’s BUL embeddedness of each 
case based on the number of embedded BUL practices in each case. Each of the seven 
cases studied will be given a rating to indicate its level of BUL embeddedness, using poor 
BUL embeddedness, moderate BUL embeddedness and good BUL embeddedness. The 




compare cases. It is also used to group the seven cases into three BUL embeddedness 
groups for further group case analysis in Chapter 5. Section 4.4 concludes this chapter by 
summarising core empirical findings in this research and discusses them in the context of 
relevant literature.  
In the following analysis, the names of cases are replaced by case codes for confidentiality. 
A full list of case codes and their details can be found in Appendix C.  
To allow readers to navigate easily, a note of cases’ ownership and sector will be included 
in brackets after the case code. For example, Case A is a local SOE in the automobile 
sector. It will be presented as “Case A (Local SOE, Auto)” to remind readers. Similarly, 
the word “Railway” is used to show the case is in the railway equipment sector. This 
method will also be used in the following chapters.  
The interviewees’ names are protected by using codes based on their position. For 
example, the Vice President in Case A is abbreviated as “A-VP”. This coding system will 
be used at the end of direct quotes made by interviewees provided in the following 
analysis. A full list of codes of interviewees can be found in Appendix C.  
4.2 Analysis of BUL Practices in Cases 
In this section, each one of the five types of BUL practices will be identified from the 
interview data. In addition, direct quotes made by interviewees will be used to explain the 
operational details of every BUL practice adopted by the cases studied. Finally, the level 
of embeddedness of each practice will be evaluated according to criteria developed from 




4.2.1 Proposal System  
Proposal Systems are used to collect and evaluate suggestions and solutions to the current 
technological problem in the existing production process and product design. 
The proposal system is very important for collecting and managing employee suggestions. 
In the case of China’s SOEs, their adoption of proposal systems is highly influenced by 
an administrative order issued by the central SASAC in 2006. In 2006, the central SASAC 
issued an instruction asking all SOEs at different levels to organise events with a theme 
of “love firm, give suggestions, and make contributions” (SASAC, 2006). This 
instruction could be considered as a starting point for proposal systems in all China’s 
SOEs nowadays. Such practices were initially implemented amongst tier 1 SOEs, and 
was then gradually adopted by their subsidiaries over the years (tier 2 SOEs and below). 
In this study, proposal systems in Cases A, B, C, E, F and G all initiated this instruction 
from 2010 to 2013. Case D is a private firm and thus was not affected by the instruction. 
The difference in the level of embeddedness of proposal systems in the seven cases will 
be compared in the following analysis.  
Table 4-1: Criteria for embedded and not embedded BUL practices 
Embedded Not embedded 
Top management support  Limited management support  
Runs frequently (at least 
every six months)  
Runs infrequently (once a 
year or less)  
Includes all employees Limited to senior employees 
Heavily rewarded  Slightly rewarded  
 
Moreover, flow charts of proposal systems of the seven cases are developed based on 




The embeddedness of the proposal system is evaluated according to criteria listed in Table 
4-1.  
4.2.1.1 Case A (Central SOE, Auto) 
In Case A (Central SOE, Auto), the firm has implemented a proposal system labelled 
Suggestion Scheme aiming to collect suggestions from employees since 2012. As an SOE 
owned by the central SASAC, their initiative to adopt the proposal system is derived from 
the instruction issued by the central CASAC.  
The Suggestion Scheme of Case A (Central SOE, Auto) is an event-like programme 
which runs once a year and lasts around a month and is managed by mid-level managers 
at department level. Mid-managers will collect suggestions from employees in their 
departments once a year and choose any good suggestions to report to the high-level 
managers.  
Employees participate in the Suggestion Scheme on a voluntary basis. Each suggestion 
will be rewarded with 5 RMB. At the end of the Suggestion Scheme every year, the top 
five suggestions will be selected by high-level management and given financial rewards. 
The financial reward for the top five suggestions varies every year, but on average is 
around 800 RMB.  
However, the level of embeddedness of their proposal system is very low for two reasons.  
First, according to the interviewees, the proposal system in Case A lacks management 
support. Lack of management support makes low-level employees fear that by offering 
suggestions to higher level managers will upset their direct supervisors and lead to some 
form of punishment. One CNC worker reports that: “I normally just report it [suggestions] 




without telling your direct superiors. … This will make my superiors unhappy, so will 
make me miserable later on… (A-CNC)”. This indicates that the high-level managers do 
not show strong support to employees who propose suggestions directly to them. In 
addition, responses from this interviewee indicates that proposing suggestions that bypass 
their direct supervisor is deemed unacceptable in Case A. With limited support from the 
management, the proposal system is unlikely to be embedded.  
Second, the proposal system only runs once a year, which is infrequent based on the 
criteria. This further demonstrates that it is not embedded.  
Although the proposal system is open to all employees and provides a relatively good 
financial reward for high-quality suggestions, with the limited management support and 
infrequent suggestion collation, the proposal system in Case A (Central SOE, Auto) is 
considered as not being embedded. This is because employees have concerns about being 
penalised after proposing suggestions to high-level managers that would outweigh any 
motivation provided by the financial rewards.  
4.2.1.2 Case B (Local SOE, Auto) 
In Case B (Local SOE, Auto), the firm introduced their proposal system in around 2010 
as part of the introduction of the Toyota Production System (TPS). They invested nearly 
1 million RMB in hiring a professional management consulting company from Japan to 
design the TPS for them. For managing the proposal systems in Case B, they established 
a Product Creation Committee at company level that was specifically responsible for 
collecting, evaluating and implementing suggestions made by employees. This committee 
comprises permanent members of staff including the CEO, vice presidents and senior 




from different departments, and experts from universities and other external organisations. 
Therefore, such a committee has both firm-specific and industry-specific expertise when 
evaluating suggestions from employees. 
Their proposal system has two main parts, namely the Kaizen Idea Programme and the 
Kaizen Team Programme, both managed by a Product Creation Committee at company 
level.  
The first part is called the Kaizen Idea Programme which collects work-related 
suggestions from all employees aiming to improve work efficiency by making 
incremental changes to the work processes.  
The system was designed to allow employee participation in the system on a voluntary 
basis. However, the involvement of employees in this programme is very low because of 
a lack of a company-wide culture to encourage proposing suggestions to higher level 
managers, this is a similar problem to the one faced by Case A (Central SOE, Auto).  
Thus, Case B (Local SOE, Auto) changed the system to a compulsory programme in 2011 
that all employees, including managers, must propose a certain number of work-related 
suggestions to the Kaizen Idea Programme every year. This programme runs throughout 
the year so that employees could make their suggestions at any time. According to the 
vice president of Case B “… everyone was asked to make five suggestions related to their 
job. … Those suggestions will be proposed directly to our committee [Product Creation 
Committee] through our online system so that other managers cannot manipulate their 
subordinates in this [suggestion making].” (B-VP) 
Therefore, with a compulsory proposal system, the involvement of employees in making 




the quality of suggestion made by employees. Thus, Case B has introduced an incentive 
mechanism to reward good suggestions with greater financial rewards. High quality 
practical suggestions will be selected by the Product Creation Committee every year and 
awards varying from 2,000 to 5,000 RMB will be made to each good suggestion. The 
average salary of a shop floor worker in Case B is around 4000 RMB. Thus, the amount 
of financial reward is high enough to stimulate employees into making high-quality 
suggestions.   
It has been noted by the Head of Production department that “the quality of suggestion 
[Kaizen Idea] and projects [Kaizen Teams] has improved dramatically in last few years. 
I think it is because we have gradually developed a culture in our company that 
encourages them [the shop floor workers] to make suggestions and improve their work. … 
I feel that proposing ideas to managers is very common among our workers now.” (B-
HoP) 
The second part is the Kaizen Team Programme, which allows employees to form small 
project teams on a voluntary basis to solve any complex technological problems they 
choose. The Kaizen teams need to register their projects with the Product Creation 
Committee at first. After the committee has approved their projects, they are able to apply 
for resources and working hours to work on their projects. If the project successfully 
solves challenging technological problems, the company will reward them financially. 
The amount of reward ranges from 5,000 to 20,000 RMB to each team member. 
Furthermore, Case B allows the Kaizen teams to patent their outcomes privately. Then, 
the company will purchase the patents from the employees at market value. This 
mechanism allows employees to be fairly compensated if they develop innovative 




allows its employees to patent the outcome of problem-solving projects privately only 
occurs in Case B amongst all the cases involved in this research.  
The proposal system in Case B (Local SOE, Auto) is embedded because the top 
management supports it, it runs all year long, it involves all employees, and it offers high 
financial rewards for high-quality suggestions.  
4.2.1.3 Case C (Local SOE, Auto)  
In Case C (Local SOE, Auto), the firm introduced their first proposal system in around 
2012. Therefore, they have had similar problems as those faced by Case A (Central SOE, 
Auto) in terms of employees being reluctant to proffer suggestions due to concerns about 
being penalised by their direct supervisor. However, the poor performance of the old 
proposal system over nearly three years, has prompted them to form a long-term joint 
research programme in management studies with a local university, aiming to redesign 
their entire management structure, including the proposal system. This university is one 
of the leading universities in management studies in China. Based on QS (2017) World 
University Rankings by Subject, their management school is ranked 11th in China in 2017. 
Unfortunately, by the time the interviews were conducted, the new proposal system had 
yet to be launched. Therefore, the original proposal system will be discussed in this thesis.  
The Kaizen Committee manages the current proposal system at company level. This 
committee is directly led by the CEO and comprises nearly all high-level managers of 
Case C and senior level engineers in their R&D department. In addition, two groups of 
experts are also often invited to join the committee temporarily to evaluate the quality 
and usefulness of the Kaizen suggestions and Kaizen projects. The first group of experts 




specific knowledge and also professional knowledge so that they can evaluate the 
practicality of suggestion made by employees. The second group of experts are professors 
from local universities in different disciplines to provide more up-to-date knowledge on 
how to operationalise suggestions from employees. Therefore, such a committee has both 
firm-specific and industry-specific expertise. 
The proposal system includes two programmes namely the Kaizen Suggestions and the 
Kaizen Projects. Employees take part in these two programmes on a voluntary basis. 
Firstly, employees are able to make suggestions to the Kaizen Suggestions programme 
and they will receive 5 RMB for each suggestion they make. The ten best suggestions 
will be selected every half year and are awarded 800 RMB each.  
Secondly, if a group of employees want to solve a more challenging technological 
problem together, they can form a team and register with the Kaizen Projects programme 
to apply for resources and time from the Kaizen Committee to carry out their experiment. 
However, before they can be approved as a Kaizen project, the team has to produce some 
preliminary outcomes to be presented to the committee to justify the validity of their 
project. In other words, Kaizen teams need to invest personal time and money to produce 
some outcomes to convince the committee to recognise and formally register their works 
as Kaizen projects.  
Successful projects are financially rewarded but the amount of reward varies dramatically 
according to the significance of the problem being solved. Moreover, no further financial 
rewards will be given even though the outcomes of some Kaizen projects are patentable 
innovations. Instead, the VP in Case C notes that in addition to money given to successful 




provincial level and even national level awards… (C-VP)”. The company will provide 
help to their employees when they apply for such awards.  
As opposed to the situation in Case B (Local SOE, Auto), Case C (Local SOE, Auto) 
specifically forbids Kaizen Project teams to patent their outcome privately, as noted by 
administration manager: “… they [the Kaizen teams] cannot patent their outcome under 
their names because they have used the company’s resources and working hours to work 
on their project… If outcomes from the Kaizen projects are patentable, our company must 
be the owner of those patents…” (C-AM).  
The embeddedness of the proposal system is questionable for two main reasons.  
First, Case C (Local SOE, Auto) lacks supports from mid-level managers. Although Case 
C has a company level committee that manages the proposal system, which is very similar 
to the one in Case B (Local SOE, Auto), it seems that employees in Case C are simply 
reluctant to make suggestions in the first place.  
According to the assistant of the Administration Manager in Case C, who has worked in 
the production department for one year as part of his job rotation: “… if I was a skilled 
worker, I would not propose anything in Kaizen programme. … It is not worth it to get 
that 800 RMB but upset your supervisors.… (C-AoAM)”. 
The reflection by the assistant of the Administration Manager indicates that Case C may 
lack a culture among managers to appreciate their subordinates to report things to high-
level managers, thus bypassing them. The consequences of doing so might lead to some 
sort of punishment. In addition, in the minds of the employees, the amount of the rewards 





Secondly, the reward system of Case C is vaguely linked with the proposal system. The 
amount of financial reward for good suggestions is 800 RMB for each from a total of 20 
good suggestions selected annually. However, the average monthly salary of a shop floor 
worker in Case C is around 2,000 – 3,000 RMB. Therefore, the 800 RMB seems not that 
attractive to the employees in Case C to propose high-quality suggestions. In addition, 
with gaining that 800 RMB, they run the risk of ruining the relationship with their direct 
supervisors. 
Although their proposal system involves all employees and runs twice a year (relatively 
frequently), due to the two problems discussed above their proposal system would not 
work properly.  
Therefore, taking into consideration the two problems linked with the proposal system in 
Case C, it is reasonable to conclude that their proposal system is not embedded.  
4.2.1.4 Case D (Private, Auto)  
In Case D, their case is quite different from all other cases as Case D is a private limited 
company. Their entire management system is nearly all designed by a mid-level manager, 
the Head of Quality Assurance Department (HoQC), who is very interested in modern 
management studies. He has not had any formal education or training in management 
courses. Instead, he learnt management theories and practices from reading books.  
The proposal system used in Case D is entirely designed by the HoQC. Case D has a 
Kaizen Committee at company level led directly by the CEO. Moreover, all senior level 
managers are also members of this committee plus the HoQC who has designed the entire 




often invited to join the committee temporarily when evaluating suggestions made by 
employees. The proposal system in Case D includes two programmes.  
The first one is a Suggestions Scheme that asks employees to make work-related 
suggestions voluntarily. Each suggestion will be rewarded 5 RMB as a “… symbolic 
reward… (D-HoQC)”. The suggestions are evaluated every three months, and the best 
suggestion will be awarded 500 RMB.  
The second one is a programme named Focus Topic. The company will publish a list of 
technological problems every year and allows technological experts to choose which to 
solve. The vast majority of these problems occur during production and are reported by 
first line managers. According to the Head of Production Department: “… Those 
problems are not that difficult but required experienced worker and engineers to invest 
extra effort to work out the best solutions gradually. …Successful projects will be 
rewarded financially to motivate them to participate [Focus Topic]. … (D-HoP)”. The 
amount of reward for successful individuals or teams in Focus Topic program is around 
5000 RMB per individual or per team.  
A Kaizen Committee manages both programmes at company level led directly by the 
CEO. Moreover, all senior level managers are also members of this committee. Apart 
from members of the committees, experienced workers and engineers are often invited to 
join the committee temporarily when evaluating suggestions made by employees. 
Although the setup of the Kaizen Committee is very similar to the Cases B and C (Local 
SOEs, Auto), Case D (Private, Auto) does not have access to invite external technological 
experts as their local university is very weak in engineering studies. Therefore, their 




The proposal system of Case D (Private, Auto) is considered as embedded. First, the 
proposal system in Case D is strongly supported by top management, involves all 
employees and runs all year long. Moreover, all suggestions are evaluated every three 
months, which is frequent enough for employees to receive rewards quickly and thus they 
remain motivated. 
Second, the amount of financial reward for the Suggestion Scheme and Focus Topic is 
sufficient to motivate employees to participate. The average monthly salary of a shop 
floor worker in Case D is about 1500. The salary level is very low in comparison to that 
in other cases. This is because Case D is located in a poorly developed area in Eastern 
China, where the overall income level is also very low. 500 RMB for the best suggestions 
contributes significantly to the income of its employees. Moreover, a 5000 RBM reward 
for successful individuals and teams in Focus Topics is even more attractive to employees 
in Case D.  
4.2.1.5 Case E (Central SOE, Railway) 
In Case E (Central SOE, Railway), the firm started their proposal system in 2012 
following an order issued by their parent company CRRC – the monopolistic firm that 
dominates the railway sector in China.  
The earliest proposal used by Case E is labelled the Suggestion Scheme, which asks 
employees to make work-related suggestions to mid-level managers (the head of the 
department). The mid-level managers will report any good suggestions to the Lean 
Production Office at company level. This office is only an administrative office with three 
staff to organise suggestions handed in by mid-level managers and to finally report to 




Employees receive 5 RMB for each suggestion they make to the Suggestion System. 
Moreover, the top ten suggestions will be selected by high-level management every year 
and gives 500 RMB to each of them. These are the only two types of rewards that 
employees are able to receive from taking part in the Suggestion Scheme.   
In 2013, the proposal system was renamed as Gold Point without any change to its 
operation. In 2015, the proposal system was renamed as Five Small. This name comes 
from five categories of suggestions that the company expects to receive from employees, 
namely: “… small improvement, small invention, small creation, small saving, and small 
suggestion … (E-VP)”. However, the operation of the proposal system still remains the 
same.  
The proposal system in Case E (Central SOE, Railway) is considered as not embedded 
for three reasons.  
Firstly, the top management support to the proposal system is not as high as in Case B 
(Local SOE, Auto) and Case D (Private, Auto). This is because the proposal system in 
Case E is managed by a small office at company level that does not have the authority to 
make any decisions. Their role is simply collecting suggestions and sending them over to 
mid-level managers, instead of top managers. Based on the criteria, this means the 
proposal system in Case E is not embedded.   
Second, the proposal system in Case D is an event like a programme that only runs once 
a year and lasts only a month.  
Secondly, the amount of financial reward given to the top ten suggestions does not seem 
sufficient to motivate employees to actively make suggestions. The average monthly 




kind of reward to high-quality suggestions made by employees, seems insufficient based 
on those experiences in Cases B and C.  
Therefore, although the proposal system in Case E involves all employees, the 
embeddedness of this system is still not embedded.  
4.2.1.6 Case F (Central SOE, Railway)  
In Case F (Central SOE, Railway), they introduced their proposal system called the 
Suggestion Scheme as an important part of their lean production practices in early 2015. 
By the time of the interview, the CEO was about to hold a meeting with all senior level 
managers to discuss the outcome of having lean production practices for a year. 
According to the CEO in Case F: “… after one year of introducing lean production to 
our company, we saved nearly 600,000 RMB on raw materials and about 250,000 RMB 
on maintaining machinery and replacing accessories… based on suggestions from our 
employees…(F-CEO)”. 
The Suggestion Scheme of Case F is managed by a Lean Production Office lead by a VP 
at company level along with a few staff. This office is responsible for collecting 
suggestions directly from first-line employees. Suggestions collected will be anonymised 
by the office. Then, suggestions will be categorised based on their content and are sent to 
the department heads of the relevant departments for evaluation. With an anonymising 
mechanism, department heads would not know who has proposed the suggestions even 
though they are responsible for the evaluation stage.  
Case F learnt this mechanism from a Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) firm 
located close to them. In 2011, the CEO of Case F organised a visit to the Japanese FDI 




from the Japanese firm to anonymise the evaluation system to avoid any bias of mid-level 
managers when evaluating suggestions.  
Employees will receive 5 RMB for every suggestion they make. All high-quality 
suggestions will be selected by the Lean Production Office every year and each will be 
awarded 500 RMB. It is found from interviews that Case F has very weak production 
capabilities as they inherited poorly trained workers from their parent company when they 
initially started. Therefore, the salary for shop floor workers was set very low, which is 
only around 1500 RMB a month. Thus, a 500 RMB reward could contribute significantly 
to the overall income of employees who actively make high-quality suggestions.  
Therefore, although Case F (Central SOE, Railway) has just introduced their proposal 
system for a year, the proposal system is carefully designed incorporating the experience 
from the Japanese FDI firm to ensure the embeddedness of the system. Moreover, the 
rewarding system linked with the proposal system is also well designed to motivate 
employees to make suggestions.  
The proposal system in Case F is considered as embedded. First, it is strongly supported 
by the top management because they have an office led by a vice president to manage the 
proposal system. Second, it involves all employees. Third, Case F rewards high quality 
suggestions with generous financial rewards.  
Although it only runs once a year, it is considered as reasonable given that they only 
introduced the proposal system for about a year when the company was interviewed. 




4.2.1.7 Case G (Central SOE, Railway)  
In Case G (Central SOE, Railway), they did not have a formal suggestion system as their 
organisational structure is significantly less hierarchical than all other cases studied. The 
CEO of Case G stated: “… we have a very flat organisation structure. Everyone can 
simply come to my office if they want. They can discuss their suggestions with me directly. 
Or, they can tell their line manager and their line manager can come to me… (G-CEO)”.  
Moreover, Case G is only an assembly plant that does not produce anything in-house. The 
couplers of trains are not complex devices to assemble. The underlying technological 
difficulties are embedded in raw materials and production. In addition, they have only 
two types of products transference, so their assembly works are relatively straightforward 
and not labour intensive.  
However, it was revealed during the interviews that with a flat organisational structure, 
employees in Case G make suggestions to high-level managers in two areas even though 
they do not have a formal proposal system. Firstly, assembly workers have made some 
improvements to the existing assembly tools based on their work experience. Moreover, 
they also invented a rotating platform to help them with holding different parts during 
assembly which dramatically increased their working efficiency. The Head of Assembly 
division states: “… we used to spend 12 working hours to assemble one pair of train 
coupling systems… [However] we reduced this to 8 hours … with our improved tools and 
rotating platform … (G-HoA)”. 
Secondly, since Case G (Central SOE, Railway) does not have a production capability, 
they appoint experienced engineers from the R&D departments to work very closely and 




technologies. They have a strong in-house R&D department focusing on improving 
imported technologies but outsource all production. Case G will send engineers to help 
suppliers solve technological production problems. However, if engineers learnt any new 
knowledge from their experienced suppliers, the engineers will report that new 
knowledge back to Case G to help their R&D department with improving the product 
design in the future. It is noted by Head of R&D department: “… our engineers…help our 
supplier … with their technological problems … [however] some of our suppliers are 
very experienced, so our engineers have learnt a lot from them and report back to us 
[company]… [which] helps with future product development … (G-HoR&D)”.  
Therefore, although Case G does not have a formal proposal system in place, their 
employees still make suggestions based on their work and interaction with suppliers to 
high-level managers. This is partly due to the flat organisation structure they have.  
In addition, the CEO has also developed an environment where employees can freely 
propose suggestions to senior level managers. This environment also plays a major role 
in ensuring an informal proposal system works. It shows a high level of top management 
support to employees who propose suggestions. Thus, in this study, Case G will be 
considered as having an embedded proposal system even though they do not have a 
formal, dedicated proposal system. 
4.2.1.8 Summary of proposal systems  
Empirical evidence shows that although the central SASAC has instructed all SOEs to 
adopt proposal systems, SOEs design their proposal system differently. The proposal 
system in the private firm also differs from what SOEs have. The difference in the 




Moreover, empirical evidence shows that embedded proposal systems share four 
characteristics. First, embedded proposal systems are strongly supported by top 
management of the firms. It allows firms to implement good suggestions and motivates 
employees to make suggestions. Second, embedded proposal systems involve all 
employees. Third, embedded proposal systems run frequently every year. Finally, 
embedded proposal systems generously reward high-quality suggestions.  
In addition, Table 4-2 summarises the proposal systems in all cases and is accompanied 
by typical quotes from interviewees.  
Table 4-2: Summary of proposal system practices in all cases and representative quotes 
Proposal System 
Company Practices  Quotes  
A Suggestion Scheme for 
individuals  
“We have our Suggestion Scheme to collect 
suggestions from our employees. Suggestions 
could be related to the product, production and 
also management. We pay 5 yuan for each 
suggestion. Every year we will select the 5 best 
suggestions and give them awards”. (A-CE) 
B Kaizen Idea Programme 
Kaizen Team Programme 
“We have two different Kaizen programmes, but 
all are supervised by our Product Creation 
Committee. We have the Kaizen Idea 
programme to gather suggestions from all 
employees … [all employees] are asked to 
propose five suggestions related to their job. … 
Our Kaizen Team programme is designed to 
allow workers who share the same interests in 
certain problems to form a team. …targeting 
more complex and challenging problems.” (B-
VP) 
C Kaizen programme for 
individuals and terms  
“We have the Kaizen programme every half 
year. Employees can form teams or work alone 
to work on their new ideas. Their achievement 
will be evaluated by our committee every half 
year and will select the top ten Kaizen 
suggestions [for rewarding].” (C-VP) 
D Kaizen Programme 
Focus Topic  
“…we have the Kaizen programme and the 
Focus Topic programme. We have the Kaizen 
programme every three months. We formed a 
Kaizen committee composed of high-level 
managers and department directors, as well as 




Topic programme … allows employees to solve 
the problems we listed each year. [Employees] 
choose any topic and use company resources to 
solve it.” (D-HoQC) 
 
E Kaizen events since 2012 
last around one month 
every year 
(Renamed as Gold Point in 
2013, refined and renamed 
as Five Small Ideas in 
2015) 
“After we introduced Kaizen in 2012, we have 
had many company events that ask for 
suggestions from employees. We started a 
project called “Gold ideas” from 2013. This 
aims to allow employees to propose their 
suggestions regarding production processes, 
health & safety, waste elimination, and so on. … 
In 2015, we further clarified what we expect 
from our employees by giving them 5 categories 
of Kaizen suggestions. It is called “Five Small 
Ideas” including small improvement, small 
invention, small creation, small saving, and 
small suggestion. This classification includes 
suggestions about the products, production 
processes and managerial flaws.” (E-VP) 
F Proposal System “We have a proposal system for employees to 
submit suggestions directly to high-level 
management. … They can suggest anything 
related to their work.” (F-CEO) 
G Informal proposal system 
due to flat organisational 
structure  
“… we have a very flat organisation structure. 
Everyone can simply come to my office if they 
want. They can discuss their suggestions with 
me directly. Alternatively, they can tell their line 
manager and the line manager can come to me.” 
(G-CEO) 
 
“They can even go to the CEO’s office directly 
because all of our employees have a very good 
personal relationship.” (G-HoR&D) 
 
“If they have suggestions about products, they 
can tell them to our director of the R&D 
department, or tell our CEO directly.” (G-HoA)  
 
Finally, an illustrative table is produced to clearly display the empirical findings (See 







Table 4-3: Summary of findings on proposal system practices in firms and its effectiveness 
BUL Practices 








■ Has the BUL practice   ● BUL practice is embedded  
□ Do not have the BUL practice  ○ BUL practice is absent or not embedded  
 
4.2.2 Problem-solving mechanisms 
Problem-solving mechanisms aim to solve technological problems at the different levels 
of the firm in systematic ways to effectively learn from problems (Marksberry et al., 2011; 
Tjosvold et al., 2004; Simon, 2012). 
The problem-solving mechanism adopted by the seven cases studied will be analysed in 
the following sub-sections.   
In commercial vehicle sectors, ISO/TS 16949 is a technical standard that all firms need 
to follow and will be certified against if they want to become suppliers to major car 
manufacturers like Ford, Toyota, Volkswagen, and so on. It is designed by the world’s 
leading automobile manufactures together to ensure the competence of their OEM 
suppliers. ISO/TS 16949 specifically requires certified firms to have a formal problem-
solving mechanism to solve production and quality problems.  
In the railway equipment sector, the international standard is called the International 




to train manufacturers, a firm must be certified by IRIS. The IRIS standard also has a 
specific requirement for firms to have formal problem-solving mechanisms to solve 
production and quality problems.  
In this research, Cases B, C and D all have parts of their business supplying the main 
automobile manufactures. Therefore, they have all been certified according to ISO/TS 
16949. Case A does not supply to major automotive manufactures, so they do not follow 
ISO/TS 16949.  
Similarly, all cases in the railway equipment sector including Cases E, F and G are 
certified by IRIS.  
Such international quality standards impose top-down instructions on firms to have 
problem-solving mechanisms. However, both ISO/TS 16949 and IRIS do not specify 
what problem-solving mechanisms should be adopted. Therefore, these seven cases have 
designed their problem-solving mechanisms differently. Such differences could also 
embed some problem-solving mechanisms, while others do not.  
Therefore, the level of embeddedness of problem-solving mechanisms in all seven cases 
will be evaluated in the following sub-sections. The criteria of embedded problem-solving 
mechanisms are developed from the literature and summarised in Table 4-4 
Table 4-4: Criteria for embedded and not embedded problem-solving mechanism  
Embedded Not embedded 
Team-based Individual-based 








4.2.2.1 Case A (Central SOE, Auto)  
Case A only produces diesel engines, so it does not need to comply with TS 16949. Its 
products are primarily used by the defence sector, so it has another standard to follow. 
Case A is certified by a standard devised by the PLA General Armament Department, 
which is not available to the author. Therefore, it is not clear whether the standard requires 
firms to have a defined problem-solving mechanism or not, like those required in 
ISO/TS16949.  
The problem-solving mechanism in Case A divides technological problems into two types. 
The first type is simple problems occurring in daily productions. It is the responsibly of 
low-level engineers – technologists on the shop floor, to work out solutions. 
Technologists will work with employees to collectively solve any simple problems that 
arise. The problem-solving activities on the shop floor are supervised by line managers.  
The second type of problems is where they are too complex and challenging to be solved 
merely by workers and technologists on the shop floor. These problems emerge mainly 
from R&D projects and producing prototypes. Moreover, major quality defects reported 
by customers are another source of complex problems.  
This type of problem is solved by project teams comprising experts from different fields. 
The members of such problem-solving teams are temporarily appointed by high-level 
management. They will return to their original position after the problem has been solved.  
Since complex problems involve a high level of investment in time and resources, 
problem-solving teams will be led by one or two senior level managers at vice president 




solving activities, they will give the problem-solving team sufficient authority to make 
decisions quickly when needed.  
The problem-solving mechanism in Case A (Central SOE, Auto) is considered as 
embedded because it relies on multi-disciplinary problem-solving teams at company level 
to solve challenging technical problems.  
As mentioned in the introduction, ISO/TS 16949 is an industrial standard devised 
collectively by the world’s leading car manufacturers to certify their suppliers. This 
standard has an instructive top-down influence on making firms in the automobile sector 
have a defined problem-solving process.  
ISO/TS 16949 states that “the organisation shall have a defined process for problem-
solving leading to root cause identification and elimination” (ISO/TS 16949, 2002: 32).  
Therefore, Cases B, C and D have to have a formal and defined process to solve problems. 
However, because the standard does not specify what method to use for problem-solving, 
the design of the problem-solving mechanism varies amongst them. As does the 
embeddedness of their problem-solving mechanism.  
4.2.2.2 Case B (Local SOE, Auto)  
In Case B (Local SOE, Auto), the entire problem-solving mechanism is based on the Eight 
Disciplines Problem-solving Method 1  (8D method) developed by the Ford Motor 
Company. The 8D method is primarily used to develop long-term solutions to 
                                                 
1 Eight Disciplines Problem-solving (8D) method was developed by Ford Motor Company based on PDCA 
(plan, do, check, act) logic. “D0: Plan; D1: Use a team; D2: Define and describe the problem; D3: Develop 
interim containment plan; implement and verify interim actions; D4: Determine, identify, and verify root 
causes and escape points; D5: Choose and verify permanent corrections (PCs) for problem/nonconformity; 
D6: Implement and validate corrective actions; D7: Take preventive measures; D8: Congratulate your 




technological problems(Duffy, 2014). Case B uses this method extensively as they 
require all employees to follow this 8D method when solving technological problems at 
the company level, at the department level, and at shop floor level.  
The second discipline of the 8D method is to form a problem-solving team comprising 
experts from different disciplines (Duffy, 2014). Therefore, Case B relies heavily on 
multi-disciplinary teams to solve technological problems.  
In Case B (Local SOE, Auto), simple technological problems are solved by quality circles 
(QCs) at shop floor level. Each quality circle comprises a few engineers and workers from 
each production division. The members of the quality circles are relatively stable so that 
they can constantly work together to solve problems.  
If certain problems are beyond the competence of the QCs at shop floor level to solve, 
department heads will ask experts in their department to form teams to tackle those 
problems by forming temporary problem-solving teams using the 8D method.  
Problems that require a joint effort from different departments will be solved by teams at 
company level. These teams will be led by senior-level managers to give them the 
authority to allocate resources and autonomy in making decisions. The problem-solving 
teams at company level are also temporarily formed so members of the teams will return 
to their position after the project is accomplished.  
To sum up, Case B relies on permanent QCs to solve daily technological problems, and 
temporary problem-solving teams at department and company level solve problems that 
are more complicated and challenging. All of the problem-solving teams in Case B need 




The problem-solving mechanism in Case B (Local SOE, Auto) is embedded for two 
reasons. First, it is largely based on multi-disciplinary teams to solve technological 
problems. Second, it adopts the 8D problem-solving method as a structured problem-
solving mechanism to develop long-term solutions to problems.  
Moreover, the use of temporary multi-disciplinary problem-solving teams encourages 
BUL because team members can share tacit knowledge by working collectively. After 
they return to their original position, they can take the new tacit knowledge with them 
and share with other colleagues.  
4.2.2.3 Case C (Local SOE, Auto)  
In Case C (Local SOE, Auto), the problem-solving mechanism is also extensively based 
on the 8D method of problem-solving. Their system is very similar to the one used in 
Case B (Local SOE, Auto).  
However, Case C does not rely merely on quality circles to solve technological problems. 
Instead, supervisors in the production divisions in Case C will appoint temporary 
problem-solving teams comprising workers and engineers with different expertise at shop 
floor level to address any technological problems that are relatively simple to resolve. 
Quality circles in Case C are mainly responsible for improving production efficiency and 
product quality through slowly modifying production processes.   
Problem-solving teams at the department and company levels are very similar to the set 
up in Case B (Local SOE, Auto).  
Case C also forms temporary multi-disciplinary teams to solve problems at company level 
and departmental levels. All members of the teams will return to their original posts once 




Therefore, Case C (Local SOE, Auto) has an embedded problem-solving mechanism 
using multi-disciplinary teams. In addition, the mechanism is structured based on the 8D 
method.  
As mentioned above, the use of temporary multi-disciplinary problem-solving teams 
encourages BUL by allowing members of the problem-solving teams take newly 
developed tacit knowledge back to their original post to share it with their colleagues. 
This helps the dissemination of tacit knowledge across the organisation. Cases B and C 
matches with the description of a typical J-form organisation identified by Lam (2002; 
Lam, 2005).  
4.2.2.4 Case D (Private, Auto)  
In Case D (Private, Auto), although they need to comply with the ISO/TS 16949 standard, 
they do not use the 8D method. Instead, they use PDCA2  (plan, do, check and act) 
approach developed by Deming (1950) to improve product quality and resolve 
technological problems.  
Case D relies on quality circles (QCs) to solve daily technological problems occurring in 
production. The members of QCs are workers and engineers at shop floor level. They will 
try to solve technological problems on a daily basis. Because the members of the QCs are 
stable, they can easily share tacit knowledge through daily interaction.  
The technological problems that emerge during R&D and producing new products are 
specifically dealt with by temporary problem-solving teams at company level led by 
senior-level managers. Moreover, problems occurring in daily production but beyond the 
                                                 
2 PDCA, also known as Deming Cycle, is a systematic approach including four steps, namely plan, do, 
check and act, for learning and knowledge development to continually improve products or processes. (See 




capability of the QCs to solve will also be dealt with by the problem-solving teams. 
Problem-solving teams are experts from different departments summoned directly by 
senior-level managers. After the problem is solved, they will return to their original 
positions.  
Furthermore, Case D also has another system for solving technological problems with 
high involvement of experts at shop floor level called Focus Topic, which has been 
discussed previously in Section 4.2.1.4 on page 143.  
The company will list some technological problems that need to be solved every year. 
Employees can form project teams voluntarily to solve the one they choose using 
company resources. The company will generously reward successful teams. This system 
is a problem-solving mechanism to allow employees to voluntarily solve problems.   
In conclusion, Case D has a structured problem-solving mechanism based on the PDCA 
approach using permanent QCs at shop floor level and temporary multi-disciplinary 
teams at company level. Moreover, they have another problem-solving system to 
encourage employees to solve technological problems on a voluntary basis. Therefore, 
the problem-solving mechanism in Case D (Private, Auto) is considered as embedded.  
As mentioned early in Section 4.2.2, firms in the railway equipment sector need to be 
certified by the IRIS. The IRIS standard also specifically requires firms to have formal 
problem-solving mechanisms to solve production and quality problems, like ISO/T 16949 
for the automobile sector.  
Therefore, such international standards impose an instructive and top-down influence on 
making Cases E, F and G (Central SOEs, Railway) to have structured problem-solving 




4.2.2.5 Case E (Central SOE, Railway)  
In Case E (Central SOE, Railway), the problem-solving mechanism is to form problem-
solving projects with multi-disciplinary teams at the different levels of the firm.  
All of the problem-solving projects are formed temporarily at company, departmental and 
shop floor levels respectively. In addition, Case E has a reporting system that allows 
problems being reported to, and being dealt with, at higher levels. For example, problems 
that cannot be solved by a team at shop floor level will be passed to a project team at the 
department level. Consequently, the most complex and challenging problems will be 
solved by project teams at the company level.  
The members of those project teams are not fixed. Therefore, they will return to their 
original position after the project is accomplished. Moreover, the project team at company 
level will be led by senior-level managers to give the project team the authority to make 
decisions effectively.  
The problem-solving mechanism in Case E (Central SOE, Railway) is considered as 
embedded because they use multi-disciplinary problem-solving teams at all levels of the 
firm. Moreover, their mechanism is structured based on a systematic reporting system to 
address problems at different levels of the firm.  
4.2.2.6 Case F (Central SOE, Railway)  
In Case F (Central SOE, Railway), the problem-solving mechanism is also to form 
problem-solving projects at the different levels of the firm, similar to those in Case E 




They have temporary problem-solving teams at company level to solve difficult and 
challenging problems, and at department level and shop floor level to solve simpler 
problems.  
However, the CEO states: “… we have … low production capability. We have to 
outsource most of our difficult parts to third parties… (F-CEO).” Case D does not have 
well trained and experienced production workers at shop floor level. Thus, the problem-
solving capability of their worker is significantly limited. 
Interestingly, due to the fact that Case D outsources all complex parts to their suppliers, 
Case D developed close relationships with local suppliers forming a joint problem-
solving mechanism. Engineers in the R&D departments are divided into project teams 
according to the type of parts they outsource. Each product team will frequently visit local 
suppliers in person to solve product design and production problems. Within this joint 
problem-solving mechanism, Case F provides product design knowledge to local 
suppliers, at the same time, local suppliers provide practical production knowledge to 
employees from Case F. Such practical production knowledge could finally be transferred 
to the production department in Case F to gradually improve their production capability.  
To sum up, Case F has an internal problem-solving mechanism based on temporary 
problem-solving projects at different levels of the firm. Furthermore, they have an 
external problem-solving mechanism based on joint problem-solving activities with local 
suppliers that are similar to the multi-disciplinary problem-solving teams. What is more, 
the external system complements the weak problem-solving capability in the production 
department of Case F, and acts as a source of production knowledge to improve internal 




4.2.2.7 Case G (Central SOE, Railway)  
In Case G, because the firm does not have any in-house manufacturing capability at all, 
they do not face production problems.  
Their first issue is that of technological problems that emerge during R&D activities. Case 
G produces two models of couplers, thus their R&D department has two R&D divisions 
responsible for each respectively. Under each R&D division, they will form small project 
teams to solve problems in modifying the product design based on feedback from two 
main sources, namely their suppliers and users. Firstly, Case G has very close interaction 
with its suppliers to transform product design into practical production manuals. During 
this process, engineers from Case G will collect and analyse suggestions from suppliers 
to modify product design to reduce any complexity in the production process, which will 
eventually reduce the overall cost. Secondly, Case G provides regular maintenance of 
their products for customers. Therefore, product maintenance teams will collect feedback 
from users, and will report them to the R&D department for product improvements.  
Their second type of problem emerges from the product assembly process. Case G is 
short-staffed in its assembly department, therefore, they need to develop customised tools 
and procedures to improve the efficiency of the production process. The staff in the 
assembly department in Case G are all very experienced workers who have transferred 
from the parent company, thus they have developed many specialised tools based on their 
working experiences from their previous roles.  
In conclusion, Case G has an embedded problem-solving mechanism based on joint 
technological problem-solving with supplier and end users that resemble multi-




4.2.2.8 Summary of problem-solving mechanisms 
From analysis of the data relating to problem-solving mechanisms implemented in all 
cases in this research, a few findings can be revealed.  
Firstly, all cases have problem-solving mechanisms that are highly embedded. As 
suggested in the literature, the main tasks of firms in the engineering and manufacturing 
sectors are to solve technological problems occurring in their daily operation. Therefore, 
those firms should have problem-solving mechanisms in place in order to survive in the 
market. In addition, all of the cases selected for this study are market leaders in their fields. 
It is reasonable to believe that they all have some kind of expertise, at least in 
technological problem-solving.  
In addition, Cases B, C (Local SOEs, Auto) and D (Private, Auto) have to obey the laws 
pertaining to the industrial technical specification (ISO/TS 16949) which explicitly 
requires them to have problem-solving mechanisms using temporary multidisciplinary 
problem-solving teams to solve technological problems. Therefore, the TS 16949 could 
be part of an explanation as to why these three cases have implemented problem-solving 
mechanisms. Similarly, Cases E, F and G (Central SOEs, Railway) are also compelled by 
IRIS to have structured problem-solving mechanisms in place.  
Secondly, although all cases have problem-solving mechanisms, the operational details 
of the mechanisms differ in terms of whether permanent, or temporary, or both problem-
solving teams are used;  
Thirdly, it is shown from the data that Cases F and G (Central SOEs, Railway) rely 
heavily on suppliers to solve technological problems in production as they have little 




problem-solving mechanisms could be called external problem-solving mechanisms. 
These are quite different from the internal problem-solving mechanisms, which rely on 
employees within the firms to solve technological problems.  
Table 4-5 summarises the problem-solving mechanisms in all cases and is accompanied 
by typical quotes from interviewees.   
Table 4-5: Summary of problem-solving mechanism practices in all cases 
Problem-solving mechanism 
Company Practices  Quotes  
A Low level engineers and 




teams comprised of experts 
for large problems 
“For small problems, they are expected to be 
solved at department level by the workers and 
low-level engineers. However, if we have big 
problems we will form a team to solve them at 
company level” (A-BM) 
“For large and challenging problems, we will 
form a group of experts to discuss and find 
solutions. … This kind of arrangement is often 
generated by high level management.” (A-CE) 
B Problem-solving teams at 
all levels of firm using 
Eight Disciplines Problem-
solving (8D) method  
 
Expert teams within 
company for major problem  
 
 
TQM teams for daily 
problem at shop floor level 
 
Kaizen Teams for voluntary 
problem-solving at work  
“We will form teams to solve problems at 
different levels. We basically follow the 8D 
method of problem-solving. The first principle 
under the 8D method is to form a problem-
solving team. Small problems will be solved at 
department level or by TQM teams. If we face 
a big problem … we will form a high-level 
problem-solving team composed of experts in 
the relevant area and led by at least a VP or 
anyone having equivalent levels of power. In 
addition, we also have the Kaizen Teams who 
form teams voluntarily amongst workers to 
solve problem they have identified.” (B-VP) 
C Multi-disciplinary problem-
solving team using the 8D 
method at different levels of 
the firm  
“We have a well-established system following 
the 8D problems solving process. We will first 
form a specialised team composed of experts in 
different fields and tackle the problem from 
different angles.” (C-VP) 
 
“This procedure [8D method] is an important 
part of employee training. Because this 
procedure is very versatile, we use it at 
different levels of our company.” (C-PS) 
D Expert team to solve major 
problem  
 
“At company level we have an expert team … 
[comprising] mainly experienced workers and 




QC team solve small 
problem at shop floor level 
 
Focus Point to ask for 
solutions on specific 
technological problems 
from employees 
because coordination resources across 
departments are often needed. … This kind of 
team is mainly used for dealing with major 
quality issues. … small problems will be solved 
by our QC teams at shop floor level.” (D-CEO) 
 
“…we also have an annual programme to ask 
employees to solve problems together. This is a 
competition style event … called Focus Topic 
… runs every year. At the initial stage we will 
list a group of problems we want to resolve and 
allow workers to provide solutions.” (D-VP) 
E Problem-solving projects at 
different levels of the firm  
 
Expert team will take 
difficult and challenging 
projects at company level 
 
Team formed by cadres 
with expertise to solve 
problems at shop floor level 
“we have three levels of projects targeting 
solving technical problems. First … the 
company level project, which is usually led by 
the R&D department to develop new products 
or solve difficult quality problems with existing 
products. Secondly, we have factory level 
projects, which are mainly production problems 
caused by obsolete machinery.  We also have 
production division level projects, which 
mainly solve small production problems … . 
Managers at each level will be responsible to 
find appropriate specialists to form a team and 
work out solutions.” (E-CE) 
 
“We mainly use project based methods to solve 
… problems that are difficult and challenging. 
… We have ... [an expert team] at company 
level. Team members are usually engineers 
from our R&D department plus experts from 
factories. … Each factory will have some 
cadres who are highly skilled in a certain field. 
Those people will be gathered by factory 
manager or production division supervisors to 
take on projects [at shop floor level].” (E-VP) 
 
 
F Project teams in R&D 




Joint R&D with CARS  
“[Technological problem] are mainly solved by 
our R&D team. Because we only have simple 
parts in our factory, they do not often have 
technical problems. When we have a new 
product, we will try to ask our factory to 
produce all of them. If they have very high 
rejection rate with some parts, we will 
outsource them directly. This is why our 
factory is very small.” (F-CEO) 
 
“We have many project teams in our R&D 
department. Each of them will be responsible to 
solve some problems … [work in] 




Academy of Railway Science (CARS). … 
[Project teams have] engineers come from 
various disciplines … because the pantographs 
involve many different technologies.” (F-CE) 
G Joint problem-solving with 
local supplier  
 
Solve problems identified 
by users by project teams at 
R&D department  
“… technological problems are found by our 
suppliers. …The engineer who is responsible to 
monitor that supplier will visit their factory and 
solve their problem together.” (G-CEO) 
 
“If our users identify any problem, we will 
form a project team in our R&D department to 
solve it for them.” (G-HoR&D) 
 
Table 4-6: Summary of findings on technological problem-solving mechanism practices in firms and its 
effectiveness 
   BUL Practices 








■ Has the BUL practice   ● BUL practice is embedded  
□ Do not have the BUL practice  ○ BUL practice is absent or not embedded  
 
Finally, an illustrative table is produced to clearly display the empirical findings (See 
Table 4-6) showing which cases have adopted problem-solving mechanisms, and whether 
or not they are embedded. 
4.2.3 Work-related record keeping  
The work-related record keeping system for documenting problem-solving activities is a 
key knowledge management strategy. This helps to articulate tacit knowledge that is 




reviewed by managers identifying good practices related to improving the production 
process and product design.  
The level of embeddedness of work-related record keeping systems in all seven cases will 
be evaluated in the following sub-sections. The criteria of having an embedded record 
keeping system is developed from the literature and summarised in Table 4-7. 
Table 4-7: Criteria for embedded and not embedded work-related record keeping systems  
Embedded Not embedded 
Based on groupware or 
Office Automation (OA) 
software  
Paper based, not integrated 
into office systems 
Regularly reviewed by 
managers 
Not or rarely reviewed by 
managers 
 
4.2.3.1 Case A (Central SOE, Auto)  
In Case A (Central SOE, Auto), workers in the production department are required to 
produce production records for quality assurance purposes. According to the VP of Case 
A: “… those documents are mainly used to meet the requirements of quality assurance 
systems like ISO 9001 etc.” (A-VP). Thus, the work records are infrequently reviewed by 
high level managers to identify good practices.  
Moreover, their system is paper based so that workers could only use text to describe any 
problems.  
Therefore, the work-related record keeping system is not embedded in Case A.  
4.2.3.2 Case B (Local SOE, Auto)  
In Case B, they have a designated online working records management system that is 
highly integrated with their office automation (OA) system designed by IBM. Employees 




Production workers are required to keep detailed production logbooks including any 
problems encountered. The online system allows them to use not only text, but also 
pictures and videos to describe problems. For problem-solving activities at all levels of 
the company, they need to complete 8D problem-solving reports to record the problem-
solving process in detail.  
Moreover, all working records, especially records produced by production workers and 
engineers in the R&D departments are regularly reviewed by their department heads to 
find useful practices that could be adopted as routine.   
Therefore, Case B (Local SOE, Auto) has an embedded record keeping system to manage 
work-related records and makes use of them to improve future works.  
4.2.3.3 Case C (Local SOE, Auto)  
In Case C, the company has an online OA system including a function to allow employees 
to fill in work-related records developed by a domestic OA company. The system must 
be completed daily by the production workers who note down any problems they find. 
Problems can be described using text, pictures and videos. If a problem is simple and 
could be solved quickly on site, workers are required to write down the problem-solving 
process along with proposed solutions. For problem-solving teams, they need to produce 
problem-solving reports using the 8D problem-solving method.  
All of those records will be reviewed by their supervisors to identify good practice to 
share among other workers. Therefore, Case C (Local SOE, Auto) has a strongly 




4.2.3.4 Case D (Private, Auto) 
In Case D, the company has developed its own OA system based on the MS Office 
software and QQ (a Chinese online chat software) by the Department of Quality Control 
due to a shortage of funds. They could not afford to buy any customised OA software so 
they decided to develop one themselves. Case D hired two university graduates 
specifically for designing and managing this system. The local government has issued a 
city level award to Case D for “Innovation in office software”. When this system was 
introduced, the company faced high levels of resistance from the managers and workers 
due to their lack of knowledge in using MS Office packages. Therefore, Case D organised 
some internal training courses on using MS Office for the entire workforce. After training, 
the managers and workers could confidently use the system.  
The system makes use of several pre-designed Word and Excel templates. Workers and 
managers in different departments need to fill in those files relevant to them. For example, 
production workers can note down problems encountered at work with text and pictures 
and insert them into Word files. Files produced by shop floor workers will be sent to 
department heads through QQ. Those files will be summarised by department heads and 
will then be presented at company level meetings.  
Although Case D does not have a professional OA software to manage work-related work 
records, it is noted by the Head of the Quality Control department that: “…the system we 
designed is highly customised to suit our needs… [which] normally would be very 
expensive … Moreover, we can easily add new functions … (D-HoQC)”.  
Moreover, the work records submitted to the department head will be reviewed, 




meetings. Therefore, department heads need to review those records regularly to produce 
the reports needed for those meetings.  
Therefore, Case D (Private, Auto) has an embedded work-related, record keeping system.  
4.2.3.5 Case E (Central SOEs, Railway)  
In Case E, workers and engineers in problem-solving projects are particularly required to 
write very detailed reports because “…managers will not always be part of the problem-
solving process, the reports will be a main way to present their achievements to the 
relevant managers… (E-VP)”. Case E does not have a designated OA system to manage 
those reports so those reports are all hard copies.  
Apart from reports produced by problem-solving teams at different levels, other work-
related reports are not regularly reviewed by department heads as they are submitted to 
the HR department to act as evidence of employees’ working hours.  
Therefore, the work-related record keeping system in Case E (Central SOE, Railway) is 
not embedded.  
4.2.3.6 Case F (Central SOE, Railway)  
In Case F, the work-related records are not required. Only specialised problem-solving 
teams are asked to write detailed reports on problems solving. It is necessary as managers 
at higher levels need to make decisions based on such reports to make changes.  
Moreover, Case F does not have an OA system. Therefore, the employees need to printout 
their reports and hand in them in, in person, to the relevant office.  




4.2.3.7 Case G (Central SOE, Railway)  
In Case G, work-related reports are specifically required for quality control. Since a train 
coupler is a vital part for the safe operation of trains, all of their products are checked 
individually by the Quality Control Department. Moreover, detailed reports are issued to 
every train coupler.  
Moreover, engineers who work closely with suppliers in technological problem-solving 
are required to produce detailed reports if the product design has been modified based on 
feedback from suppliers. These reports need to be approved by high level mangers before 
changes can finally be made. However, this kind of case is very rare according to the CEO 
of Case G.  
Moreover, all of these records are paper based. Case G does not have an OA system.  
Although Case G has a work record keeping system for quality control and joint problem-
solving with suppliers, the embeddedness of this system is considerably weak. This is 
because the system is mainly used for quality control rather than knowledge management. 
Even though detailed reports are produced in joint problem-solving activities, the 
frequency of such activities is too low to be considered as an important construct of a 
work-related, record keeping system.  
To conclude, the work record keeping system in Case G is not embedded.  
4.2.3.8 Summary of work-related record keeping  
From analysis of the data related to work-related, record keeping in those cases studied, 




Firstly, all firms have a work-related, record keeping system to collect and manage work-
related records. Some of them (Cases E, F and G, central SOEs, railway) have it merely 
for quality assurance purposes. However, others (Cases B, C and D, local SOEs and 
private firms, auto) use the work-related records deliberately to establish good practice at 
shop floor level. 
Secondly, record management systems used among these cases differ significantly. Local 
SOEs have invested huge amounts of money to hire specialised IT companies to develop 
customised OA systems to collect and manage work-related records from shop floor 
workers. Private firms (Case D, private, auto) can only afford to use widely available, 
generic office software to develop an OA system for themselves. Conversely, central 
SOEs studied in this research have invested little in work record keeping systems. Most 
of their work records are still paper based and lack a unified system to manage those 
records.  
Table 4-8 summarises the work-related record keeping system in all cases and is 
accompanied by typical quotes from interviewees.   
Table 4-8: Summary of work-related record keeping practices in all cases and effective evaluation 
Work-related record keeping 
Company Practices  Quotes  
A Reports of problem-solving 
projects at company level 
 
Production logbook for QC 
purpose  
“Workers and engineers are not expected to 
keep logs unless their line managers want them 
to.” (A-BM) 
 
“We do not have company level policies that 
tell our employees to keep a logbook. However, 
the departmental head often asks their team 
leaders to keep a log especially in the 
production department where re-traceable 
documentation is needed for quality control 
purposes. For our problem-solving activities at 
company level, the team leader needs to 




who is responsible for the problem and how it 
is solved. … those documents are mainly used 
to meet the requirements of the quality 
assurance systems like ISO 9001 etc.” (A-VP)  
B Online system to ask all 
employees to fill in work-
related reports using various 
forms of data (text, picture, 
video) 
 
In-depth reports are 
required for problem-
solving projects and Kaizen 
programmes  
“… we have an online system to let all of our 
employees fill in notes related to their job. … 
they can fill in a report that describes the 
problem. … they can take a picture … take a 
short video of the area they think is having 
problems. … For problem-solving, they will 
need to fill in reports in more detail than in 
normal works. Especially for the Kaizen 
Teams, they need to fill in detailed reports in 
order to apply for resources from our Product 
Creation Committee. They will also need to 
provide a final report about the whole project 
and how their outcome can be implemented. 
This will be used to assess how each team is 
awarded financially.” (B-VP) 
 
“…  workers are required to complete daily 
reports about their work. … If production went 
smoothly … they can keep this report simple. 
However, once problems emerge, they will 
need to note them down … Otherwise, they 
will liable for the consequences of hiding 
production problems. If the problem is too 
complex … they can use photos and videos to 
show what went wrong.” (B-HoP) 
 
 
C Daily work report by all 





solving teams at different 
levels of the firm using 
online system 
“… we have an online system that everyone 
needs to fill in with any necessary information 
at the end of every day. … Problem-solving 
teams need to write very detailed reports about 
the problem-solving process according to those 
8 disciplines [8D problem-solving method]. 
Keeping these records are clearly required in 
ISO/TS 16949. (C-VP) 
 
“[Problem-solving teams] need to hand in 
detailed reports to describe the problem, 
analysis of the problem and justification as to 
why a certain solution has solved it. If this 
report is approved by the production 
department, the solution they used may become 
part of routine to avoid the same problem in the 
future.” (C-AM) 
D Regular work records 
produced by all employees  
 
We ask our managers in the production 
department to produce a production log every 
day to keep good records for future reference 







OI system developed 
through DIY based on MS 
Office software (awarded 
by government for 
managerial innovation) 
departments have similar things [records] too. 
… (D-CEO) 
 
Our department have designed basically all 
templates for reports, daily logbook, meeting 
notes and so on. … All those individual 
documents are Word files that most people 
know how to use. … the template for 
summarising the report is produced with Excel. 
Managers are required to use hyperlinks in this 
Excel template to make it easy to navigate. … 
we used to have problems when different 
managers do not how to use the system I 
developed, especially the hyperlink part. 
Therefore, I have organised many lessons to 
train them how to use the system we developed 
using MS Office software … now they can use 
them very competently. … we even received a 
city level award for Secondary Innovation in 
MS Office Software. This saved us a lot of 
money … and is also more tailored to our 
needs. (D-HoQC) 
E Regular work reports by 




“Engineers and workers need to write reports to 
summarise their works. This is an important 
mechanism for human resource management. 
For problem-solving projects, they will need to 
produce detailed reports. Because managers 
will not always be part of their problem-solving 
process, the reports will be a main way to 
present their achievement to relevant 
managers.” (E-VP) 
 
“company level projects are required to 
produce very detailed reports about each step in 
problem-solving and explain how solutions are 
developed. … other two levels [department 
level and shop floor level] of projects will be 
the same. They also need to report to managers 
at different levels respectively” (E-CE) 
F Project reports by engineers 
in R&D department  
 
Production logbook by 
workers  
“They [engineers] are required to produce very 
detailed reports of how each project is 
completed. This is used to apply for awards 
from CRRC for the annual competition in 
innovation.” (F-CEO) 
 
“…project team will need to produce a detailed 
report...” (F-CE) 
 
“[Production workers] will write production 
logbook before they go home. They mainly just 
note down amount of work finished. … In 




[workers] to produce a separate report unless 
the problem is caused by a worker’s mistake.” 
(F-HoP) 
G Reports of change on 
product design  
 
“All of our workers need to write work records. 
This is required for quality control. … our 
quality department will also produce a final 
quality check report before they transport parts 
to the assembly factory. Our assembly worker 
also needs to fill in the work report to record 
their progress” (G-CEO)  
 
“If those problems require modification on our 
product design, our engineers will need to 
produce formal reports to record every change 
they make and explain why. … [Requires] a 
series of testing and approval by our high-level 
managers...” (G-HoR&D) 
 
Finally, an illustrative table is produced to display the empirical findings clearly (See 
Table 4-9) showing which cases have adopted a work-related record keeping system, and 
whether or not it is embedded. 












■ Has the BUL practice   ● BUL practice is embedded  





4.2.4 Internal training  
Training for employees for professional skills based on internal trainers is an important 
mechanism for formal knowledge sharing between experienced employees and others.  
The criteria of embedded internal training are developed from the literature and 
summarised in Table 4-10 
Table 4-10: Criteria for embedded and not embedded internal training   
Embedded Not embedded 
Including all employees or 
including production workers 
Limited to manager or senior 
engineers.  
Has formal internal training 
development programmes  
Does not have formal 
internal training development 
programmes 
Frequently or regularly  Occasionally  
 
4.2.4.1 Case A (Central SOE, Auto)  
In Case A, the company does not provide employees with training apart from induction 
training for new recruits. Production workers are all recruited directly from technical 
schools so they are expected to have sufficient levels of skills and knowledge to carry out 
their jobs. Engineers are all university graduates holding relevant degrees.  
Workers and engineers in Case A do not receive any training for their professional skills. 
Only some engineers are occasionally allowed to attend industrial conferences.  
Therefore, Case A does not have internal training programmes.   
4.2.4.2 Case B (Local SOE, Auto)  
In Case B, the company provides intensive internal training to all employees including 
managers. They have a training programme entitled Saturday Training Day, which 




workers and engineers are trained by experienced senior workers and engineers who have 
expertise in certain fields. Experienced workers and engineers can apply to become 
internal trainers after they have passed an internal trainer development programme. 
Managers are trained by senior level managers who have knowledge in management 
theories and rich, firm-specific knowledge.  
In addition, this internal training programme is also integrated with an external training 
system. The company will provide external training to employees when managers believe 
the knowledge of the workforce needs updating.  
To conclude, Case B has an embedded internal training system to improve the knowledge 
base of their workforce.  
4.2.4.3 Case C (Local SOE, Auto)  
In Case C, the company has a very unique, internal training system among all cases in 
this study, because they have an in-house college. This university was an in-house 
technical school providing workers only to Case C. However, after the school grew 
rapidly during the last decade, they upgraded it to a college and it became a professional 
training institution open to the general public.  
Case C provides two types of internal training programmes. The first one is a compulsory 
course aiming to re-train workers who are not proficient in carrying out production 
routines. Employees who make mistakes at work are sent to the college for two weeks. 
They can graduate if they pass a test, which asks them to carry out their production 
routines ten times without making any kind of mistake, and within a limited time.  
Second concerns selective courses available to all employees who want to upgrade their 




courses are generally free to employees. However, some advanced courses required 
employees to pay 30% towards the tuition fee and the company will absorb the remainder.  
Most trainers in the college are internally developed. They encourage experienced 
employees to develop their own courses and teaching materials. The contents of each 
course and its teaching materials are reviewed by the Department of Employee Training. 
After the course has been approved, the teaching materials must be renewed every year 
based on reflections of trainees from the previous year.   
To conclude, Case C has a unique, well-established and embedded internal training 
system based on an in-house college that is available to all employees.  
4.2.4.4 Case D (Private, Auto) 
In Case D, the company does not have any training programme for workers to develop 
their professional skills. However, the CEO states: “… Occasionally we will organise in-
house training to give our engineers lessons on certain topics. These lessons are all 
delivered by our Senior Engineers who often attend industrial meetings… (D-CEO)”.  
Therefore, Case D has some kind of internal training system on professional skills for 
engineers. However, because the training is only occasional and limited to its engineers, 
it is considered as not embedded.  
4.2.4.5 Case E (Central SOE, Railway)  
In Case E, the company does not have any form of training for employees apart from 
induction training to new recruits. Shop floor workers are recruited directly from technical 
schools. Therefore, they are expected to have a sufficient level of skill and knowledge to 
carry out their jobs. Engineers are all university graduates holding relevant degrees. Only 




Therefore, Case E does not have any internal training programme.   
4.2.4.6 Case F (Central SOE, Railway)  
In Case F, the company does not have training for any of its employees including the 
managers. They overwhelmingly rely on suppliers to produce complex parts due to a lack 
of experienced workers in the production department. However, the company still does 
not have any form of training for workers to improve their production capability.  
Therefore, Case F does not have any internal training programme in place.   
4.2.4.7 Case G (Central SOE, Railway)  
In Case G, they do not have any form of training for employees. They outsource all of 
their production tasks to their suppliers, so they do not need to train production workers. 
Although they have an assembly plant, assembly workers only received training from 
their foreign parent company at the very beginning when the assembly line was installed. 
Nor was any further, subsequent training provided by Case G to their assembly workers. 
Therefore, Case G does not have any internal training programme in place. 
4.2.4.8 Summary of Internal training for employees 
From the analysis of internal training across these cases, only a few of them provide 
internal training to their employees to improve their professional skill sets. None of the 
central SOEs in either the auto or railway sectors have internal training systems. 
Conversely, all local SOEs have well designed and highly embedded internal training 
systems to improve skills within their respective workforce. In addition, the private firm 
(Case D, private, auto) provides some internal training to its managers. However, this 
system is only limited to managers so its workers do not receive any training to improve 




Table 4-11summarises the internal training programmes in all cases and is accompanied 
by typical quotes from interviewees.   
Table 4-11: Summary of internal training practices in all cases and effective evaluation 
Internal training 
Company Practices  Quotes  
A None “… we only have before job training and 
maybe some training for management 
trainees.” (A-VP)  
 
“We do not have regular training at company 
level. We will send our engineers to industrial 
meetings organised by universities and 
research institutes.” (A-CE)  
B Saturday Training for all 
employees is partially 
delivered by an internal 
trainer, and is partly 
delivered by an external 
trainer from professional 
bodies.  
“… our Saturday training day is our main 
training system including everyone in our 
company. We train our employees based on 
their needs in their daily work. Management 
personnel are taught by high-level managers 
who know management theories. Of course, 
we will have external trainers to tell us new 
theories … Engineers are mainly taught by 
experienced senior engineers, who have been 
successful in many projects or won awards. 
Their trainers could also be professors from 
universities or research institutes. … Workers 
are mainly taught by our own in-house 
trainers who normally have worked in our 
company for more than ten years. They will 
have rich experience in production and have 
won many awards in skill competitions at 
different levels.” (B-CE)  
C Regular training for workers 
and managers at the in-
house university  
 
Experienced workers can 
become internal lecturers to 
teach specific topics based 
on their work experience  
“ We have regular training for our skilled 
workers based on their speciality fields. All 
that training is delivered by our university. … 
We also have management courses for 
managers. … For engineers, we ask local 
universities to provide training courses for 
them. … [Experienced workers could] 
become lecturers to teach courses in our 
university. They need to design their own 
teaching material and pass evaluation by our 
Employee Training Department” (C-VP) 
 
“…Our employees will regularly go back to 
our uni to have training…” (C-AM) 
 
“We have our training programme for 




part time teachers in our university. So they 
will be able to teach others with their work 
experiences.” (C-DoT) 
D In-house training for 
engineers by senior 
engineers  
“ … Occasionally we will organise in-house 
training to give our engineers lessons on 
certain topics. These lessons are all delivered 
by our Senior Engineers who often attend 
industrial meetings.” (D-CEO)  
 
“We do not have much training for workers. 
They have some meetings among them to 
share work experiences. … Our R&D 
department will have training for engineers if 
our senior engineers have been to external 
conferences. They will bring back some new 
information in the market.” (D-VP) 
 
“We do not have training for our workers 
apart from giving them good masters at 
beginning.” (D-HoP)  
E None 
 
“Our company will send our engineers to 
have seminars in universities in our system. 
Mostly the Beijing Jiaotong University.” (E-
CE)   
F None  “We occasionally will send our engineers to 
attend seminars at universities. … every 
department in our company will have many 
meetings, like daily meetings, weekly 
meetings etc. All of these meetings can be 
used to share work experiences.” (F-CE)) 
G None “Apart from training provided by [parent 
company] on product assembly, we do not 
have any training for our workers.” (G-CEO) 
 
Finally, an illustrative table is produced to display the empirical findings clearly 
(SeeError! Not a valid bookmark self-reference.) showing which cases have adopted 







Table 4-12: Summary of findings on Internal Training System practices in firms and its effectiveness 
   BUL Practices 
Company 








■ Has BUL practice    ● BUL practice is embedded  
□ Do not have BUL practice  ○ BUL practice is absent or not embedded  
 
4.2.5 Job rotation of employees 
Job rotation of employees aims to allow them to develop firm-specific knowledge through 
working in different areas.  
Table 4-13: Criteria for embedded and not embedded job rotation programme  
Embedded Not embedded 
Structured and planned  Unstructured and unplanned  
Including junior employees  Only limited to managers 
 
The level of embeddedness of a job rotation programme in all seven cases will be 
evaluated in the following sub-sections. The criteria of an embedded job rotation 
programme are developed from the literature and summarised in Table 4-7 
4.2.5.1 Case A (Central SOE, Auto)  
In Case A, the company does not have any form of job rotation programme for both 




4.2.5.2 Case B (Local SOE, Auto) 
In Case B, the company has a planned job rotation programme for its new recruits. Newly 
recruited administration staff are required to work in many different departments in the 
first two years to quickly develop firm-specific knowledge. Moreover, they need to work 
on the production shop floor for at least six months to understand how production workers 
operate. This helps the administration staff to easily communicate and interact with the 
production department in the future.  
Therefore, Case B has an embedded job rotation programme in place to allow 
administration staff to quickly develop firm-specific knowledge.  
4.2.5.3 Case C (Local SOE, Auto)  
In Case C, their job rotation programme is about the same as that used in Case B. 
Management trainees in Case C are moved around the company in their first two years so 
the programme is planned. In addition, they need to work together with the production 
staff on a daily basis for six months during this two-year job rotation programme to 
understand how the factories operate. This programme helps new management trainees 
to quickly develop firm-specific knowledge. In addition, this programme allows them to 
learn practical production knowledge, which is not taught in universities.  
Therefore, Case C has an embedded job rotation programme in place to allow 
administration staff to quickly develop firm-specific knowledge.  
4.2.5.4 Case D (Private, Auto)  
In Case D, the company does not have any form of job rotation programme for both 




4.2.5.5 Case E, F and G (All of them are Central SOEs, Railway)  
None of the three SOEs in the railway equipment sector have any form of job rotation for 
their employees and managers.  
4.2.5.6 Summary of job rotation  
From analysing the job rotation programmes used in these cases, only local SOEs have 
job ration programmes. Moreover, they are all well planned and aimed at new recruits, so 
they are all embedded BUL practices.  
Table 4-14 summarises the job rotation programmes in all cases and is accompanied by 
typical quotes from interviewees.   
Table 4-14: Summary of job rotation programmes in all cases and effective evaluation 
Job rotation of employee 
Company Practices  Quotes  
A None  N/A 
B Job rotation for 
management trainees for 
two years  
 
Job rotation among some 
CNC workers  
“… we have a job rotation scheme for new 
management recruits. They will work in 
different departments in the first two years… 
They will also need to work in … production 
factories to learn how our company works. “ 
(B-BM) 
 
“We sometimes have job rotation for part of the 
skilled workers who studied CNC techniques in 
school. This is because most of the technical 
schools will teach students with various CNC 
machineries. They normally will learn CNC 
lathe, CNC mill, CNC machining centre. So, 
we will move this kind of worker around our 
factories to check which kind of machinery 
they are most competent with.” (B-VP)  
C Job rotation for 
management trainees for 
two years  
 
“We arrange our new management trainees to 
move around our company in their first two 
years after they join our company … For 
workers, we do not have standardised job 
rotations.” (C-DoT)  
D None  N/A 
E None  N/A 
F None  N/A 




Table 4-15: Summary of findings on Job Rotation practices in firms and its effectiveness 
BUL Practices 
Company 








■ Has BUL practice   ● BUL practice is embedded  
□ Do not have BUL practice  ○ BUL practice is absent or not embedded  
 
Finally, an illustrative table is produced to display the empirical findings clearly (See 
Table) showing which cases have adopted job rotation programmes, and whether or not 
they are embedded. 
4.3 Comparison of the Level of BUL Embeddedness  
This section summarises the research findings in the previous sections. An illustrative 
table is produced to clearly show the findings (see Table 4-16). Moreover, cases are 
ranked, based on the number of their embedded BUL practices (see Table 4-17).  
As discussed in Section 3.6.1.2, this research rates the level of BUL embeddedness of 
those cases studied. The level of BUL embeddedness is a relative measure of how many 
embedded BUL practices have been adopted by cases in comparison to others. Three 
levels of ratings are given to those cases studied: good BUL embeddedness, moderate 
BUL embeddedness, and poor BUL embeddedness. The rating of the level of BUL 
























Job rotation of 
employees 
A ■○ ■● ■○ □○ □○ 
B ■● ■● ■● ■● ■● 
C ■○ ■● ■● ■● ■● 
D ■● ■● ■● ■○ □○ 
E ■○ ■● ■○ □○ □○ 
F ■● ■● ■○ □○ □○ 
G ■● ■● ■○ □○ □○ 
■ Has the BUL practice   ● BUL practice is embedded  
□ Do not have the BUL practice  ○ BUL practice is absent or not embedded  
 
Table 4-17: Summary of BUL practices in all cases and case groups based on relative BUL system performance 


















Level of BUL 
embeddedness 
B ■● ■● ■● ■● ■● Good  
C ■○ ■● ■● ■● ■● Good 
D ■● ■● ■● ■○ □○ Moderate 
F ■● ■● ■○ □○ □○ Moderate 
G ■● ■● ■○ □○ □○ Moderate 
E ■○ ■● ■○ □○ □○ Poor 
A ■○ ■● ■○ □○ □○ Poor 
■ Has the BUL practice   ● BUL practice is embedded  
□ Do not have the BUL practice  ○ BUL practice is absent or not embedded  
 
Empirical evidence in this research shows that local SOEs have good BUL embeddedness 
as they have the highest number of embedded BUL practices across the seven cases in 




adopted some of BUL practices. Interestingly, amongst the four central SOEs studied, 
two of them have moderate BUL embeddedness as they have some embedded BUL 
practices; while the other two central SOEs have only poor BUL embeddedness as they 
only have one embedded BUL practice.  
4.4 Chapter Conclusion 
4.4.1 Addressing research question one 
To address research question one - “Do China’s firms have bottom-up learning (BUL) 
practices to develop their innovation capability, and how embedded are BUL practices? 
“this chapter analysed seven cases in terms of what BUL practices the firms in the study 
had adopted, how BUL practices in each case operate, and how embedded these BUL 
practices are in each case.  
Five types of BUL practice adopted by the seven cases have been analysed through cross 
case analysis. Moreover, the operational detail of BUL practices adopted in each case has 
been discussed to understand how their BUL practices operate. Finally, based on the 
operational detail of BUL practices, the embeddedness of all BUL practices in each case 
has been evaluated according to criteria developed from various literature (see Section 
3.6.1.1).  
This research found that Chinese firms have adopted BUL practices. However, empirical 
evidence shows that BUL practices adopted, by the cases in focus, vary in two dimensions. 
Firstly, the type of BUL practice adopted by each of the seven cases varies. Secondly, the 
degree of embeddedness of adopted BUL practices varies amongst cases. This is because 
some cases have the same type of BUL practice, like the Kaizen programme or suggestion 




detail of BUL practices led to differences in the embeddedness of the same type of BUL 
practice across the cases. 
Empirical findings concerning the characteristics of embedded BUL practices will be 
summarised in the following subsections and grouped according to the five types of BUL 
practices.  
4.4.1.1 Proposal system 
The four main characteristics of an embedded proposal system found in this study are: 
Firstly, all embedded proposal systems are monitored by an office or a committee at 
company level, these are managed directly by senior level managers. Therefore, these 
senior managers have the authority to directly implement good suggestions. This kind of 
management structure shows the level of management support, given to the proposal 
systems, is high.  
Secondly, all embedded proposal systems used by these cases have frequent suggestion 
collecting programmes running at least twice a year. Moreover, all embedded proposal 
systems have a formal and structured evaluation system led by a company level office, or 
committee, to select good quality suggestions.  
Thirdly, all embedded proposal systems feature a high involvement of shop floor workers 
instead of only including experienced engineers or managers. This shows that the level 
of employee involvement in those proposal systems is high.  
Fourthly, all embedded proposal systems generously reward good quality suggestions 




Moreover, evidence from some of the companies studied shows that employees have 
concerns about being penalised if they propose suggestions to company level suggestion 
schemes when directly bypassing their mid and line managers. For example, employees 
in Case A (Central SOE, Auto) expressed their concerns about being seen as challenging 
the authority of their supervisors if they submit suggestions directly to the company’s 
suggestion scheme. This suggests that an effective proposal system requires a company 
culture where mid and low-level managers are actively open to suggestions and criticism 
from their subordinates, and do not feel offended if high level managers collect 
information directly from shop floor workers. Otherwise, they could potentially represent 
a hindrance to the effectiveness of the proposal systems. This issue of employees 
reporting to their seniors whilst bypassing mid-level managers has been briefly discussed 
by Child (1974) who suggests that mid-level managers consider being bypassed as 
undermining their management authority. Therefore, it is a conflict between different 
levels of managers that has to be resolved before having an effective proposal system. 
Case B (Local SOE, Auto) effectively resolved the conflict between different levels of 
managers by making their proposal systems compulsory, which requires everyone to 
propose some suggestions every year. Because all employees, including managers, have 
to propose suggestions, mid and low-level managers would no longer feel challenged by 
their subordinates, or feel their authority was being undermined.  
4.4.1.2 Problem-solving mechanisms  
All cases have defined problem-solving mechanisms based on multi-disciplinary 
problem-solving teams. This result could be partly explained by strict requirements of the 
quality control process. All seven cases are governed by industrial standards, all of which 




technological problems. Therefore, the problem-solving mechanisms in all cases are 
considered as embedded. 
However, some cases adopted more advanced problem-solving methods while other firms 
use more simplistic methods. Two local SOEs and the one private firm have implemented 
well known structured problem-solving tools, namely 8D and PDCA.  
Others have not used well known, structured problem-solving approaches even though 
they also rely on a multi-disciplinary problem-solving team.  
4.4.1.3 Work-related record keeping  
All seven cases have adopted formal record keeping systems to collect and manage their 
work-related records. However, only three of them have embedded record keeping 
systems. They are two local SOEs (Cases B and C, Auto) and one private firm (Case D, 
Auto).  
Empirical evidence shows that an embedded work-related, record keeping system shows 
two main characteristics. Firstly, embedded record keeping systems are highly integrated 
within the company's OA system based on ICT technology. Their systems allow 
employees to record problems encountered during daily production processes in multiple 
formats including text, pictures and videos. Secondly, embedded record keeping systems 
do not only collect information from employees at work, but also invest effort to review 
the records regularly to identify production problems and good practice. Because these 
records are kept online within their OA system, managers at different levels can easily 




4.4.1.4 Internal training  
Based on empirical findings in this research, only three out of the seven cases have 
adopted internal training practices. Moreover, only two of them have highly embedded 
internal training practices, which are the two local SOEs.  
Empirical evidence shows that embedded internal training practices have three 
characteristics. Firstly, internal training programmes are open to all employees. Secondly, 
embedded internal training practices are underpinned by well-structured internal trainer 
development programmes. Anyone could apply to become an internal trainer if they have 
expertise in a certain area. They will be provided with complete training on how to 
organise workshops and to give lectures. Thirdly, the frequency of internal training is 
very high in those two firms. For example, Case B (Local SOE, Auto) provides internal 
training workshops every Saturday.  
4.4.1.5 Job rotation of employees 
It has been found in this research that only two of the local SOEs have adopted job rotation 
programmes and these practices are embedded.  
Empirical evidence shows that embedded job rotation programmes have two 
characteristics. Firstly, they have well planned rotation routes for employees to develop 
knowledge in multiple fields. Secondly, job rotation programmes are targeted to new 
recruits aiming to develop their firm-specific knowledge quickly across all functions.  
4.4.2 Addressing research question two 
To address research question two – “How the level of firms’ BUL embeddedness varies 
amongst firms with different ownership? “this chapter analysed the relationship between 




Seven cases have been grouped into three groups based on the number of embedded BUL 
practices adopted by each case.  
In the following subsections, findings regarding the relationship between types of firm 
ownership and levels of embeddedness of BUL practices will be summarised.  
4.4.2.1 Good BUL embeddedness  
Empirical evidence shows that local SOEs have the highest number of embedded BUL 
practices. This group include Cases B and C who are market leaders in China’s 
commercial vehicle industry. These two SOEs are owned by the local government in 
different regions in China. This empirical result suggests that when SOEs are owned by 
the local government, they are more likely to have highly embedded BUL.  
4.4.2.2 Moderate BUL embeddedness  
Empirical evidence shows that private firms and some central SOEs have adopted a 
moderate number of embedded BUL practices. This group includes Case D (Private, 
Auto), and Cases F and G (Central SOEs, Railway). This empirical finding reflects that 
the combination of institutional factors faced by private firms and some central SOEs 
have some influence on their incentive or capability to adopt embedded BUL practices.  
4.4.2.3 Poor BUL embeddedness  
Empirical evidence shows that two central SOEs, Case A (Auto) and Case E (Railway) 
have only adopted one embedded BUL practice. This finding reflects that some central 
SOEs face a certain combination of institutional factors that significantly influence their 





Chapter 5: GROUP-CASE ANALYSIS:  
Investigation on the Impact of China's NSI on the Level 
of BUL Embeddedness of Firms  
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter aims to investigate the level of BUL embeddedness variations amongst the 
seven cases studied in this research, and how the differences are explained by the impact 
of China’s NSI. The seven cases will be analysed though group-case analysis, based on 
three case groups, based on the levels of BUL embeddedness as developed in Chapter 5.  
This chapter provides empirical evidence to address research question three: “How does 
China’s corporate governance system and firms’ access to capital influence the adoption 
of embedded BUL practices in firms?” 
As already discussed in the literature review chapter Section 2.5.3, three assumptions are 
made in this thesis based on extensive literature. The three assumptions justify why firms 
should adopt BUL to develop innovation, why BUL requires long-term planning by top 
managers, and why BUL requires top managers to have firm-specific knowledge. The 
three assumptions have been developed from the literature making them theoretically 
justified. 
a) BUL leads to improved innovation capability and better innovation 
performance, which consequently leads to improved economic performance. 
--- Thus, top managers of firms will adopt BUL practices if they want to have 




b) BUL practices require long term investment before their benefits can be 
perceived in terms of better innovation capability or performance. --- Thus, 
top managers who will only remain in their position for 4-5 years are less likely 
to adopt embedded BUL practices, as they are unable to anticipate the benefit of 
those practices within their period of employment.  
c) BUL is more difficult as it is less visible to top managers who do not have 
firm-specific knowledge. It is because BUL tends to occur amongst employees 
on a daily basis. --- Thus, outsiders who do not have sufficient firm-specific 
knowledge are less likely to have an awareness of the BUL activities taking place 
on the shop floor. Even if they noticed such learning activities, they would not 
adopt BUL practices or facilitate them as they are unaware of the benefits of such 
learning effects. 
Synthesised from the existing literature, three institutional factors have been identified to 
study and explain how China’s corporate governance system, and firms’ access to capital, 
influences the level of BUL embeddedness in firms, namely: 1) whether the top manager 
is an insider or an outsider (Cai and Tylecote, 2005; Liu and Tylecote, 2009), 2) whether 
the length of employment of the top manager is short-term or long-term (Cai and Tylecote, 
2005; Tylecote, Cai and Liu, 2010), and 3) the level of a firm’s access to capital (Peng et 
al., 2005; Yiu and Lau et al., 2005).  
Whilst performing the data analysis, it was noted that the three institutional factors could 
not sufficiently explain the findings from the research. Empirical evidence shows that the 
level of market competition that a firm faces has a crucial impact on its level of BUL 
embeddedness. Empirical evidence in this research shows that competition increases the 




economic performance and maintaining its market share. Therefore, the fourth 
institutional factor, namely the market competition factor, is added to the original 
framework developed from previous literature, to fully explain the research findings. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 analyses the impact of government 
appointment of top managers for SOEs on the level of embeddedness of BUL practices. 
This section will investigate the background of top managers in the seven cases studied 
to explore whether their top managers are insiders or outsiders. Section 5.3 investigates 
the impact of the length of employment of a top manager on the level of BUL 
embeddedness of firms. This factor explains the level of top managers’ incentives to adopt 
embedded BUL practice. Section 5.4 studies the impact of the level of firm’s access to 
capital on the level of BUL embeddedness of firms. Each case will be studied to establish 
how many forms of capital they have received from the government. This factor explains 
whether the level of firms’ access to capital influences top managers’ capabilities to 
engage with innovation. Section 5.5 investigates the impact of market competition on the 
level of BUL embeddedness of firms. This factor is added during data analysis to fully 
explain the research findings. Market competition influences the incentive of a top 
manager to adopt embedded BUL practices to address threats from rivals and to defend 
their market share. Section 5.6 concludes this chapter by discussing research findings and 
developing insights for the discussion chapter.  
In the analysis that follows, the names of cases are replaced by case codes for 





To allow readers to navigate easily, a note of case ownership and sector will be included 
in brackets after the case code. For example, Case A is a local SOE in the automobile 
sector. It will be presented as “Case A (Local SOE, Auto)” to remind readers. Similarly, 
the word “Railway” is used to show that the cases are in the railway equipment sector.  
The informants’ names are hidden by using codes based on their position. For example, 
the Vice President in Case A is abbreviated as “A-VP”. This coding system will be used 
at the end of direct quotes of interviewees provided in the following analysis. A full list 
of codes for the interviewees can be found in Appendix C.  
5.2 An Insider or an Outsider as the Top Manager 
To study how management appointment of SASAC (government) influences adoption 
and embeddedness of BUL practices, three case groups (good, moderate and poor 
embeddedness) will be compared in terms of whether the top manager is an insider or an 
outsider. Based on work performed by Tylecote and his colleagues (Tylecote and Conesa, 
1999; Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006; Tylecote and Visintin, 2008; Liu and Tylecote, 2016), 
two attributes determine whether managers are insiders or outsiders.  
a) Whether the top manager of a firm is an insider or outsider. This indicates the 
level of the top manager’s firm-specific knowledge which determines the top 
manager’s capability to observe less visible innovation activities like technical 
problem solving at shop floor level.  
b) Length of employment of the top manager. This determines whether he/she has 
had the opportunity to develop firm-specific knowledge on the job. If an outsider 




he/she is considered as an insider as he/she has had sufficient time to develop 
firm-specific knowledge at work.  
The background of the top managers of the cases studied will be analysed to identify 
whether they are insiders or outsiders. Two criteria have been used to distinguish between 
insiders and outsiders, namely: 1) whether the top manager has worked at the company 
before he/she was appointed to the top manager role; and 2) if the current top manager 
was appointed from outside of the firm, how long had he/she remained at this position. 
Ten years’ experience is used as a boundary to distinguish whether top managers could 
develop in-depth firm-specific knowledge. Thus, in a case where a top manager was an 
outsider at the time he/she was appointed, he/she is considered as an insider if he/she has 
stayed in this position for more than ten years.  
An insider top manager would have high-level firm-specific knowledge that has 
developed over the years of working in their company so they have an in-depth 
understanding about how the company and shop floor operates on a daily basis. So that 
they could observe less visible innovation efforts like problem solving at shop floor level.  
An outsider top manager would have little or no firm-specific knowledge as they have 
never worked in the company or even in any relevant industry. Thus, they have no 
knowledge of how the company and shop floor operates. Consequently, they are 
incapable of observing less visible innovation efforts like problem solving at shop floor 
level.  
Since top managers of SOEs in China are directly appointed by central or local 
government, whether an insider or an outsider is to be appointed as a top manager of any 




the decision of central or local government to appoint either an insider or outsider to the 
role of top manager of a SOE.  
Therefore, government policies and decisions regarding local and central SOEs have a 
great deal of impact on whether top managers of SOEs have sufficient firm-specific 
knowledge to observe less visible learning and innovation efforts like BUL. Consequently, 
the embeddedness of BUL practices is likely to be weak if an outsider has been appointed. 
This is because outsider top managers lack the capability to observe less visible learning 
and innovation efforts like BUL, therefore, such expensive and time-consuming BUL 
practices are unlikely be appreciated.  
5.2.1 Good BUL Embeddedness Group  
The analysis given in Chapter 5 demonstrates that Case B (Local SOE, Auto) and Case C 
(Local SOE, Auto) have the highest number of embedded BUL practice. 
Because both cases are local SOEs owned by different local governments, their top 
managers are directly appointed by their local SASAC on behalf of the local government. 
In the case of Chinese SOEs, the Chairman of the Board of Shareholders (Chairman) is 
the official representative of SASAC. Therefore, the Chairman of SOEs has the most 
authority in decision making, higher than the general manager (or CEO). When changes 
need to be made in the management structure of SOEs, especially when such change is 
based on instructions issued by SASAC, the Chairman would be the person to make the 
final decision and to answer directly to the local government. Thus, the Chairman is the 
core decision maker in Chinese SOEs, and thus has the greatest impact on embeddedness 




5.2.1.1 Case B (Local SOE, Auto)  
The current Chairman of Case B has been in this position since 2002 and was appointed 
directly by the local SASAC. So, he has worked in the same company and same position 
for nearly 15 years. This is a considerably long term of service for a top manager in 
China’s SOEs in comparison to the traditional term of office of 4-5 years noted in other 
research (Liu and Tylecote, 2009).  
The current Chairman of Case B was appointed when the previous Chairman reached 
retirement age. At the time he was appointed, he did not have any formal education within 
the automobile industry. However, before the current Chairman was appointed, he had 
worked very closely with Case B during his previous job as a government official who 
was responsible for developing industrial policies for the local automobile industry. It has 
been noted by VP that “… His job was a government official in our local government who 
was responsible for developing local industrial policies. … He worked intensively with 
our company to develop competitiveness of the local automobile industry… planned 
strategically by local government. … Since our parent company is the only SOE [large 
corporate group] in the local automobile sector, he worked closely with our company to 
work out ways to improve production capability and product quality [of commercial 
vehicles]. … He was acting as a bridge connecting our company with the local 
government to apply for necessary capital…(B-VP)”.   
Therefore, the Chairman of Case B is considered as having in-depth, firm-specific 
knowledge. This was because the current Chairman of Case B had had opportunities to 
develop some firm-specific knowledge before being appointed. Furthermore, the current 




5.2.1.2 Case C (Local SOE, Auto)  
The current Chairman of Case C has been appointed by a local SASAC in 2015. Although 
the Chairman has only been in this position for couple of years at the time of this research, 
the Chairman has spent his entire career in Case C, taking up his employment immediately 
after graduating from Tsinghua University in 1987. He started as a technologist in the 
R&D department in Case C and was gradually promoted over the years until being 
appointed as Chairman. Therefore, he has a high level of firm-specific knowledge after 
nearly 30 years of working in Case C.  
5.2.1.3 Good BUL embeddedness case group summary 
To sum up, the top managers in those SOEs with embedded BUL practices are all insiders 
so they have high levels of firm-specific knowledge making them capable of observing 
less visible innovation efforts like problem solving activities at shop floor level.   
From previous analysis, some findings could be demonstrated in relation to whether an 
insider or an outsider had been appointed as a top manager for any SOEs. Firstly, 
empirical evidence in this research shows that the local government likes to appoint 
insiders as top managers of local SOEs, those who have firm-specific knowledge to be 
able to observe less visible learning efforts. This is different from what was once revealed 
in previous literature, where SOEs would only have outsiders as top managers. Both Case 
B and Case C are local SOEs in the automobile industry, thus, at least local SOEs have 
insiders as top managers. Secondly, those insiders tend to stay as top managers of local 
SOEs for long periods of time, which is different from the normal 4-5 years term of top 
managers that is suggested in the literature. The long-term employment of top managers 
allows them to develop in-depth, firm-specific knowledge so that they understand how 




5.2.2 Moderate BUL embeddedness group 
From the analysis outlined in Chapter 5, the findings show that Case D (Private, Auto), 
Case F (Central SOE, Railway) and Case G (Central SOE, Railway) have a moderate 
number of embedded BUL practices. 
Case D is a private limited company where shares are jointly owned by all of the managers 
and employees. Therefore, their top manager is the CEO elected by their managers and 
employees who are all shareholders.  
Cases F and G are second tier3 subsidiaries who do not have a board of shareholders, thus 
they do not have a Chairman as their top manager as in Cases B and C. Therefore, the top 
managers of these two firms are the CEOs.  
5.2.2.1 Case D (Private, Auto)  
Case D was a local SOE, however, it was privatised by the local government in 2006 
following a management buyout. Managers and employees bought all the shares of Case 
D, and the current CEO owns the highest percentage of shares. Before 2006, the current 
CEO had already been the General Manager of the firm for almost 10 years. The CEO of 
Case D states that “… I was appointed as the general manager in 1996. … I started as an 
engineer in the R&D department in 1988. … From 2005, our local government decided 
to sell some underperforming SOEs cheaply to private investors. We are one of those 
underperforming SOEs to be sold. I organised our managers and employees to buy out 
all of our shares so that we become working for ourselves and enjoy every cent we 
made…Because I invested a large amount of money when buying shares, I got the highest 
                                                 
3 Second tier subsidiary of the SOE means that the case in question is a subsidiary of the parent company. 
The parent company is a larger subsidiary of a giant SOE (corporate group) owned directly by SASAC at 




percentage of shares of our company… (D-CEO)”. After Case D was privatised, the 
managers and employees asked the CEO to remain in post in the new private, limited 
company.  
Therefore, the current CEO is viewed wholly as an insider, having a great level of firm-
specific knowledge. Despite the CEO’s 21 years of experience working as the top 
manager since 1996, the current CEO also worked as an engineer and at various 
managerial levels since 1988.  
5.2.2.2 Case F (Central SOE, Railway)  
Case F is a central SOE founded in 2003. The current CEO was appointed by the parent 
company on behalf of the central SASAC in 2013, however, he is due to retire4 in 2017. 
Therefore, at the time the current CEO was interviewed, the CEO stated that: “… our 
parent company will appoint a mid-level manager in our parent company to take my 
position after I retire. The mid-level manager is going to retire in 5-6 years so the parent 
company wants him to be promoted to become a CEO in a subsidiary company before his 
retirement … (F-CEO)”.  
Because of the short time the current CEO will stay in Case F firm, he will be considered 
as an outsider who does not have a good level of firm-specific knowledge.  
5.2.2.3 Case G (Central SOE, Railway)  
Case G is a 50:50 JV between a central SOE and a foreign company. However, the foreign 
parent company does not involve itself in the management of Case G, they merely provide 
                                                 
4 The official retirement age of employees in SOEs is 60 for men and 50 for women. However, if approved 





licences for their technology. Therefore, the top manager of Case G will be appointed by 
the parent company (the central SOE) on behalf of the central SASAC.  
The current CEO of Case G was appointed in 2012 by the parent company on behalf of 
the central SASAC. He was appointed because the parent company considered sending 
him to manage a subsidiary as an opportunity to develop his resume. The CEO of Case G 
advises that: “… before I was appointed as CEO to our company, I was a Deputy Head 
of R&D department in our parent company… the Chairman in our parent company 
wanted to promote me to senior level manager but there was no vacant position until few 
years later. … So, I have been sent to this subsidiary (Case G) as CEO which is about 
equivalent to the VP level in our parent company. … Our Chairman considers this as an 
opportunity for me to develop my CV so that I can easily be recalled back to the parent 
company in the future as a senior level manager in a few years. … (G-CEO)”.  
Therefore, due to the short term that the current CEO would work at Case G, he is 
considered as an outsider who would not have sufficient firm-specific knowledge.  
5.2.2.4 Moderate BUL embeddedness in the case group summary 
To conclude, within the case group with moderate embeddedness of BUL practices, Case 
D, a private company, has an insider top manager who worked as a CEO for nearly 21 
years. Conversely, both central SOEs, Case F and Case G (Railway), have outsiders as 
top managers who will only work as a CEO for a short term, that being around 5 years.  
Interestingly, in Case F (Central SOE, Railway), the current top manager was appointed 
when, in approximately 5 years, he would reach the compulsory retirement age. Moreover, 
the top manager who would be his replacement would also be retiring in 5-6 years. 




term of office, which is traditionally around 4-5 years. On reaching the retirement age of 
65, by law, they will have to leave the companies.  
Another central SOE (Case G, Railway), has an outsider as its top manager, but in this 
company, for different reasons to those already mooted. The parent company considers 
sending mid-level manager to subsidiaries as a means to improve their management skills. 
After 5-6 years they would be recalled to the parent company and be promoted to senior 
level management positions.  
Therefore, the top managers of two central SOEs in this group were all outsiders when 
they were appointed. They were all appointed by the parent company when they were 
mid-level managers in their respective parent companies. These top managers would only 
work for another 5 years before they must leave. This means top managers in central 
SOEs in this particular group, do not initially have firm-specific knowledge, and they do 
not have sufficient time within the firm to develop such knowledge, due to the short time 
left before their retirement. This could be one of main reasons why they do not have good 
BUL embeddedness.  
5.2.3 Poor BUL embeddedness group 
From the analysis given in Chapter 5, Case A (Central SOE, Auto) and Case E (Central 
SOE, Railway) have the least number of embedded BUL practices amongst all the cases 
studied in this thesis. These two companies are all large first tier subsidiaries5 fully owned 
by giant central SOEs (a corporate group directly owned by central SASAC), and the top 
                                                 
5 First tier subsidiary of the SOE means that the firm studied is a large size subsidiary owned by a giant 




managers in Cases A and E are directly appointed by the parent company on behalf of the 
central SASAC.  
In Cases B and C, the Chairman of the Board of Shareholder is the key decision maker. 
Therefore, the background of the chairmen in Cases A and E will be discussed in the 
following paragraphs to establish whether they had firm-specific knowledge when they 
were appointed. 
5.2.3.1 Case A (Central SOE, Auto) 
Case A is at the transformational stage between its old and new Chairmen at the time of 
interview in early 2016. The new Chairman was appointed directly by SASAC from 
outside so he has not worked in Case A or the parent company before. The VP of Case A 
stated that: “… our new Chairman was a secretary of the governor of a province. He has 
not worked in this (automobile) sector before. …he is a total layman (person not knowing 
the technology) selected by our parent company or even by central SASAC directly from 
outside of our system (central SOEs in automobile sector) …(A-VP)”. Therefore, because 
the new Chairman has neither firm-specific nor industry-specific knowledge, is 
considered as a complete outsider who is unable to observe less visible innovative efforts.   
5.2.3.2 Case E (Central SOE, Railway)  
The CEO and Chairman of Case E is the same person who was appointed in 2011. Before 
he was appointed as CEO and Chairman of Case E, he was the Chairman of other 
subsidiaries owned by CRRC. At the time of interview, the CEO/Chairman had worked 
in Case E for nearly 6 years. It is not yet known whether he will be transferred to other 




managers is that he will be allowed to remain in position for another 3-4 years until his 
retirement. 
Therefore, the CEO/Chairman of Case E is still considered an outsider due to the short 
time he has worked in the company. However, if allowed to remain in his position for 
another 3-4 years, he could become an insider having, by that point, developed firm-
specific knowledge.  
5.2.3.3 Poor BUL embeddedness case group summary  
To conclude, empirical evidence in this research shows that the central government 
favours appointing outsiders as top managers for central SOEs. In addition, those 
outsiders will only enjoy short term employment as a top manager for approximately 5 
years. Therefore, they do not have firm-specific knowledge when they are appointed to 
the role of  top manager, and do not have the opportunity to develop firm-specific 
knowledge due to the short term they would remain in the firms. Consequently, those 
outsiders are unlikely to adopt highly embedded BUL practices because they are unable 
to observe them and would not appreciate any BUL efforts made as these are less visible 
to outsiders.   
5.2.4 Summary of findings from the analysis of management 
appointments 
From the analysis of management appointments of insiders or outsiders as top managers 
of SOEs, the findings are revealed and summarised in Table 5-1.  
Firstly, empirical evidence in this research reveals that the local government (local 
SASAC) prefers to appoint insiders who have firm-specific knowledge as top managers 




opportunities to develop in-depth, firm-specific knowledge. In Cases B and C (Auto) as 
local SOEs, they have both appointed insiders as top managers. In addition, top managers 
of those two local SOEs have all worked for at least 15 years in the role of top manager. 
Therefore, top managers in those two local SOEs have the knowledge and capability to 
observe and appreciate BUL efforts that are less visible to outsiders. 
Table 5-1: Summary of findings on management appointments of top managers by governments 
Case Case group Ownership and 
sector 
Total years worked 
in the current 
company (including 
time before being 
appointed as top 
manager) 
Insider or outsider 
as top manager 
B Good Local, Auto 15 Insider 
C Good Local, Auto 30 Insider 
D Moderate Private, Auto 29 Insider 
F Moderate Central, Railway 5 Outsider 
G Moderate Central, Railway 6 Outsider 
A Poor Central, Auto 0 Outsider 
E Poor Central, Railway 6 Outsider 
Rows in grey could not be explained by the findings in this section - thus requires further 
analysis.  
 
Secondly, empirical evidence in this research shows that the central government (central 
SASAC) likes to appoint outsiders who do not have firm-specific knowledge as top 
managers of central SOEs. Moreover, the outsiders are appointed for only a short term of 
around 4-5 years so that they do not have the opportunity to develop more in-depth, firm-
specific knowledge. Case A (Auto), Case E, Case F and Case G (Railway), as central 
SOEs, have all appointed outsiders as top managers in a parachute manner. Moreover, 
top managers of those central SOEs only stay for around 5 years, and then they will leave 
the firms. Thus, due to their short-term employment in the role of top manager, they do 
not have the opportunity to develop in-depth, firm-specific knowledge. Therefore, top 
managers in those four central SOEs do not have the knowledge and capabilities to 




Thirdly, empirical evidence in this research shows that by having as insider as the top 
manager of the firm is no guarantee to lead to higher levels of embeddedness of BUL 
practices. Case D (Auto), as a private limited company, has an insider as a top manager 
for nearly 21 years. Nevertheless, the number of embedded BUL practices is only at a 
moderate level amongst all cases studied. This phenomenon may not be explained by 
whether an insider or an outsider was appointed, or selected, as top manager of the 
company.  Thus, this finding suggests that by only having insiders as a top manager is not 
wholly sufficient for firms to have highly embedded BUL practices. Therefore, this 
requires more analysis in the following sections to offer an explanation.  
Fourthly, empirical evidence in this research shows having an outsider as a top manager 
does not necessarily mean that the firm does not have embedded BUL practices. Case F 
and Case G (Railway) are central SOEs who have outsiders as top managers but they have 
an average number of embedded BUL practices in place in all cases. However, their 
moderate levels of embedded BUL practices could not be explained by having an outsider 
as the top manager in Case F and Case G (Central SOE, Railway). Thus, this phenomenon 
requires further analysis in the following section to establish other contributory factors.  
5.3 Length of Employment of Top Managers 
As suggested in other literature, top managers in Chinese SOEs tend to only serve a short 
period of time that is around 4-5 years. After that they will leave their SOEs. Due to the 
fact they will only manage the company for a short period of time, they have a tendency 
to only plan for short term profit, for instance, relying heavily on importing ready-made 
technological packages to boost production capability in the short term, whilst ignoring 
the internal development of long term learning and problem-solving capabilities (Liu and 




manager, that is for more than 10 years, he would have to plan for the long-time 
performance of the company because his career, including any personal gain, is tied into 
the performance of the company. Because one assumption drawn from literature is that 
BUL leads to improved innovation capability, better innovation performance and 
increased economic performance, meaning top managers with long term employment 
would be more highly motivated towards the benefits of adopting embedded BUL 
practices in the long term. Therefore, long term employment of top managers increases 
the incentive to adopt long term management practices, like BUL practices, to improve 
internal learning and problem-solving capabilities.  
Thus, the group-case analysis investigated the relationship between the length of 
employment of top managers in the seven cases studied, to better understand the levels of 
top managers’ incentives to adopt embedded BUL practices with a view to improving the 
long-term innovation capability of firms. 
5.3.1 The good embeddedness BUL group  
5.3.1.1 Case B (Local SOEs, Auto)  
As already discussed in Section 5.2.1.1, the top manager of Case B has been in his 
position for nearly 15 years at the point this study was prepared. Therefore, it is reasonable 
to conclude that the top manager of Case B has a high-level of incentive to adopt BUL 
practices because his personal gain is closely linked with the long-term prospects of the 
firm.  
To conclude, because the top managers of Case B have long term employment, the level 





5.3.1.2 Case C (Local SOEs, Auto) 
As discussed in Section 5.2.1.2, the top manager of Case C has worked in this firm for 
nearly 30 years. However, he has only recently, 2 years ago, been appointed as Chairman. 
Thus, it is difficult to predict his length of tenure in this position.   
However, it was found that the last top manager of Case C had been in the position from 
1990 to 2015, which is for 25 years. He has a total of 46 years of working experience in 
Case C from 1969 to his retirement in 2015. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the 
local government prefers to appoint insiders as top managers in Case C, and the length of 
such an appointment is likely to be long term.  
Thus, the incentive of the current top manager in Case C to adapt embedded BUL 
practices is high because his career prospects and personal gain are closely tied to the 
long-term prospects of the firm.  
5.3.1.3 Good BUL embeddedness case group summary 
Empirical evidence in this research shows that top managers in local SOEs are appointed 
by the government for long term employment. Therefore, their personal gains are closely 
linked with the long-term prospects of the firms in which they are employed. This makes 
them willing to plan for long term development of the firm’s innovation capability 
through adopting embedded BUL practices.  
Thus, although BUL practices require a long period of time before producing observable 
benefits, those top managers of local SOEs are willing to adopt them to develop the firm’s 




5.3.2 Moderate embeddedness BUL group  
5.3.2.1 Case D (Private, Auto)  
As discussed in Section 5.2.2.1, the top manager of Case D has been in his position for 
nearly 21 years. Because Case D is a private company, their top manager is not appointed 
by the government. Instead, the top manager is elected by their shareholders, these consist 
of all employees and managers of the company. Because the current top manager also 
owns the highest parentage of shares, his personal gain is closely linked with the long-
term prospects of the firm.  
Thus, because the top manager has enjoyed a long-term employment in his position, and 
his personal gain is closely linked with the long-term prospects of the company, the level 
of his incentive to adopt embedded BUL practice is high in order to improve the firm’s 
innovation capability.  
5.3.2.2 Case F (Central SOE, Railway) 
As discussed in Section 5.2.2.2, the top manager of Case F was appointed for only 5 years. 
Moreover, he is due to retire in 2017. Thus, he could only work in this firm for 5 years. 
What is more, according to the CEO of Case F, the one who will take over his position 
after he retires will also retire in 5-6 years. This means the length of employment of the 
subsequent top manager of Case F will still be very short. With such a short period of 
administration, the current and subsequent top managers are unlikely to adopt BUL 
practices due to the long time needed for those practices to produce any benefits. In 
addition, because both the current and subsequent top managers were, and will be, 
appointed when they only have approximately 5 years left before reaching compulsory 




firms. Consequently, their incentive to adopt embedded BUL practices to improve 
innovation capability is likely to be low.  
5.3.2.3 Case G (Central SOE, Railway)  
As discussed in Section 5.2.2.3, the top manager has been in his position for 6 years. It is 
unknown how long he might remain in this position because the length of tenure will be 
at the discretion of the parent company and central SASAC. According to the CEO of 
Case G, he expects to be transferred back to the parent company as a VP shortly. Because 
the previous CEO has only worked for this firm for 5 years, the length of employment of 
the current CEO is likely to be short and will end soon. Therefore, the personal gain of 
the current top manager is not closely linked with the long-term development of Case G 
due to the short term of his employment. Consequently, the level of his incentive to adopt 
embedded BUL practices is low.  
5.3.2.4 Moderate BUL embeddedness case group summary 
The previous analysis of Case D (Private, Auto), Case F and Case G (Central SOEs, 
Railway), shows that private firms offer long term employment to their top managers. 
However, top managers in two central SOEs have all been appointed short-term. 
Therefore, the level of the top manager’s incentive to adopt BUL practice is high in 
private firms but low in central SOEs.  
5.3.3 Poor embeddedness BUL group  
5.3.3.1 Case A (Central SOE, Auto)  
As discussed in Section 5.2.3.1, the current top manager of Case A has just been appointed 
by the parent company on behalf of the central SASAC in early 2016. Thus, he has only 




is solely up to the plans of the central SASAC. However, based on the experience from 
their last top manager, who has only worked for 5 years, the length of employment of the 
new top manager is unlikely to be long. Being such a short time that the top manager 
would remain with the firm, which is around 5 years, their personal gain is not linked 
with the long-term development of the firm. Therefore, the level of incentive of the top 
manager in Case A to adopt embedded BUL practice is low because the top manager 
would only stay for around 5 years.  
5.3.3.2 Case E (Central SOE, Railway)  
As discussed in Section 5.2.3.2, the top manager of Case E has worked in the firm for 6 
years. There is no guarantee how much longer he would stay in this position. However, 
because he is going to retire in 3-4 years, the expectation within the workforce is to have 
him remain in position until retirement. Therefore, the expected time he will work as a 
top manager in Case E could reach 9 – 10 years in total.  
Nonetheless, the length of employment of the top manager in Case E is still considered 
as short because firstly, the 9-10 years expectation is based solely on the expectations of 
the workforce, it remains the decision of the parent company and central SASAC. At this 
stage, no official or creditable information is available from the parent company and 
central SASAC regarding this issue. Secondly, 9-10 years as a top manager only barely 
meets the definition of long term employment in this thesis, which is at least 10 years. 
Thus, the length of employment of the top manager in Case E is still considered as short 
term in this thesis, due to the limited information available at this stage. Given this, the 
level of incentive of the top manager to adopt embedded BUL practices to develop 




5.3.3.3 Poor BUL embeddedness case group summary 
Empirical evidence in this research demonstrates that the level of incentive of top 
managers in central SOEs is low, this finding is based on the fact that top managers in 
both Case A (Central SOE, Auto) and Case E (Central SOEs, Railway) were only 
appointed in the short term.  
5.3.4 Summary of findings on the length of employment of top managers 
From the analysis based on the length of employment of top managers in each of the 
seven cases studied, the findings are developed and summarised in Table 5-2.  
First, empirical evidence in this research shows that top managers in local SOEs (Cases 
B and C, Local SOEs, Auto) and in the private firm (Case D, Private, Auto) have high 
levels of incentive to adopt BUL practice. This is due to the top manager being appointed 
or elected for a longer term of at least 15 years (in Case B, local SOE, Auto).  
Table 5-2: Summary of findings based on the length of employment of top managers  
Case Case group  Ownership and 
sector 
Insider/ 




top manager  
Note 
number 
B Good Local, Auto Insider  Long term  
C Good Local, Auto Insider  Long term 1 
D Moderate Private, Auto Insider Long term  
F Moderate Central, Railway Outsider Short term  
G Moderate Central, Railway Outsider  Short term  
A Poor Central, Auto Outsider Short term 2 
E Poor Central, Railway Outsider Short term 3 
Row in grey could not be explained by findings in this section – thus requires further analysis.  
 
Notes:  
1. The penultimate top manager worked for more than 15 years, so the current top 
manager is likely to be in position for a long time.  
2. The current top manager will retire in 3-4 years, thus the general expectation amongst 
employees is that the CRRC will allow him to work until retirement. The unofficial 
anticipated time in post is 9-10 years. This is not official.  
3. The current top manager is newly appointed by the parent company on behalf of the 
central SASAC. It is unclear how long he will remain. However, based on case of the 





Second, empirical evidence in this research shows that top managers in central SOEs have 
less incentive to adopt BUL practices in general compared to local SOEs and private firms. 
This is due to their short-term employment in the firms. When employed as a top manager 
for a period of approximately 5 years, they do not plan for long term development of the 
firm’s innovation capability. 
Third, empirical evidence in this research shows that amongst central SOEs, top managers 
of two firms (Cases F and G, Central SOEs, Railway) have some incentive to adopt BUL 
practices because they face a degree of competition from the domestic market. Threats 
from rivals force them to have some BUL practice in place to develop some innovation 
capability to avoid being replaced by the parent company CRRC. However, because the 
other two central SOEs (Case A, Central SOE, Auto; and Case E, Central SOE, Railway) 
have little or no competition in their fields, the top manager’s incentive to adopt BUL 
practices is low.  
Fourthly, the moderate level of embeddedness of BUL practice in Case D (Private, Auto) 
is still not wholly explained by the length of employment of its top manager. Case D has 
an insider top manager with long-term employment so its top manager has a strong 
incentive to adopt embedded BUL practices. However, it only achieved a moderate level 
of BUL embeddedness. Therefore, more factors need to be analysed to explain this 
phenomenon.  
5.4 Firm’s Access to Capital 
In this section, the level of a firm’s access to capital will be analysed, to establish whether 
access to financial capital and human resource capital influences the top managers’ 




BUL requires involvement of knowledgeable employees into the innovation process, and 
continuous training to both managers and employees. Therefore, a firm’s access to high 
quality human resource capital is important to have embedded BUL. Moreover, based on 
the experience from Case B (Local SOE, Auto) it is also very expensive to build a BUL 
system consisting of highly embedded BUL practices. Case B has all five BUL practices 
in place and all of them are highly embedded. They spent at least a million RMB to hire 
a professional, lean management consultancy firm from Japan to design their lean 
production system, including a proposal system using Kaizen programmes as instruments. 
In addition, the OA (office automation) system they used to manage their work-related 
records was developed by IBM for them, which is highly unlikely to be cheap. Moreover, 
every Saturday Case B provides intensive training for all its employees and managers. 
Although most of this training is delivered by internal trainers, so many training hours 
provided in-house would certainly not be delivered for free.  
Therefore, whether or not a firm has access to capital could influence its capability to 
adopt embedded BUL practices.  
In the following subsections, each case will be studied to discover how many forms of 
capital they have access to using the classification of capital developed based on work by 
Peng et al. (2005) and Yiu and Lau (2008). The forms of capital have been divided into 
two groups to include financial capital and human resource capital.  
5.4.1 Good BUL embeddedness group 
5.4.1.1 Case B (Local SOE, Auto) 
Case B receives all types of capital except for the training on management knowledge for 




Financial Capital  
Easy Loan 
The firms could very easily acquire loans from banks because they are one of the market 
leaders in the Chinese commercial vehicle sector. In addition, they are one of the core 
manufacturing companies in their city. Therefore, banks would like to lend money to 
them. 
Tax relief 
They also receive tax exemption on new products they launch in the first three years. 
Furthermore, because they export to over 80 countries, they receive tax refunds for their 
exports. Moreover, they get tax reductions on products that have received technological 
awards issued by government at varying levels.  
Government purchase 
Case B is the only producer of commercial vehicles in that region, therefore, nearly all 
buses in that city are produced by Case B.  
Funding for R&D from government  
Where Case B is jointly developing new energy vehicles with Tsinghua University, as 
previously mentioned, the central government provided them with research funding for 
30 million RMB. Moreover, Case B received many forms of direct funding from different 
levels of governments that totalled over 170 million RMB in 2016.  




As a key leader in the local economy, and a leader of China’s commercial vehicle sector, 
Case B receives many awards from different levels of government every year. Recently, 
Case B received 2 City-level rewards for two new types of technological innovations used 
on their products.  
Human Resource Capital  
Technical training 
Engineers in Case B receive some training from local universities because they have joint 
R&D programmes with them.  
Human resources  
Case B attracts a large number of highly talented engineers from all over China because 
the local government gives Case B an annual quota to help employees from other cities 
(“outsiders”) to have local Hukou (local citizen residency). This is a very attractive thing 
to “outsiders” because it is very difficult for them to get Hukou in the city where Case B 
is located, this policy has attracted a large number of highly talented and skilled people 
to work for Case B.  
5.4.1.2 Case C (Local SOE, Auto) 
As with Case B, Case C receives all types of capital apart from management knowledge 
training for managers.  
Financial Capital  
Easy Loan 
Case C could very easily acquire loans from banks because they are one of the market 




province belong to us…At the beginning of every year, the branch managers of local 
banks will actively call me to ask how much money we would like to borrow this year … 
[It is because] these managers … have an annual quota of loans they have to give out to 
creditable customers … [who] are mainly large SOEs like us … (C-VP)”. Therefore, Case 
C has easy access to loans due to the vital role it plays in the local automobile sector.  
Tax relief 
Case C also benefits from tax exemption on new products launched in its initial three 
years like Case B. This is a national level policy so all firms in China are entitled to this, 
regardless of their ownership. Moreover, firms receive tax refunds for their exports as 
does Case B. Moreover, tax exemptions on new energy vehicles helps to attract more 
customers. Case C is a market leader in heavy duty trucks that run on natural gas, 
customers who buy their trucks are also exempt from paying Vehicle Purchase Tax. This 
is a nationwide policy of the central government.  
Government purchase 
As the only automobile firm in their province, the government gave them priority when 
purchasing trucks. However, because Case C does not produce coaches, the local buses 
are not produced by them. They mainly sell trucks and special utility trucks, like road 
cleaning vehicles to the local government.  
Funding for R&D from the government  
Case C has a national level research institute specialising in developing natural gas engine 




Information Technology, they received direct funding for 130 million RMB to develop 
natural gas engine technologies to improve fuel efficiency.  
Awards issued by authorities  
As a key driver in local economic growth, and a leader of China’s natural gas heavy duty 
trucks, Case C receives many awards from different levels of government every year. 
Recently, Case C received a national level reward issued by the China Transportation 
Association for the significant contributions made to the express postal service in China. 
They received this award because Case C has developed an Internet of Things (IoT) 
system especially designed for organising freight transportation. The system was 
launched in 2011 and had been adopted by nearly all major express companies in China 
by 2016.  
Human Resource Capital 
Technical training 
Engineers in Case C receive regular technical training from local universities. There is 
one local university that is highly specialised in automobile engineering and design, thus 
they formed strategic alliances with firms to regularly train their engineers, and also 
conduct joint R&D programmes on automobile technology.  
Human resources  
As the only firm in the local automobile sector, Case C attracts many high-quality 
university graduates with the university mentioned above who specialise in automobile 
engineering and design. They formed a partnership to give priority to the graduates of this 




5.4.1.3 Good BUL embeddedness case group summary 
Empirical evidence in this research shows that local SOEs receive high levels of capital 
from the government so they have easy access to financial capital through easy loans and 
direct funding for R&D projects. This allows them to adopt expensive BUL practices, 
given the fact that the top managers of the two local SOEs are insiders and both have the 
necessary incentive to adopt BUL practices. Also, as they have good access to human 
resource capital, their employees and managers have the capability of contributing ideas 
to BUL for innovation.  
Table 5-3: Summary of capital received by good BUL embeddedness group 
Forms of Capital Case B Case C 
Financial Capital 
Easy Loan ■ ■ 
Tax relief ■ ■ 
Government 
purchase ■ ■ 
Funding for R&D 
from government ■ ■ 
Awards issued by 
authorities ■ ■ 
Human Resource 
Capital 
Technical training ■ ■ 
Management 
knowledge □ □ 
Human resources ■ ■ 
■ Have access to this form of capital  □ Do not have access to this form of capital 
 
5.4.2 Moderate BUL embeddedness group  
5.4.2.1 Case D (Private, Auto) 
Case D only has access to limited capital.  





Case D also receives tax exemption on new products launched in its initial three years 
like Case B and C. This is a national level policy so all firms in China are entitled to this 
regardless of ownership. Moreover, because Case D exports a great deal to foreign 
countries, including Germany, Italy, Switzerland, the United States and Southeast Asia, 
they receive tax refunds for their exports as in Cases B and C.  
Awards issued by authorities  
As one of the leading Chinese manufacturers producing fuel supplying parts for engines, 
like fuel injectors and high-pressure fuel pumps, Case D received many awards for their 
new products and innovations. Moreover, they have recently been issued a licence to 
supply products to firms in the defence sector. Because such licences are very difficult to 
obtain, especially for private firms, this licence could be considered as a certificate 
confirming their high product quality and reliability.  
Apart from the awards issued for the products or technologies they developed, Case D 
also received a city level award for their innovation in using MS Office software to 
develop a customised OA system. However, this innovative utility of MS Office software 
is actually forced by their poor access to financial resources from banks. They spend most 
of the money renewing equipment, meaning they could not afford to adopt highly 
embedded BUL practices like Cases B and C have.  
As listed above, Case D could only acquire a little capital from the government, a 
dramatically different experience from what is enjoyed by local SOEs as discussed in the 
previous sub-sections. This is because Case D lost the privilege to receive other forms of 
capital from the local government after becoming a private firm. They have especially 




states that: “… [When we were an SOE] we were able to easily borrow money from local 
banks to expand our factory. However, as a private company it becomes more difficult 
now. … We can still get loans, but more difficult than before … (D-CEO)”.  
Moreover, because the only local university does not have a good reputation in 
engineering, this causes two main issues. Firstly, they are unable to recruit high quality 
engineers locally for their R&D department. What is worse, because Case D is located in 
a poorly developed, small city, graduates from good universities are not willing to work 
for them. Moreover, even local people who graduated from good universities in other 
regions do not want to return to their home town and work for them. This is a major 
problem for Case D to employ a sustainable, high quality workforce.  
In addition, because of the low capability of the local university, Case D cannot have joint 
R&D projects with them. It is also difficult for Case D to currently conduct joint R&D 
with public research institutes (PRIs). This is because a large number of PRIs in the field 
of fuel supply systems have been privatised and have become internal research institutes 
owned by large SOEs who have subsidiaries producing fuel supply products. Due to the 
competitive relationship between them, it is very hard for Case D to form any joint R&D 
project with those internal research institutes, especially Case D as it is now a private 
company.  
Thus, Case D only receives very low levels of capital from the government. They have 
especially poor access to financial capital, which makes them unable to adopt embedded 
BUL practices. Based on the experiences of Case B these practices are very expensive. 
Having poor access to good quality human resource capital also constrains their capability 





5.4.2.2 Case F (Central SOE, Railway) 
Case F is a second-tier subsidiary of CRRC which is the only SOE owned by the central 
government. Therefore, all SOEs in China’s railway sector are tier one subsidiaries of 
CRRC.  
The level of capital that Case F receives is about the same as that of the local SOEs (Case 
B and C) in the automobile sector that is discussed in Section 5.4.1.  
Financial capital  
Easy Loans 
Case F has easy access to bank loans because they are the sole supplier to some models 
of high speed trains that are widely used in China nowadays. Since they have a basically 
monopolistic position in their business, and they are a central SOE, banks do not doubt 
their ability to repay their loans. Case F built their current headquarters in a rural area 
around Beijing that was solely reliant on loans from local banks.  
Tax relief 
The new product developed by Case F is exempt from tax in its first three years. They 
also receive a tax reduction on products that have received technological rewards from 
the Ministries of Transportation and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. 
Funding for R&D from the government 
Case F was founded in 2003, ten years before the former China’s Ministry of Railway 




they were established. The mission of Case F has been to import and localise pantograph 
technologies from foreign companies. Moreover, they also needed to continue making 
improvements on the original design so that their products could be fitted on newer and 
faster high-speed trains developed indigenously by China North Rail (merged with China 
South Rail into CRRC) at that time. Thus, they receive a tremendous amount of funding 
from the former Ministry of Railways to carry out R&D. Although the Ministry of 
Railways has been reformed, Case F is still the leading company in the production of the 
pantograph and other related parts for high speed trains. Their newest model is capable 
of operating at a speed of 380 km/h.  
Awards issued by authorities 
As the leading firm in producing pantographs for high speed trains, they received many 
awards for the technological innovation they produced. For example, they received a 
Second-Class Railway Technology Award issued by the China Academy of Railway 
Sciences for their innovation to solve electrical shortages caused by the severe air 
pollution, called fine particle matter (PM2.5), in many regions of China.  
Case F does not benefit from government purchasing because their products cannot be 
used independently. Therefore, they are only a supplier for major high-speed train 
producers.  
Human Resource Capital 
Technical training 
The engineers of Case F often attend meetings organised by the university relating to their 




organises seminars and meetings to keep their subsidiaries up-to-date about new 
technologies that have been developed or imported, as well as recent market trends.  
Human Resources  
As a central SOE located in a highly developed tier 1 city (yixianchengshi), Case F is a 
very attractive employer especially given the fact that their parent company is CRRC. 
Being a subsidiary of CRRC means the welfare and salary provided by Case F is much 
higher than SOEs in other sectors. In addition, because Case F is classified as a “high-
tech” company, local government allows their employees to have priorities when 
applying for Hukou. This privilege is very similar to that enjoyed by Case B employees. 
Therefore, this allows Case F to hire many talented engineers for their R&D department.  
To conclude, Case F receives a high level of capital from the government. They could 
afford to adopt embedded BUL practices because they have easy access to financial 
resources through loans.  
5.4.2.3 Case G (Central SOE, Railway)  
Financial capital  
Easy loans 
Although Case G does not often borrow from the banks, they have easy access to loans 
from local banks. It is because they have special status being a central SOE in a small 
city. The city where Case G is located has two central SOEs in the railway sector. They 
are Case G, and the parent company of Case G, which is a large central SOE. Therefore, 





Like all other cases discussed above, they enjoy tax exemption for new products for three 
years. Because this is a national policy since 1984, every company has this. Apart from 
this, no other tax relief policy was agreed by the local government.  
Awards issued by authorities 
As the only supplier of train couplers for heavy duty freight trains, Case G has received 
some awards for the technological problems they’ve solved to meet customer needs. For 
example, one model of their range of couplers used to have a malfunction issue when 
locomotives pushed coaches from the rear. After they worked closely with CARS they 
have modified the design of the coupler to avoid this problem. The modification has been 
awarded a Third-Class Railway Technology Award by CARS.   
Human Resource Capital 
Technical training  
Similar to Case F, Case G also needs to send engineers to attend seminars and meetings 
organised by CRRC and Beijing Jiaotong University to learn new technological 
developments and new trends in the market.  
Human resources 
As a central SOE in a small city, Case G is a very attractive employer who can provide 
good salaries and high job security. However, Case G cannot find highly skilled engineers 
locally because the city is too small for them to stay. Fortunately, because Case G is a 
small company, they only need to recruit about one person every two or three years. 




To sum up, Case G does not receive as much capital from the government as other SOEs. 
This is mainly due to the size of their firm, and they do not have production plants which 
usually have much higher overheads. However, the level of capital provided by the 
government to Case F is still significantly higher than what Case D (Private, Auto) could 
achieve. Therefore, the level of capital Case F receives from the government is considered 
as high in this thesis.  
5.4.2.4 Moderate BUL embeddedness case group summary  
Amongst firms with moderate levels of embedded BUL practices, Case D (Private, Auto) 
has low levels of access to capital. Its level is significantly lower than what central SOEs 
could have, regardless of how small the central SOEs (like Case G, Railway). The limited 
access to capital considerably constrains its capability to adopt all embedded BUL 
practices like Case B (Local SOE, Auto) even though it has an insider top manager with 
long-term employment.  
However, Case D (Private, Auto) found some ways to avoid adopting expensive BUL 
practices by developing them in-house. For example, they developed an online proposal 
and record keeping system using Microsoft Office software. This allows them to have 
some embedded BUL practices without a large amount of financial investment. This 
finding explains the moderate BUL embeddedness of Case D.  







Table 5-4: Summary of capital received by moderate BUL embeddedness group 
Forms of Capital Case D Case F Case G 
Financial 
Capital 
Easy Loan □ ■ ■ 




Funding for R&D 
from government □ ■ □ 
Awards issued by 




Technical training □ ■ ■ 
Management 
knowledge □ □ □ 
Human resources □ ■ □ 
■ Have access to this form of capital  □ Do not have access to this form of capital 
5.4.3 Poor BUL embeddedness group  
5.4.3.1 Case A (Central SOE, Auto)  
Financial capital  
Easy loans 
Case A is a large central company that produces high speed engines for special vehicles 
and ships. It is the only SOE in the automobile sector in their city. Moreover, because 
their products are widely used by the army and navy, they have an especially high status 
in the local economy. This allows them to have easy access to loans from local banks. In 
fact, most of their new equipment is purchased with loans. Therefore, their equipment is 
frequently renewed.  
Tax relief 
 Apart from the regular three years exemption of tax for new products, which is 
commonly available to all firms, Case A is entitled to a special tax exemption policy that 




exemption policy to military products in 1994, most products of Case A are exempt from 
paying tax for an unlimited period. 
Government purchase  
The main customer of Case A is China’s armed forces. Case A has been assigned military 
representatives to work in their company to monitor product quality and production 
progress.  
Funding for R&D from the government 
Because Case A produces military products, the details of funding provided by the 
government are confidential. Therefore, it will not be discussed here. However, it was 
confirmed by the Chief Engineer of Case A that their R&D projects are heavily funded 
by the government.  
Awards issued by authorities 
As the leading firm in producing military use high speed engines, Case A has received 
many awards from government agencies and industrial associations. For example, they 
have recently been awarded a Second Class National Science and Technology Progress 
Award by the State Council.  
Human Resource Capital  
Technical training 
The Industrial Association of Internal Combustion Engines often organises workshops to 
teach new technology, regulations and policies to firms. During the data collection period 




organised by the industrial association and hosted by the Beijing Institute of Technology. 
There they discussed cutting edge technologies developed in the international market, 
technologies recently developed by Chinese firms, changes to regulations regarding new 
emission standards, forecasting the direction of the engine sector for the next few years, 
and so on.  
Human resources 
Because Case A is the only firm who specialises in producing high speed diesel engines 
for military vehicles and ships, they attract a lot of graduates with relevant degrees from 
universities all over China. Case A has formed a partnership with a university who 
specialises in developing engine technologies to give priority to their graduates when they 
apply for jobs in Case A.  
To sum up, Case A receives a high level of capital so they have easy access to financial 
resources. Therefore, they are able to afford to adopt embedded BUL practices.  
5.4.3.2 Case E (Central SOE, Railway)  
Financial capital 
Easy Loans 
Case E is the leading manufacturer of electric locomotives for heavy duty freight trains. 
It is a tier 1 subsidiary under CRRC. As a large SOE in a small city, they are one of the 
main manufacturing companies in that region. Therefore, local banks give them 
preferential policies when issuing loans. They use loans to conduct some of their R&D 





As in other cases cited, Case E enjoys tax exemption for its new products for three years. 
Apart from this, they do not have other tax relief benefits.  
Government purchases 
Because the railway transportation service is controlled by the China Railway 
Corporation (CRC), a central SOE, they are the main customer of Case E. It is a newly 
formed company after the former Ministry of Railways was disbanded. Therefore, this 
company used to be part of the ministry, and as such, CRC used to be part of the central 
government.  
Funding for R&D from the government  
As a leading manufacturer of locomotives for heavy duty freight trains, they are heavily 
funded to develop products based on plans made by CRRC. For example, they have 
completed two major projects that started in 2004 and, until recently, were developing 
two models of heavy duty locomotives to export to a country in Europe where the average 
temperature is very low during winter. Low temperatures have a significant impact on the 
reliability of locomotives, even world leading railway equipment manufacturers 
SIEMENS and Alstom have failed in this project. Case E has worked closely with 
universities and PRIs, and spent at least 1.5 billion RMB on these two projects. Most of 
the research funding was provided by CRRC and loans were issued by The Export-Import 
Bank of China6.  
Awards issued by authorities 
                                                 
6The Export-Import Bank of China is directly owned and managed by the State Council of China to provide 





Case E has received many awards for their products and technologies developed 
indigenously. For instance, the two projects mentioned previously, were awarded a 
Second-Class Railway Technology Award issued by the China Academy of Railway 
Sciences.  
Human Resource Capital  
Technical training  
Similar to Cases F and G, Case E also needs to send engineers to attend seminars and 
meetings organised by the CRRC and Beijing Jiaotong University to learn new 
technological developments and new trends in the market.  
Human resources 
Case E is a large central SOE located in a small city so it is a very attractive employer in 
the local labour market. A lot of native people who have gone to universities in other 
cities to gain degrees in railway-related fields choose to return and work for Case E. 
Therefore, they have a good source of human resource from the local labour market.  
To sum up, Case E receives a high level of capital from the government as do other SOEs 
studied in this thesis.  
5.4.3.3 Poor BUL embeddedness case group summary 
Empirical evidence in this research shows that central SOEs receive high levels of capital 
from the government. They have especially easy access to financial capital through easy 
loans and direct funding on R&D projects. This makes them able to afford to adopt 
embedded BUL practices. However, Case A (Central SOE, Auto) and Case E (Central 




high levels of access to capital. Therefore, more factors need to be considered together to 
explain this finding.  
Findings from analysis of poor BUL embeddedness case group is summarised in Table 
5-5 
Table 5-5: Summary of capital received by poor BUL embeddedness group 
Forms of Capital Case A Case E 
Financial Capital 
Easy Loan ■ ■ 
Tax relief ■ ■ 
Government 
purchase ■ ■ 
Funding for R&D 
from government ■ ■ 
Awards issued by 
authorities ■ ■ 
Human Resource 
Capital 
Technical training ■ ■ 
Management 
knowledge □ □ 
Human resources ■ ■ 
■ Have access to this form of capital  □ Do not have access to this form of capital 
 
5.4.4 Summary of findings on a firm’s access to capital 
From previous analysis on the level of capital each case received from the government, 
several findings are summarised in Table 5-6.  
Table 5-6: Summary of findings on firm’s access to capital 
 
 
Embeddedness of BUL practices  Firm’s access to capital Ownership  
B Good  High Local 
C Good  High Local 
D Moderate Low Private 
F Moderate High Central 
G Moderate High Central 
E Poor High Central 
A Poor High Central 





Firstly, the private firm (Case D, Auto) only received a low level of capital from the 
government. They have especially poor access to financial resources through loans. In 
addition, they could not form a joint R&D situation with local universities and PRIs 
because the local university does not have good levels of engineering studies, and PRIs 
in this field have mostly been transformed into internal research institutes owned by their 
competitors (subsidiaries of large SOEs).  
Having poor access to financial resources could be the key explanation as to why Case D 
only has moderate levels of embedded BUL practices, even though they have an insider 
top manager for the long term, and he has a strong incentive to adopt BUL practices. 
Because highly embedded BUL practices are expensive to have according to the 
experience of Case B, lack of financial resources limited Case D’s capability to adopt 
embedded BUL practices. In short, Case D could not afford them.  
Secondly, empirical evidence in this research shows that central SOEs and local SOEs 
receive nearly all forms of capital in both financial capital and human resource capital. 
This allows them to have the capability to afford having embedded BUL practice and to 
expect good suggestions from knowledgeable workforce.  
However, only local SOEs have achieved good BUL embeddedness. It suggests that other 
factors need to be considered together to explain these results.  
From Section 5.2 and Section 5.3, empirical evidence shows that all four central SOEs 
that have been studied have outsider top managers on short-term employment. This could 
partly explain why central SOEs have lower levels of BUL embeddedness than local 




Because outsider top managers have no firm-specific knowledge needed to observe and 
appreciate low-visibility BUL activities and tend to only plan for short-term development 
of the firm’s innovation capability, they do not have the incentive to adopt embedded 
BUL practices.  
However, this explanation could only explain the poor BUL embeddedness of Case A 
(Central SOE, Auto) and Case E (Central SOE, Railway), but fails to explain the moderate 
BUL embeddedness of Cases F and G (Central SOEs, Railway).  
Therefore, more factors need to be added to the original framework to fully explain the 
research findings. This additional factor is that of market competition which emerged 
during the data analysis. This factor will be analysed in the next section.  
5.5 Market Competition 
Whilst performing the data analysis, it was noted that the original three institutional 
factors could not sufficiently explain the findings of the research. Empirical evidence 
from interview data shows that the level of market competition, that a firm faces has a 
crucial impact on its level of BUL embeddedness. Therefore, the fourth institutional 
factor is added to the original framework to fully explain the research findings. 
The following sub-sections will analyse the impact of market competition on the level of 
BUL embeddedness of firms using group-case analysis.  
5.5.1 Good embeddedness BUL group  
5.5.1.1 Case B and C (Local SOEs, Auto)  
Case B faces intense competition from domestic competitors. This is because there are a 




commercial vehicles. Therefore, those local SOEs are competing with one another in the 
domestic market. Apart from domestic competition, Case B also faces many threats from 
foreign firms in the international market. This is because Case B has established an 
assembly plant in 20 countries and exports to over 80 countries.  
Therefore, the top manager of Case B is under pressure to address threats from its rivals 
by improving its innovation capability through the adoption of embedded BUL practices.  
5.5.1.2 Case C (Local SOEs, Auto) 
Case C faces intense competition in the domestic market as there are many other large 
commercial vehicle manufacturers, who also are local SOEs, owned by other city or 
provincial governments. In fact, Case B (Local SOE, Auto) is one of their largest domestic 
competitors. They do not face many threats directly from foreign rivals in the domestic 
market because the Chinese government considers the technologies of heavy duty trucks 
as strategic and provides special applications to military vehicles. Therefore, the central 
government maintains strategic control on how much of the market is open to foreign 
manufacturers to protect its domestic firms. Foreign firms can only enter the Chinese 
market by forming minority shareholding (foreign firms hold less than 50%) JVs with 
Chinese SOEs to enable technology transfer and spill over.   
However, because Case C has established 4 FDI factories overseas and they export to 
Europe, Africa, Asian and Middle-eastern countries. They face a high level of competition 
from foreign manufacturers in the international market. Therefore, the top manager of 





To conclude, the top manager in Case C is under pressure to address threats from rivals 
in both the domestic and international markets. Therefore, the top manager of Case C has 
a high level of incentive to adopt embedded BUL practices.  
5.5.1.3 Good BUL embeddedness case group summary 
Empirical evidence in this research shows that local SOEs face intense competition from 
both domestic and international competitors, so top managers of local SOEs have to adopt 
embedded BUL practices to develop the innovation capability of their firms. Therefore, 
local SOEs have the highest level of BUL embeddedness.  
5.5.2 Moderate embeddedness BUL group  
5.5.2.1 Case D (Private, Auto)  
Case D also faces intensive competition in the domestic market and international markets. 
This is because the market of parts for fuel supply systems for engines is completely open 
to market competition. Most firms are private right from their inception or were privatised 
from SOEs nearly a decade ago. The others are subsidiaries of large SOEs who produce 
entire vehicles. The CEO of Case D states that: “I think a big challenge to our product 
innovation is severe imitation and price competition from local competitors. … A few 
weeks after we launch some new products … [some competitors] will release a near 
identical product at a lower price. … (D-CEO)”.  
What is more, the central government allows foreign manufacturers to freely enter this 
market through exports and FDIs. For example, Robert Bosch GmbH is the world’s 
leading manufacturer of parts for fuel supply system for engines. They formed a majority 




injector factory in Wuxi, Jiangsu Province, to produce some products locally in China in 
2005. Bosch is one of the main foreign competitors to Case D in the domestic market.  
Therefore, Case D faces intense competition not only from domestic competitors, but it 
also faces a direct threat from the world’s leading foreign rivals in the domestic market. 
This forces Case D to adopt embedded BUL practices to improve their innovation 
capability. However, as found before in Section 5.4.2.1, limited access to capital 
constrains the capability of Case D to adopt a large number of embedded BUL practices, 
which require a significant amount of financial investment. Such financial constraints 
mean that Case D has only moderate BUL embeddedness.  
5.5.2.2 Case F (Central SOE, Railway) 
Case F produces pantographs specifically to fit to some models of high speed trains that 
are produced in China. At the time they were established, they had only one competitor. 
However, some railway equipment manufactures in China started to enter into this market 
in recent years by licencing technologies from foreign firms. The CEO of Case F states 
that: “… These new firms grow quickly as they simply licence ready-made technologies 
and import turnkey factories. … Because a pantograph is a modularised part on high 
speed trains, our products could potentially be abandoned by train manufacturers … (F-
CEO)”. Thus, the top manager of Case F has had to adopt some BUL practices to develop 
their innovation capability and to maintain their market share by adopting embedded BUL 
practices.  
5.5.2.3 Case G (Central SOE, Railway)  
Case G produces couplers that are specially used on some models of trains. These models 




be extremely durable and reliable. They do not face intense competition in the domestic 
market as they have very stable customers who purchase the trains. 
Nevertheless, they still face some degree of competition because couplers of trains are 
highly modularised parts, therefore, they could easily be replaced by newer models if 
necessary. In fact, there are already some subsidiaries under CRRC who have started to 
licence coupler technologies from foreign companies. Most of their products are used on 
passenger trains that are much more light-duty than what are produced by Case G for 
freight trains However, once the plan of CRRC changes to allow those subsidiaries to 
produce new models of couplers, Case G could very easily lose its market share.  
Like the situation of Case F (Central SOE, Railway), Case G started to face emerging 
competition from subsidiaries of other central SOEs. Thus, the top manager has had to 
introduce some embedded BUL practices to develop an innovation capability through 
adopting embedded BUL practices to maintain their market share.  
5.5.2.4 Moderate BUL embeddedness case group summary 
Empirical evidence in this research shows that private firms face intense competition in 
the domestic market. Threats from rivals encourage the top managers of private firms to 
adopt embedded BUL practices to develop innovation capability and to defend their 
market share. However, this research finds that private firms have limited access to capital 
making them incapable of adopting a large number of embedded BUL practices. 
Therefore, they could only attain moderate BUL embeddedness.  
This research also finds that some of the central SOEs are facing some degree of 
competition in the domestic market. Although their top managers are outsiders with short-




market. Therefore, the top managers in those central SOEs decided to adopt some 
embedded BUL practice to improve their innovation capability.  
5.5.3 Poor embeddedness BUL group  
5.5.3.1 Case A (Central SOE, Auto)  
Case A faces almost no competition in the domestic market. Case A is by far the oldest 
and most specialised company amongst very few suppliers of high-speed diesel engines 
for the Chinese defence sector. Their products are widely used on heavy duty trucks, ships, 
emergency generators and special vehicles in both the defence and civil-use markets. 
Because their products are mainly used for military vehicles and ships, they have almost 
total monopoly in this business meaning they have little or no competition in the domestic 
market.  
Therefore, the top manager does not have to adopt BUL practices to maintain the 
competitiveness of the firm. Especially given that embedded BUL practices are costly 
and require a long period of time before the outsider manager of Case A might observe 
the benefits of BUL on improving the innovation capability of the firm. Thus, his 
incentive to adopt embedded BUL practices is low.  
5.5.3.2 Case E (Central SOE, Railway)  
Case E faces little competition from the domestic market. Case E specialises in producing 
high power electric locomotives for freight transportation. Only a very limited number of 
subsidiaries of CRRC are capable of producing such heavy-duty locomotives. Others 
produce mainly passenger trains that are comparatively much easier to produce. Therefore, 




Therefore, the top manager in Case E does not have to improve his innovation capability 
to survive in the market, so the level of his incentive to adopt BUL practice is low.  
5.5.3.3 Poor BUL embeddedness case group summary 
Empirical evidence in this research shows that the level of incentive of top managers in 
some central SOEs is low because they do not face any competition. It is found that Case 
A (Central SOE, Auto) and Case E (Central SOE, Railway) enjoy having almost total 
monopoly in their fields of business means neither face any competition in the domestic 
market.   
Because some SOEs barely face any competition, the top managers in those central SOEs 
do not have to adopt BUL practices to maintain the competitiveness of their firms. 
Especially given that embedded BUL practices are costly and require a long period of 
time before the outsider manager of the central SOEs observes the benefits of BUL on 
improving the innovation capability of firm. This finding explains why all four central 
SOEs studied have outsider top managers with short-term employment, and have access 
to high levels of capital, showing two different levels of BUL embeddedness.  
The central SOEs with poor BUL embeddedness do not face competition, while the 
central SOEs with moderate BUL embeddedness face some degree of competition.  
5.5.4 Summary of findings on market competition 
From the analysis of the impact of market competition on the level of BUL embeddedness 
of firms, the findings are summarised in Table 5-1.  
Firstly, empirical evidence in this research shows that local SOEs and private firms face 
intense competition in the domestic market. Threats from rivals force the top managers 




practices making them capable of defending their market share. Moreover, they could 
maintain their competitive advantage and generate a better economic performance. 
Therefore, local SOEs could have good BUL embeddedness.  
Table 5-7: Summary of findings on market competition 
Case Case group  Ownership and 
sector 
Level of Market 
competition  
B Good Local, Auto High 
C Good Local, Auto High 
D Moderate Private, Auto High 
F Moderate Central, Railway Moderate  
G Moderate Central, Railway Moderate  
A Poor Central, Auto Low 
E Poor Central, Railway Low 
Row in grey could not be explained by findings in this section. So require further 
analysis.  
 
However, the intense market competition factor could not explain the moderate BUL 
embeddedness of Case D (Private, Auto). This must be combined with the fact that Case 
D has limited access to capital, making them unable to afford having several embedded 
BUL practices even though its top manager has the incentive to do so.  
Secondly, empirical evidence in this research shows that central SOEs do not face intense 
market competition in the domestic market so they do not have to adopt BUL practices 
to maintain the competitiveness of their firms. Especially given that embedded BUL 
practices are costly and require a long period of time before the outsider manager of any 
central SOEs observes the benefit of BUL on improving the innovation capability of firm. 
This finding explains why all four central SOEs studied have outsider top managers with 
short-term employment, and have access to high levels of capital, showing two different 
levels of BUL embeddedness.  
The central SOEs with poor BUL embeddedness do not face competition, while the 




These two findings suggest that to fully explain the current level of BUL embeddedness, 
the four institutional factors within China’s NSI should be simultaneously considered. 
Failing to include any one of them would prevent a full explanation being developed for 
a firm’s level of BUL embeddedness from China’s NSI perspective.  
5.6 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter studies the impact of four institutional factors within China’s NSI on the 
level of BUL embeddedness of firms. The four factors are:1) whether the top manager of 
a firm is an insider or an outsider, 2) the length of employment of the top manager, 3) the 
firm’s access to capital. The fourth institutional factor is found during data analysis which 
is the market competition.  
As already mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, three assumptions are made in 
this research based on extensive literature (see Section 2.5.3). The three assumptions 
justify why firms should adopt BUL to develop innovation, why BUL requires long-term 
planning by top managers, and why BUL requires top managers to have firm-specific 
knowledge. The three assumptions are developed from the literature so they are 
theoretically justified. 
a) BUL leads to improved innovation capability and better innovation 
performance, which consequently leads to improved economic performance. 
--- Thus, top managers of firms will adapt BUL practices if they want to have 
good innovation along with improved economic performance.  
b) BUL practices require long term investment before their benefits can be 
perceived in terms of better innovation capability or performance. --- Thus, 




to adopt embedded BUL practices, as they could not anticipate the benefit of those 
practices within their period of employment.  
c) BUL is more difficult as it is less visible to top managers who do not have 
firm-specific knowledge. It is because BUL tends to occur amongst employees 
on a daily basis. --- Thus, outsiders who do not have sufficient firm-specific 
knowledge are less likely to have an awareness of the BUL activities taking place 
on the shop floor. Even if they noticed such learning activities, they would not 
adopt BUL practices or facilitate them as they are unaware of the benefits of such 
learning effects. 














ss of BUL 
B Local Insider High Long-term High Good 
C Local Insider High Long-term High Good 
D Private Insider Low Long-term High Moderate 
F Central Outsider High Short-term Mid Moderate 
G Central Outsider High Short-term Mid Moderate 
A Central  Outsider High Short-term Low Poor 
E Central Outsider High Short-term Low Poor 
 
With the three assumptions in mind, the empirical evidence in this research shows that:  
Firstly, local SOEs have insiders as a top manager so they have firm-specific knowledge 
to observe and appreciate BUL efforts at shop floor level. Moreover, top managers have 
high level incentives to adopt BUL practices because they have long term employment as 
the top manager, and they plan for the long term development of the firm’s innovation 
capability. In addition, local SOEs face intense competition in the domestic and 




their market share. Lastly, local SOEs are wealthy as they receive high levels of capital 
from local government, especially financial resources through easy loans. Therefore, 
local SOEs could afford to adopt embedded BUL practices.  
Secondly, private firms have insiders as top managers as well, so they could observe and 
appreciate BUL effects at shop floor level. Moreover, the level of the top manager’s 
incentive to adopt BUL is high because the top managers are selected for long term 
employment and they face intense market competition even more seriously than local 
SOEs. However, private firms have poor access to financial resources because the local 
government does not provide them with many forms of capital. Therefore, their BUL 
embeddedness is only at moderate level as they could not afford to adopt embedded BUL 
practices even though their top managers are insiders and have a strong incentive to do 
so. 
Thirdly, central SOEs receive high levels of capital provided by the government, 
especially financial resources through easy loans. This allows them to adopt embedded 
BUL practices. However, the government only appoints outsiders as top managers of 
firms so top managers do not have sufficient, firm-specific knowledge to observe and 
appreciate BUL effects at shop floor level. Moreover, the level of top managers’ 
incentives to adopt BUL practices is low because they are only appointed for a short term 
of around 5 years, so they do not need to plan for the long-term development of their 
firm’s innovation capability. What is more, some central SOEs do not face market 
competition, so they do not have to innovate to address threats from rivals. Therefore, 
even though central SOEs have financial resources to afford to have embedded BUL 
practices, they do not do so because the top managers are incapable of observing and 




Fourthly, exceptions amongst central SOEs exist where there is a moderate level of 
embedded BUL practices. It is mainly because these central SOEs face some degree of 
competition in the market even though they have outsiders as top managers for the short 
term. Top managers have to adopt at least some BUL practices to compete with rivals in 
innovations. Therefore, central SOEs could have a moderate level of embedded BUL 
practices when they face competition.  
These four patterns of combination of institutional factors (summarised in BUL leads to 
improved innovation capability and better innovation performance, which 
consequently leads to improved economic performance. --- Thus, top managers of 
firms will adapt BUL practices if they want to have good innovation along with improved 
economic performance.  
d) BUL practices require long term investment before their benefits can be 
perceived in terms of better innovation capability or performance. --- Thus, 
top managers who will only remain in their position for 4-5 years are less likely 
to adopt embedded BUL practices, as they could not anticipate the benefit of those 
practices within their period of employment.  
e) BUL is more difficult as it is less visible to top managers who do not have 
firm-specific knowledge. It is because BUL tends to occur amongst employees 
on a daily basis. --- Thus, outsiders who do not have sufficient firm-specific 
knowledge are less likely to have an awareness of the BUL activities taking place 
on the shop floor. Even if they noticed such learning activities, they would not 





Table 5-8) suggest that to fully explain the current level of BUL embeddedness, the four 
institutional factors within China’s NSI should be simultaneously considered. Failing to 
include any one of them would prevent a full explanation being developed for a firm’s 
level of BUL embeddedness from China’s NSI perspective.  
The next chapter concludes this research by discussing research findings from Chapters 






Chapter 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF RESEARCH  
6.1 Introduction 
This research took the critical realism epistemology stance to formulate causal-
explanations of the impact of three sets of institutions of China’s national system of 
innovation (NSI) on bottom-up learning (BUL) activities in firms. To do this, this research 
used the multiple-case study method to analyse and evaluate how corporate governance, 
a firm’s access to capital and market competition influenced the firms’ adoption of BUL 
practices in seven Chinese firms including four central SOEs, two local SOEs and one 
private limited firm in China’s commercial vehicle sector and railway equipment sector.  
This chapter will discuss the key findings of this research and conclude this research as 
follows: Section 6.3 discusses the key research findings. Section 6.4 discusses 
contributions of this research to theories and practices. Moreover, an updated conceptual 
framework is developed based on the empirical findings. Section 6.5 acknowledges the 
limitations of this research and gives recommendations for future research directions.  
6.2 Summary of Research Design 
Based on NSI theory, innovation activities of firms are a social phenomenon shaped by 
their institutional environment. Therefore, this research is a causal-explanatory research 
aiming to investigate the underlying causal mechanism of that social phenomenon. The 
author took the critical realism epistemology stance believing the reality is stratified and 
that knowledge can be developed from investigating the underlying causal mechanism of 
the phenomenon by answering how and why questions. The multiple case study method 




This research is based on qualitative data collected from 37 in-depth semi-structured 
interviews with interviewees from seven companies between late 2015 and early 2016. 
Interviews were mainly high and mid-level managers in charge of R&D, quality 
management and HRM. These interviewees were chosen because they have sufficient 
knowledge of the firm’s management practices including its BUL practice to provide 
appropriate information needed to answer the research questions. Some employees were 
also interviewed when possible to triangulate information given by managers. Interviews 
with several managers in a firm also served the purpose of triangulating the information 
provided by them. Moreover, some employees have been interviewed to triangulate 
information provided by the managers. Cases included four central SOEs, two local SOEs, 
and one private limited firm. Four cases are in automobile sector, and three cases in 
railway equipment sector.  
The research questions are addressed using cross-case and group-case analysis. The next 
section will discuss how research questions are addressed respectively.  
6.3 Research Aim and Discussion of Key Research Findings 
This research aimed to understand the impact of China’s NSI on BUL activities in firms. 
To attain this objective, this research studied how China’s corporate governance system, 
the firm’s access to capital, and sectoral openness to competition influence a firm’s 
adoption of BUL practices. This objective has been further translated into three research 
questions. Each research question will be addressed with findings in this research in the 
following paragraphs.   
Addressing research question one - “Do China’s firms have bottom-up learning (BUL) 




Empirical evidence in this research shows that China’s firms have various BUL practices. 
This research identified five main types of BUL practices adopted by seven cases studied, 
namely a proposal system, a problem-solving mechanism, work-related record keeping, 
internal training and job rotation. The findings indicate that China’s firms have BUL.  
Moreover, empirical evidence shows that the level of BUL embeddedness of China’s 
firms varies significantly.  
The level of BUL embeddedness is a relative measure of how many embedded BUL 
practices have been adopted by cases in comparison to others. Three levels of ratings are 
given to those cases studied: good BUL embeddedness, moderate BUL embeddedness, 
and poor BUL embeddedness.  
In this research, an embedded BUL practice means that the practice is effective and thus 
helps the firm facilitate BUL activities. Not embedded BUL practices are not effective in 
facilitating BUL activities, so they only exist on paper. Whether a BUL practice is 
embedded or not is evaluated based on criteria developed using existing literature. (See 
Section 3.6.1.1) 
Addressing the research question two – “How the level of firms’ BUL embeddedness 
varies amongst firms with different ownership?” 
Empirical evidence shows that the level of BUL embeddedness varies amongst China’s 
firms with different ownership.  
This research found that local SOEs have good BUL embeddedness. The private firm has 
moderate BUL embeddedness. Some central SOEs have moderate BUL embeddedness, 




Empirical evidence in this research shows that local SOEs have good BUL embeddedness 
as they have the highest number of embedded BUL practices across the seven cases in 
focus. The private firm has only moderate BUL embeddedness because it has only 
adopted some of BUL practices. Interestingly, amongst the four central SOEs studied, 
two of them have moderate BUL embeddedness as they have some embedded BUL 
practices; while the other two central SOEs have only poor BUL embeddedness.  
Further analysis in Chapter 6 reveals that the differences in the level of BUL 
embeddedness amongst the seven cases studied are caused by different combinations of 
corporate governance, the firm’s access to capital and market competition factors that 
each case faces. This will be discussed subsequently.  
Addressing research question three – “How does China’s corporate governance 
system and firms’ access to capital influence the adoption of embedded BUL practices 
in firms?” 
Synthesised from existing literature, three institutional factors have been identified to 
study and explain how China’s corporate governance system and firms’ access to capital 
influences the level of BUL embeddedness in firms, namely 1) whether the top manager 
is an insider or an outsider, 2) whether the length of employment of the top manager is 
short-term or long-term, and 3) the level of a firm’s access to capital.  
These three factors could explain why local SOEs have good BUL embeddedness but 
some central SOEs only have poor BUL embeddedness. It is because local SOEs have 
insider top managers for long-term employment but central SOEs have outsider top 
managers for the short-term. Therefore, top managers in local SOEs plan for long-term 




embedded BUL practices. On the contrary top managers in some central SOEs only plan 
for short-term development of innovation capability so have fewer embedded BUL 
practices.  
 However, these three factors could not explain why some central SOEs having outsider 
top managers with short-term employment and having good access to capital have 
moderate BUL embeddedness.  
Whilst performing the data analysis, it was noted that the three institutional factors could 
not sufficiently explain the findings from the research. Empirical evidence shows that the 
level of market competition that a firm faces has a crucial impact on its level of BUL 
embeddedness. Therefore, the fourth institutional factor is added to the original 
framework developed from previous literature to fully explain the research findings. 
Empirical findings in this research identified four patterns of how different combinations 
of the four institutional factors influenced the level of BUL embeddedness.  
The first pattern is that firms with an insider as the top manager, having a top manager 
with long-term employment, having access to high levels of capital, and facing intense 
competition in the domestic market, have good BUL embeddedness. (See Table 6-1) 
Table 6-1: Combination of institutional factors led to good BUL embeddedness 
Good BUL 
embeddedness 
Insider top manager  
Long-term employment of top 
manager 
High level of access to capital 
Facing intense market competition 
 
This is the combination of institutional factors faced by local SOEs, so they have the 




local SOEs have an insider as their top manager, so they have the firm-specific knowledge 
to observe and appreciate BUL effects at shop floor level. Second, top managers have a 
high level of incentives to adapt BUL practices because they have long-term employment 
as the top manager, and they plan for long-term development of the firm’s innovation 
capability. Third, local SOEs have the financial capability to adopt embedded BUL 
practices as they receive a high level of capital from local government, especially 
financial resources through easy loans. Fourth, local SOEs face intense competition in the 
domestic and international market, so top managers of firms have to address threats from 
rivals to defend their market share. Therefore, local SOEs are able to afford to adopt 
embedded BUL practices.   
The second pattern is that firms with an outsider as top manager, having short term 
employment of the top manager, facing no competition in the domestic market, and 
having high access to capital, have poor BUL embeddedness. (See Table 6-2) 
Table 6-2: Combination of institutional factors led to Poor BUL embeddedness 
Poor BUL 
embeddedness 
Outsider top manager  
Short-term employment of top 
manager 
High level access to capital 
Facing no market competition 
 
This is the combination of institutional factors faced by two central SOEs. Their poor 
BUL embeddedness can be explained by three reasons. First, this research shows that 
central government only appoints outsiders as top managers of central SOEs, so top 
managers do not have sufficient firm-specific knowledge to observe and appreciate BUL 
effects at shop floor. Second, the top managers in central SOEs are only appointed for a 




of the firm’s innovation capability. Thus, they lack the incentive to adopt BUL practices. 
Third, these two central SOEs do not face market competition, so they do not have to 
innovate anything to address threats from rivals.  
Therefore, although the two central SOEs have good access to capital, they do not have 
many embedded BUL practices because the top managers are incapable of observing and 
appreciating BUL effects due to a lack of firm-specific knowledge, and they do not offer 
incentives. The top managers in central SOEs do not have incentives to adopt embedded 
BUL practices because firstly, top managers are not concerned with the long-term 
performance of the firm as they have short-term employment; and secondly, they are not 
under pressure from competition. 
However, two central SOEs studied in this research have moderate BUL embeddedness. 
These two cases show the third pattern of how the combination of institutional factors 
influence a firm’s BUL embeddedness.  
The third pattern is that firms with an outsider as the top manager, having short-term 
employment of the top manager, and having access to high levels of capital, but facing 
some degree of competition in the domestic market, have moderate BUL embeddedness.  
Table 6-3: Combination of institutional factors led to Moderate BUL embeddedness 
Moderate BUL 
embeddedness 
Outsider top manager  
Short-term employment of top 
manager 
High level of access to capital 
Facing some market competition 
 
This is the combination of institutional factors faced by another two central SOEs. The 




some degree of competition in the domestic market. Although the top manager of these 
two central SOEs are outsiders and have short term appointments, they are forced to have 
some embedded BUL practices to develop their innovation capability to defend their 
market share. Competition in the domestic arena contributes to the increasing of top 
managers’ incentives to adopt embedded BUL practices. Therefore, they could have a 
moderate level of BUL embeddedness.   
The fourth pattern that emerges shows firms with an insider as the top manager, having 
long-term employment of their top manager, facing intense competition from the 
domestic market, but having low access to capital, has moderate BUL embeddedness.   
Table 6-4: Combination of institutional factors led to Moderate BUL embeddedness 
Moderate BUL 
embeddedness 
Insider top manager  
Long-term employment of top 
manager 
Low level of access to capital 
Facing intense market competition 
 
Amongst the seven cases studied, only the private firm has poor access to financial 
resources. Therefore, its BUL embeddedness is only at a moderate level as it could not 
afford to adopt embedded BUL practices even though its top manager is an insider and 
has a strong incentive to do so. Professionally designed BUL practices are very expensive 
based on the experiences of Cases B and C (Local SOEs, Auto). However, Case D 
(Private, Auto) found some ways to avoid adopting expensive BUL practices by 
developing them in-house. For example, it developed an online proposal and record 
keeping system using Microsoft Office software. This allows the firm to have some 




limited access to capital still limits their capacity to invest in other BUL practices such as 
internal training, which also requires a heavy investment in finance and labour.  
These results lead to some interesting insights.  
First, this research has empirically proved that China’s NSI is not inconsistent with BUL 
activities in firms. In addition, firms design their BUL practices in different ways, so the 
level of embeddedness of BUL practices varies amongst firms.  
It is found in this research that in general local SOEs and private firms have better BUL 
embeddedness than central SOEs. This is mainly because local SOEs and the private firm 
that were studied have long-term, insider top managers. Moreover, these two types of 
firms face intense competition in the domestic market. Therefore, top managers of local 
SOEs and private firms are highly motivated to adopt embedded BUL practices.  
However, amongst the seven cases studied, local SOEs have access to capital, and the 
private firm does not. This scenario limits the capability of private firms to adopt 
expensive embedded BUL practices. Therefore, the private firm can only achieve a 
moderate level of BUL embeddedness.  
Second, empirical findings in this research show that the level of BUL embeddedness, as 
discussed previously in this section, can be explained by different combinations of four 
institutional factors. More importantly, it is found that those four institutional factors must 





For example, good BUL embeddedness is found in local SOEs with an insider as the top 
manager, having long-term employment of the top manager, facing intense competition 
in the domestic market, and having access to high levels of capital.  
However, because private firms have limited access to capital, they could not afford to 
adopt more embedded BUL practices even though they have motivated top managers.  
Therefore, to fully explain the current level of BUL embeddedness, four institutional 
factors should be simultaneously considered. Failing to include any one of them would 
prevent a full explanation being developed for a firm’s level of BUL embeddedness from 
a Chinese NSI perspective.  
6.4 Research Contribution 
This section discusses the contribution that this thesis makes to current theories and 
practices that will be discussed respectively in the following sub-sections. The thesis 
contributes to three fields of literature: Section 6.4.1 discusses its contribution to China’s 
NSI studies. Section 6.4.2 discusses its contribution to studies on corporate governance 
and firms’ innovation performance in China. Section 6.4.3 discusses its contribution to 
BUL literature. Section 6.4.4 discusses the conceptual framework that will be updated 
with the findings of this research.  
This thesis also contributes to contemporary practices by providing new insights to 
management practitioners and policymakers. Section 2746.4.5 discusses the management 




6.4.1 Contribution to studies on China’s NSI 
To respond to the research objective – to develop an understanding of the impact of 
China’s NSI on innovation activities in firms. This research studies three elements of 
China’s NSI, namely 1) corporate governance system, 2) a firm’s access to capital and 3) 
market competition. Corporate governance is further divided into two factors including 
1) whether the top manager of a firm is an insider or an outsider, and 2) whether the length 
of employment of the top manager is short-term or long-term.  
This research formulates a theoretical framework consisting of four institutional factors 
to analyse and evaluate the impact of China’s corporate governance system, the firm’s 
access to capital and market competition on firms’ BUL.  
This four-factor framework is developed by drawing on and synthesising from various 
literature (Tylecote and Cai, 2004; Cai and Tylecote, 2005; Liu and Tylecote, 2009; 
Tylecote, Cai and Liu, 2010; Peng et al., 2005; Yiu and Lau, 2008).  
The four factors include: 1) whether the top manager of a firm is an insider or outsider, 2) 
the length of the top manager’s employment, 3) the firm’s access to capital, and 4) the 
level of competition. 
The first three factors are based on combining the F&CG model developed by Tylecote 
and his colleagues (e.g. Tylecote and Conesa, 1999; Miozzo and Tylecote, 2001; Tylecote 
et al., 2002; Cai and Tylecote, 2005; Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006; Tylecote, 2007; Liu 
and Tylecote, 2016) with the network-based resource capital model created by Peng, Lee 
and Wang (2005) and Yiu and Lau (2008: 36).  
During the data analysis, it was established that the research findings could not be fully 




faced by firms has a significant influence on the level of BUL embeddedness of firms. 
By adding the market competition factor, the research findings could then be fully 
explained.  
Therefore, this research contributes to the existing literature by adding a market 
competition factor to the F&CG framework to explain the level of BUL embeddedness 
of firms. This four-factor framework contributes to studies on interaction between 
China’s NSI and firms’ innovation activities by explaining how CG, firms’ access to 
capital and market competition influence firms’ BUL.  
Each of the four factors will be discussed in the following paragraphs by comparing 
current literature with empirical findings. It should be stressed that each factor 
individually is not sufficient to explain the level of embeddedness of BUL practice of 
firms. It requires a combination of four factors to explain the variances in the level of 
embeddedness of BUL practices within the seven cases being studied. 
Insider vs. outsider top manager 
As suggested by the literature, having an insider as the top manager improves a firm’s 
innovation capability (Tylecote and Cai, 2004; Liu and Tylecote, 2009; O’ Sullivan, 
2000). This is because outsider top managers do not possess sufficient levels of firm-
specific knowledge to observe low-visibility innovation activities that take place on the 
shop floor (Liu and Tylecote, 2009). Moreover, without such insider knowledge, 
outsiders are not likely to appreciate low visibility and slow-pay-off activities (ibid) like 
BUL. Therefore, the level of embeddedness of BUL practices would be lower when the 




Empirical findings in this research are in line with the literature showing that firms with 
insiders as top managers have, in general, a higher level of BUL embeddedness than firms 
with outsiders as top managers.  
This factor is proved to be an effective indicator that demonstrates whether the top 
manager of a firm has sufficient levels of knowledge to observe and appreciate low 
visibility and slow-pay-off BUL activities (Wei et al., 2011). If the top manager is an 
insider who has rich, firm-specific knowledge, developed over years of working in the 
firm, they will be able to observe and appreciate BUL effects amongst shop floor 
employees.  
However, this factor alone is not a sufficient indicator of the level of embeddedness of 
BUL practices of firms. It is because empirical evidence shows that some firms with 
outsiders as top managers have a moderate level of embedded BUL practice. This 
research shows that an outsider top manager can still implement these practices if they 
have the incentive to do so. For example, when the firm faces competition in the domestic 
market.  
This finding shows that, whether the top manager of a firm is an insider or an outsider is 
not a decisive factor on its own in determining the level of BUL embeddedness in the 
firm. Therefore, other factors need to be taken into consideration to explain the level of 
BUL embeddedness of those firms studied.  
Length of employment of top manager  
As suggested in the literature, the length of employment of the top manager has a 
significant impact on their decision-making in terms of planning for long or short-term 




also has a significant impact on the level of the top manager’s incentive to adopt slow-
pay-off activities like BUL. Under short-term employment, top managers are more 
inclined to adopt short-term practices to improve the firm’s innovation capability and to 
boost its profitability, such as by adopting technological bundles (Cai and Tylecote, 2005). 
This is because they want to please their superiors to place them at a higher position after 
4-5 years. This kind of short-term behaviour, in the long run, neglects the importance of 
developing an internal innovation capability (ibid).   
Empirical findings from this research are in line with the existing literature showing that 
firms with long-term employment of top managers have a higher level of embeddedness 
of BUL practices, in general, than firms with short-term employment of top managers. 
This finding suggests that the length of employment of the top manager is an effective 
factor that indicates whether or not top managers of firms have the motivation to adopt 
an embedded BUL practice. 
However, as already mentioned above, this factor alone does not explain why some firms 
with only short-term employment of top managers still have a moderate level of 
embeddedness of BUL practices. Therefore, more factors need to be taken into 
consideration to understand this phenomenon.  
Access to capital  
Much literature on the subject of China’s NSI and China’s SOEs argue that China’s SOEs 
have privileged access to scarce capital in comparison to private firms (e.g. Cai and 
Tylecote, 2005; Liu and White, 2001; Xue et al., 2011; Okazaki, 2017). Poor access to 




embeddedness because embedded BUL practices require a high level of financial 
investment.  
This research confirms the argument of previous literature that SOEs have access to much 
more capital than the private firm. The private firm has only moderate BUL 
embeddedness because they cannot afford to have many embedded BUL practices. 
Therefore, a lack of access to capital will limit the firm’s capability to adopt embedded 
BUL practices.  
Although the literature suggests that BUL is a cost-less approach to develop innovation 
capability and innovation performance of firms (Bessant et al., 1994), this research shows 
that it is, in fact, very expensive to adopt highly embedded BUL practices.  
Based on the experiences cited by Cases B and C (Local SOEs, Auto), highly embedded 
BUL practices require a high level of investment in, for example, proposal systems 
supported by advanced IT systems and heavy financial rewards, problem-solving 
mechanisms at the expense of labour hours and experiments, internal training systems 
supported by expenditure on developing internal trainees. All of these highly embedded 
BUL practices require a high level of capital which is not, in general, accessible to private 
firms in China.  
However, a firm’s access to capital is not a deciding factor when determining the level of 
BUL embeddedness of firms. This research found that having high access to capital does 
not necessarily lead to a high level of BUL embeddedness, because central SOEs that 
were studied, and that have good access to capital, only have poor or moderate BUL 
embeddedness. This is because central SOEs have little or no competition in the domestic 




Therefore, the competition factor is added to the three CG&F factors to fully explain the 
level of BUL embeddedness in firms.  
Market competition  
The crucial role played by market competition in forcing firms to actively engage in 
innovation activities has been recognised by some highly regarded innovation scholars 
like Rosenberg (1992) and Freeman (1995).  
Competition is an important factor that influences the innovation activities of firms. In an 
historical work studying planned economy in Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 
Rosenberg (1992) argues that the lack of competition in the planned economy allows 
firms to survive without developing any innovation because they do not face threats from 
rivals in the domestic market. In addition, innovation has inherent elements of risks which 
deters managers from innovation activities when their survival does not rely on them. In 
contrast, competition in a capitalist economy forces firms to actively engage with 
innovation to gain a competitive advantage. Although innovation involves risk, not 
innovating in a competitive market could be fatal (Rosenberg, 1992).  
Freeman (1995) identifies low levels of competition as one of the main reasons why the 
USSR had such low levels of innovation capability in comparison to Japan in the 1980s.  
This research finds that market competition leads to improved BUL embeddedness and 
innovation capability because firms must innovate in order to address threats from their 
rivals. Therefore, due to the high cost of failure in innovation, firms would avoid it if they 
could. However, when they face competition, they cannot avoid innovation.  
This factor is specifically important in the context of Chinese firms, depending on the 




survival of SOEs in China is principally due to the control of market competition in 
certain sectors (Liu and Tylecote, 2016). If firms enjoy monopolistic status in their field 
and are protected by government plans, they do not have to innovate, just like in the case 
of the USSR (Rosenberg, 1992; Freeman, 1995).  
However, in line with other factors, the level of embeddedness of BUL practices of firms 
could not be fully explained merely by whether or not the company faces market 
competition. For example, the private firm operating in a highly fragmented market 
producing parts for fuel supplying system for engines. It has moderate BUL 
embeddedness due to its lack of access to capital. Therefore, more factors need to be 
considered to understand this phenomenon.  
From previous discussions on how the four institutional factors explain the level of BUL 
embeddedness of firms, it is evident that each factor alone is not sufficient to explain the 
level of BUL embeddedness in firms. It requires a combination of the four factors to 
develop a full explanation of the variances in the level of embeddedness of BUL practices 
amongst the seven cases in question. 
6.4.2 Contributions to the literature on corporate governance and firm 
innovation performance 
This thesis contributes to studies on innovation of China’s SOEs in general by 
distinguishing local SOEs from central SOEs in how they are managed by the government 
at different levels. Existing literature on China’s NSI, China’s SOEs, and China’s 
economic reforms tend to group SOEs owned by the government at different levels (i.e. 




different level of government, have similar styles of innovation activities (e.g. Liu and 
White, 2001; Liu and Lundin, 2007; Liu, 2009; Xiao et al., 2013).  
However, empirical evidence from this research shows that central SOEs and local SOEs 
are managed differently by the government at different levels in two aspects.  
First, empirical evidence shows that the local government has a tendency to appoint an 
insider as the top manager of local SOEs. However, central government tends to appoint 
outsiders to the central SOEs.  
Second, the top manager in local SOEs could remain in that position for a long period of 
time so that they have time to develop firm-specific knowledge, which is beneficial to 
BUL. However, the top managers in central SOEs only stay in that position for about 3-
4 years before they are transferred to ministry offices or to other central SOEs as 
suggested by Tylecote et al. (2010).  
A recent study, using the panel data of listed firms in China, Kou and Henning (2017), 
argues that SOEs owned by provincial and city level governments have a better 
innovation performance than those SOEs owned by the central government. Findings in 
this research are in line with this, showing that central SOEs are less engaged with 
innovation activities than are local SOEs. It is because central SOEs have outsider top 
managers with short-term employment. Top managers of central SOEs tend to avoid 
innovation as they do not face competition in the domestic market.  
Distinguishing central SOEs from local SOEs has important implications for innovation 
studies on China’s SOEs because it shows that SOEs could be very innovative if they are 
managed in the appropriate way, i.e. by appointing an insider as their top manager coupled 




6.4.3 Contribution to BUL literature 
This research contributes to BUL literature by initiating efforts to operationalise the 
concept of BUL to make it a practical management tool for developing an innovation 
capability in firms.  
Although the concept of BUL has been widely suggested as an important approach to 
develop innovation capability (March, 1991; Bessant and Caffyn, 1997; Lam, 2002; Mom 
et al., 2006; Andersen, 2008; Aoki, 2008; Høyrup, 2010; Wei et al., 2011), the breadth of 
literature that focusses on how BUL is implemented in firms, and how to evaluate the 
embeddedness of BUL practices, is considerably limited. Therefore, this research has 
initiated efforts to operationalise the concept of BUL to make it a useful tool or approach 
to develop an innovation capability in firms.  
Five major types of BUL practices have been identified in the seven featured cases, 
namely:  
• Proposal systems  
• Problem-solving mechanisms  
• Work-related record keeping 
• Internal training  
• Job rotation  
 
Additionally, the criteria of embedded BUL practices has been established based on the 




In the following discussions, the criteria for embedded BUL practices will be summarised 
in order to propose a practical list of BUL practices, as well as how to improve the level 
of embeddedness of BUL practices. (also summarised in Table 6-1) 
An embedded proposal system requires a high level of support from top managers. This 
is because implementation of any new suggestions requires cooperation and resource 
allocation across functional departments. Managers at lower levels simply do not have 
enough authority to make such decisions. Moreover, data collection events need to be run 
frequently to develop a climate for employees to actively propose suggestions. 
Furthermore, embedded proposal systems should include all employees so that everyone 
has an opportunity to share their knowledge in their specialised fields. Lastly, rewards for 
high quality suggestions should be attractive enough to motivate employees.  
Embedded problem-solving mechanisms should mainly be based on multi-disciplinary 
teams. Such team-based, problem-solving mechanisms not only allow problems to be 
tackled from different angles, but also allows team members to learn from experts in 
different disciplines. Moreover, the problem-solving process should be organised based 
on certain problem-solving approaches such as 8D or PDCA. This is because systematic 
problem-solving processes enable knowledge creation and effective learning (Tjosvold et 
al., 2004).  
Embedded work-related record keeping systems should be highly integrated with a firm’s 
Office Automation (OA) system. This helps employees to record problems they are 
encountering at work in multiple formats, such as making use of photography and videos. 
Moreover, OA systems allow managers at different levels to conveniently review work 




of any embedded work record keeping systems. The management of a firm should invest 
time and effort to identify problems and also good practice on the shop floor.  
Table 6-5: Summary of criteria for embedded BUL practices 
BUL Practices Embedded  Not embedded  
Proposal system Top management support  Limited management support  
Frequent (at least every six 
months)  
Infrequently (once a year or 
less)  
All employees Limited employees  
Heavily rewarded  Poorly rewarded  
 
Problem-solving mechanism Team-based  Individual-based  
Defined and structured  Undefined and unstructured 
 
Detailed work record keeping  Highly integrated with Office 
Automation software  
Paper based, not integrated to 
office system  
Regularly reviewed by 
managers 
Not or rarely reviewed by 
managers 
 
Internal training  Including all employees or 
including production workers 
Limited to manager or senior 
engineers.  
Have formal internal training 
development programmes  
Not have formal internal 
training development 
programmes 
Frequently or regularly  Occasionally  
 
Job rotation Structured and planed  Unstructured and unplanned  
Including junior employees  Only limited to managers 
 
Embedded internal training programmes should involve shop floor workers instead of 
limiting their availability to only managers and senior level engineers. This is because 
shop floor workers have a large amount of tacit knowledge developed from repeatedly 
performing their role. Their experiences and insight could be shared with their fellow 
workers if given a platform to deliver lectures in their field of expertise. Moreover, 
embedded internal training programmes should be underpinned by well-established 
internal training development programmes, specifically because employees are not 




other skills to prepare teaching materials, this is a process for transforming their tacit 
knowledge into explicit knowledge.  
Embedded job rotation should be well planned so that workers are given the opportunity 
to develop knowledge of different functional departments. Moreover, job rotation 
programmes should primarily focus on new or young employees because they have the 
highest potential for developing firm-specific knowledge.  
An interesting finding of this research is that embedded BUL practices often require a 
high level of investment in introducing a new OA system, hiring professional consultancy 
companies to design new management structures, heavy investment in financial rewards 
to employees, costs associated with providing internal training to employees, and so on.  
This finding contradicts the previous literature that has suggested that by using employees’ 
knowledge to make improvements and innovation is a cost-less approach to improving 
innovation performance (Bessant et al., 1994). This research proposes that BUL activities 
might seem to be free but costs associated with adopting and running BUL practices are 
very high based on those empirical findings.  
6.4.4 The updated conceptual framework 
Based on research findings, a new conceptual framework is proposed. (see Illustration 
6-1 and Illustration 6-2).   















Links 1a and 1b denote the impact of government plans on what capital is provided to 
firms with different ownership, namely central SOEs, local SOEs and private firms. SOEs 
and private firms will receive both financial and human resource capital from the 
government, but to different levels.  
Link 2a denotes that government plans influence the corporate governance of SOEs by 
appointing top managers directly by SASAC.  
A new market competition factor has been added as an institutional factor within China’s 
NSI that influences a firm’s BUL embeddedness.  
Links 3a and 3b denote that government plans determine the level of competition that a 
firm faces because governments make political decisions on what sectors are open to 
competition and to what extent.  
On the right-hand side of the conceptual framework, the original three institutional factors 
have been expanded to four factors by adding in the level of market competition. 
Moreover, the findings in this research are displayed in the new framework by linking 
four combinations of factors with the level of BUL embeddedness found amongst the 
cases in point 
6.4.5 Managerial implications  
This research provides new insight into management practices in two areas.  
Firstly, earlier literature often argues that outsider top managers lack firm-specific 
knowledge because they are disengaged with their firm. However, this research shows 
that outsiders can develop sufficient firm-specific knowledge in a short period of time if 




development of the firm. Thus, they would be able to observe and appreciate low-
visibility and slow-pay-off BUL activities.   
Although empirical evidence shows that the top managers of central SOEs are only 
appointed for a short period of time, long terms plans might be preferable by those top 
managers if the incentive mechanisms are right. For example, governments could 
encourage top managers of central SOEs to make long term plans in areas like developing 
a long-term innovation capability through adopting embedded BUL practices. In addition, 
the supervisory agency could develop a new performance evaluation system that takes 
long term development of SOEs into consideration. In this way, new top managers will 
have the incentive to follow up on plans made by their predecessors.  
Secondly, for private firms that often have limited access to capital, they could also adopt 
embedded BUL practices. For example, Case D (Private, Auto) who cannot afford to buy 
professional and customised OA software for managing work records has chosen a 
cheaper route, that is to develop a system in a DIY fashion internally, using a generic 
software like Microsoft Office. Therefore, private firms could still develop an innovative 
capability through BUL in the long run if they can design and develop some embedded 
BUL practices internally even though they have limited access to capital.  
6.4.6 Policy implications  
Based on the empirical findings in this research, this research proposes a few new insights 
to policymakers to help them develop the innovation capability of SOEs and private firms 
using BUL as a learning approach for innovation.  
Firstly, policy makers should introduce competition in sectors controlled by monopolistic 




moderate BUL embeddedness because they face some degree of competition in the 
domestic market.  
Secondly, the government should primarily appoint insiders as the top managers of their 
SOEs, and the term of employment of top managers should be long enough to encourage 
those top managers to make long term plans for developing an innovative capability. 
Although the long-term appointment of a top manager in SOEs might lead to problems 
like corruption (Ge et al., 2014), other measures could be adopted to deal with such issues. 
However, disengaged outsider top managers having short-term employment impede firms’ 
BUL. Therefore, appointing an insider for long term employment could be an effective 
way to improve BUL embeddedness of SOEs, which will consequently lead to improved 
innovation and economic performance of SOEs. Alternatively, policies that promote 
engagement and long-term planning of top managers in SOEs are essential.  
Thirdly, policy makers should help private firms to gain access to capital because the lack 
of capital considerably constrains their capability to develop innovative capabilities. It 
has been reported for decades that private firms face limited access to capital in 
comparison to SOEs (e.g. Cai and Tylecote, 2005; Liu and White, 2001; Tylecote et al., 
2010). Regardless of this, several rounds of reforms in China’s banking and finance 
sectors, empirical findings show this situation has still not been significantly improved 
(Xue et al., 2011; Okazaki, 2017).  
Private firms normally have highly engaged top managers and incentives to plan for long 
term development. Moreover, private firms in China face intense market competition so 
that they have to innovate to protect their market share. Based on the four-factor 




the private firm from adopting all five embedded BUL practices. It is reasonable to predict 
that if private firms have access to a high level of capital like SOEs, their BUL 
embeddedness will be as high as local SOEs.  
6.5 Research Limitations and Further Research Recommendations  
Although this research has successfully addressed three research questions and has 
fulfilled the research objective – to understand the impact of China’s NSI on BUL 
embeddedness in firms. This research has several limitations in its theories, research 
design, and generalisability of results. Therefore, several recommendations for future 
research are proposed below. 
1) This research aims to understand the impact of China’s NSI on firms’ BUL 
embeddedness. However, only four institutional factors have been chosen when 
trying to explain the level of BUL embeddedness of cases studied. Although the 
four-factor framework has been empirically proved useful in providing 
explanations to current BUL embeddedness of the seven cases, China’s NSI may 
include more factors that could provide other angles to analyse cases, like the 
national education system of workers, the stock market as a source of capital for 
firms, industrial plans in certain sectors, and so on. Every one of those institutional 
factors could influence the BUL embeddedness of Chinese firms even though 
such links have not been found in any mainstream literature yet. Therefore, extra 
institutional factors are expected to be added to the four-factor framework to 
provide more comprehensive explanations as to how China’s NSI influences BUL 
embeddedness of firms in China.  
Organisational studies literature could also help with providing more factors that 




firms would be an important factor as this will significantly influence the 
hierarchy and structure of the management. Two cases in this research are small 
central SOEs who have more embedded BUL than other large, central SOEs 
studied. This suggests that being a small sized firm could make adopting 
embedded BUL practices more easily if the firm have the initiative to adopt BUL 
that is triggered by market competition. Thus, the firm’s size should be taken into 
consideration in future researches on BUL.  
2) Only five types of BUL practices have been studied in this research. In the 
literature review chapter, five other BUL practices have been identified but they 
have been excluded during the data analysis because none of the seven cases in 
point have adopted them. Nevertheless, it is possible to find those excluded BUL 
practices in other research contexts if more cases have been studied. Unfortunately, 
due to constraints on time and resources in this PhD project, it is beyond the 
capability of the author to include more cases. Therefore, more cases and more 
BUL practices are expected to be studied in future research.  
3) This research has only studied two engineering sectors, which are commercial 
vehicles and railway equipment. As suggested in earlier literature (Dosi, 1988a; 
Lundvall, 1992; Freeman, 1994; Tidd et al., 2005; Lundvall, 2010), the foundation 
of innovation is interactive learning and creative problem solving. Thus, BUL 
could certainly play a critical role in other sectors, particularly in other 
engineering sectors that rely on a similar knowledge base to the seven firms 
studied. This is because BUL is a learning approach that facilitates interactive 




Future research could further study the role of BUL in developing firms’ 
innovation capability in other engineering sectors.  
4) This research uses cross-sectional data to compare the combination of the four 
institutional factors faced by each case and to compare their BUL embeddedness. 
However, it should be noted that those firms might be at different stages of 
implementing embedded BUL practices. Firms that recently started to adopt BUL 
practices might show low BUL embeddedness as they have little experience in 
managing those practices. In addition, the effect of BUL may not be visible in the 
short term because BUL is a slow-pay-off learning approach aiming to develop 
innovation capability in firms in the long run. Moreover, based on case data, BUL 
practices tend to evolve after years of implementation. Therefore, if time and 
resources are available, it would be useful to conduct longitudinal studies to 
comprehensively explore how BUL practices evolve over time, and how BUL 
helps firms to gradually develop innovation capability.  
5) This research is primarily based on qualitative data from in-depth semi-structured 
interviews with mainly high and middle level managers. Because this research 
aims to explore how firms adopt BUL practices, those managers were deemed as 
appropriate respondents. However, these managers were unable provide 
information on the opinions of shop floor employees. The information on how 
employees react to BUL practices is missing. Therefore, future research could 
focus specifically on studying how operating staff participate in BUL practices 
and how this leaning approach helps them improve their knowledge and skill sets.  
6) This research only studied seven Chinese firms including four central SOEs, two 




Although such a sample size is sufficient for a PhD research project, it is still 
beyond the capability of this research to produce more generalised results. 
Therefore, if time and resources allow, industry-wide surveys could be conducted 
in future quantitative research using questionnaires developed and based on the 
updated conceptual framework (see Section 6.4.4) and the list of criteria for 
embedded BUL practices (see Section 6.4.3). This could produce more 
convincing and rigorous results that can be generalised.  
7) Firms studied have been broadly classified into three groups including, central 
SOEs, local SOEs, and private firms. This classification hides any differences in 
the ownership structure within each group. Within the central SOEs group, Cases 
A and E are fully owned by the government, but Case F has around 35% of its 
shares owned by private firms, and Case G is a 50:50 joint venture between a fully 
central SOE and a foreign, private firm in France. Within the local SOEs group, 
Case B has multiple shareholders including both SOEs and private firms, and part 
of it has been listed on various stock markets. Case C is collectively owned by 
two large, local SOEs in two provinces of China respectively. The private firm, 
Case D, is owned by all the employees of that firm, where the managers have their 
own shares but workers only have shares that are collectively controlled by an 
Employee Shareholding Committee. According to the work by Cai and Tylecote 
(2005), the percentage of state ownership in SOEs has an impact on the firms’ 
innovation performance. This suggests that the detailed difference in ownership 
amongst seven cases studied could have an impact on their BUL embeddedness. 
Thus, the detailed structure of firms’ ownership should be included in future 




8) This research primarily studies the powerful role that the Chinese government 
plays by intervening in the market when establishing a large number of SOEs in 
important sectors. The lesson learned from this research could also provide some 
insight on understanding the role of the state in other countries where the state 
also plays a significant role in controlling the market either through, or not through, 
establishing SOEs. As shown in this research and backed by some existing 
innovation studies, the institutional environment built by national systems of 
innovation will have an impact on firms’ innovation activities (Freeman, 1994; 
Nelson, 1991; Fuller, 2016). Therefore, the four-factor model developed in this 
research could be applied to other countries where the state has a strong presence 
in the market.  
9) The lesson from this research could also be transferred to other countries where 
SOEs are present. The management of SOEs by the state is not necessarily the 
same across other countries. It would be valuable to apply the four-factor model 
to study how NSI impact SOEs in other countries where the state manages and 
controls SOEs in similar ways to China.  
10) When studying BUL in a national setting in future research, culture could also be 
an influential factor that has an impact on the implementation of BUL practices. 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 2 Section 2.3.1.5 on page 49, Japan has a suitable 
cultural environment at societal and individual level that encourages employees 
to propose suggestions and make change to existing work. Whilst China’s 
collectivist culture is, to some degree, in conflict with the notion of BUL, which 
requires proposing potentially critical suggestions to co-workers and their 




the culture of a country could facilitate or hinder BUL for innovation, which make 
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Appendix A: Informed Consent Form 
 








Tel: +44 (0)121 414 
3344 
Fax: +44 (0)121 414 
3971 
Informed Consent Form 
《同意书》 
  
The main purpose of this form is to provide information that may affect your decision about whether 
or not you want to participate in this research project. If you choose to participate, please sign in the 






WHO IS DOING THE RESEARCH? 研究人员信息 
Zhongzhen Miao, a doctoral researcher under the direction of Dr. Paulina Ramirez and Dr. Yufeng 
Zhang in the Birmingham Business School at the University of Birmingham, is conducting a research 
study, titled Bottom-up learning for innovation in state owned enterprises in China, to study how 
different degree of acceptances to bottom-up learning behavior could influence company’s technical 
innovation capability and innovation performances, and is inviting you to participate in it. 
 
苗仲桢，英国伯明翰大学商学院博士生。导师为 Paulina Ramirez 博士和张玉峰博士。研究课
Name of Researcher 研究人员姓名 
Zhongzhen Miao  苗仲桢 
Title of study 课题名称 
Bottom-up learning for innovation in firms in China 
《中国企业员工以创新为目标自下而上的学习行为》 
Governing Body and Supervisors 管理机构和导师姓名 
Dr. Paulina Ramirez & Dr. Yufeng Zhang at the University of Birmingham 








WHAT DOES PARTICIPATION IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY INVOLVE? 参与研究的过程 
If you decide to participate in this study, you will be interviewed at a place of your choice. Your 
participation will take approximately one hour. If approved by you, you will be audio taped during 
your participation in this research. Audio recordings will be confidential. These audio recordings 






WHY ARE YOU BEING ASKED TO PARTICIPATE? 被采访者选择标准 
You have been invited to participate because you are an experienced senior level manager working 





ARE THERE ANY BENEFITS TO PARTICIPATION? 参与课题的益处 
a) When your participation is complete, you will be given an opportunity to learn about this 
research, which may be useful to you in your career of managing innovative workforces. 
b) You will have new insights in understanding how to make/adjust innovation strategies to increase 






ARE THERE ANY RISKS INVOLVED IN THIS STUDY? 参与本课题的风险 





WHAT HAPPENS IF THE RESEARCHER GETS NEW INFORMATION DURING THE STUDY?  
课题发生变化 
The researcher will contact you if he learns new information that could change your decision about 




HOW WILL THE RESEARCHER PROTECT MY CONFIDENTIALITY? 对研究数据和参与者的保护 
The results of the research study will be submitted to the University of Birmingham, and may be 
published later on, but your name or identity will not be revealed. In order to maintain confidentiality 
of your records, the researcher will use codes to replace yours and your company’s name. 
 
All data collected from you will be stored encrypted and used solely for research purposes. Upon 








所有数据将会加密保存，并仅用于学术研究。在项目完成后，所有数据将会被封存 10 年。 
 
WHAT HAPPENS IF I DON’T WANT TO CONTINUE IN THE STUDY? 如何退出课题研究 
If you choose to withdraw from the study, the deadline is 01/01/2016. There will be no further 
consequences for you to withdraw from the study. Your data will be destroyed. 
Please contact Zhongzhen Miao via  
 
如果您决定退出本课题项目，请您在 2016 年 1 月 1 日前联系我。退出本课题研究您不会承担
任何后果。您所提供的数据将会被销毁。 我的邮箱   
 
VOLUNTARY CONSENT 自愿声明 
By signing this form, you are saying: 
(a) that you have read this form or have had it read to you and  







The researcher will be happy to answer any questions you have about the research. If you have any 





Note: By signing below, you are telling the researchers “Yes,” you participate in this study. Please 
keep one copy of this form for your records.  
请注意, 在下方签名代表您同意参加上述课题研究项目。请您妥善保存本《同意书》的副本。  
 
Your Signature 签名: ________________________  
Your Name (please print) 姓名（拼音）: ___________________________________  
Date 日期: ______________________________ 
 
INVESTIGATOR’S STATEMENT 研究员承诺 
I certify that this form includes all information concerning the study relevant to the protection of the 
rights of the participants, including the nature and purpose of this research, benefits, risks, 
confidentiality and right of withdrawing. I have described the rights and protections afforded to 
research participants and have done nothing to pressure, coerce, or falsely entice this person to 
participate. I am available to answer the participant’s questions and have encouraged him or her to 










Investigator’s Signature 研究员签名: _________________________  
Investigator’s Name 研究员姓名: Zhongzhen Miao 苗仲桢.  





Appendix B: Interview Guidance  
Interview Guidance 
1 Technological innovation of company 
1.1 Numbers of new products, product improvement 
1.2 Number of improvement in production process  
1.3 Total number of R&D personnel 
1.4 R&D investment 
2 What is the process of a successful innovation project? (i.e. your star product or 
series of products) 
2.1 What is considered as innovation in your company?  
2.2 What are your company’s advantages when conducting R&D or problem 
solving that could create new knowledge or innovation? 
2.3 What kind of edge do these advantages give your company? What roles are 
they played in the innovation process in your company?  
2.4 How do your company develop and manage these advantages?  
2.5 What kind of challenges common to the innovating process of your company? 
How do your company cope with those challenges?  
3 Bottom-up learning activities.  
3.1 What is the source of knowledge and technology commons to the company’s 
innovation? 
3.2 Does your company consider knowledge created during daily operations by 
shop floor employee/workers as a valuable source of knowledge for process 




3.3 What is the main problem-solving method used by the company to solve 
technical problems? 
3.4 Do your company setup teams specialised in solving problems arose from daily 
operations? Does your company organise multidiscipline teams?  
3.5 What kind of decisions could those teams make? (Level of autonomy)  
3.6 During formal R&D and daily problems solving events, do employees keep a 
detailed logbook to record what had happened and their thoughts about it, as 
well as proposed solutions?  
3.7 Do workers keep production logbooks to record problems encountered at work? 
3.8 How does your company make use of those kinds of logbooks for future 
innovation? Do managers frequently review them? 
3.9 How your company allows employees propose their suggestions on making 
changes to existing product and production process? How are those suggestions 
handled and processed? 
3.10 How your company encourages employees to help others when somebody has 
a new idea want to pursue?  
3.11 How could active employees find the appropriate person for help? What is the 
mechanism for this? How does it work?  
3.12 Does your company have job rotation to enrich employee breath of knowledge?  
3.13 How your company allows employees learn from each other (i.e. writing 
documents or face to face communication)?  
3.14 What is the level of employee engagement in daily work, in solving problems 




3.15 Does your company have schemes to develop employees’ technical innovative 
capability? Which part of employees is involved?  
3.16 Does your company have a rewarding system for employees who make 
suggestions, help colleagues and share experiences?  
3.17 How do your company recognise those active employees? What kind of role 
played by mid-level managers in this?  
3.18 How do you company reward innovation?  
3.19 Does high-level management frequently interact with shop floor employees to 
listen and understand employee’s ideas to carry out the experimental project by 
themselves?  
3.20 How managers support employees when they have suggestions and want to 
carry our experiments?  
4 Corporate governance of company 
4.1 Distributions of shares of your company 
4.2 How and why this shareholding structure provides advantages and 
disadvantage to the company? (Including certain firm-specific policies, access 
to resources, etc.)  
4.3 Do you receive supports from government? in what forms?  
4.4 How and why central planning influences the decision-making process of 
company’s management? 
4.5 Is the top manager of your company appointed internally? 
4.6 Does he/she have professional knowledge about the sector, about your 
company?  




4.8 Do you agree with that “management structure in SOEs is too rigid to be 
responsive to new ideas and changes”?  (I heard this idea at a conference of 
Chinese Engine manufacturers) 
 






Appendix C: Summary of Case and Interviewee Profiles  
Summary of case profile 
Compan
y code 
Sector Industry Ownership  Tier of SOEs 
(SASAC count 
as 0) 
Degree of state 
shareholding  
A Automobile Engine production Central  3 Full 
B Automobile Commercial vehicle production  Local  3 Majority 
C Automobile Commercial vehicle production Local  2 Full 
D Automobile Engine fuel supplying system 
production  
Private N/A None 
E Railway 
equipment  
Locomotive production  Central  2 Full 
F Railway 
equipment 
Pantograph production  Central  3 Majority 
G Railway 
equipment 
Train coupler production Central 3 50/50 JV 
 









Position  Interviewee 
code cited in 
text 
Note 
1 A High  Member of board of shareholder A-BM  
2 Vice president A-VP  
3 Chief engineer  A-CE  






5 Deputy Head of New product 
development Depart.  
A-DHoNPD  
6 Employee CNC operative A-CNC  
7 Low level engineer  A-LLE  
8 Quality control personnel  A-QC  
9 B High Member of board of shareholder  B-BM  
10 Vice president B-VP  
11 Chief engineer B-CE  
12 Mid  Head of production Depart. B-HoP  
13 C High Vice President C-VP In charge of total R&D in 
Company C, supervisor of Chief 
Engineer  
14 Secretary of shareholder board C-SSB Representing a member of board 
of shareholder  
15 Party Secretary  C-PS In charge of internal university 
16 Mid Administrative manager C-AM  
17 Director of employee training department C-DoT  
18 Employee Assistant of Administrative manager C-AoAM Worked two years in production 
department as management 
trainee 




Vice president  D-VP  
Chief engineer  D-CE  
22  Mid Head of production depart. D-HoP  
23 Head of Quality Control Depart. D-HoQC The one who design BUL 
system for Company D 
24 Deputy Head of Sales Depart D-DHoS Worked as production worker 
for many years before 




26 E High Vice president  E-VP  
27 Chief engineer E-CE  
28 Mid Deputy Head of Production Depart. E-DHoP  
29 Employee CNC operative E-CNC  
30 F High CEO F-CEO  
 Party Secretary  F-PS  
31 Chief Engineer F-CE  
32 Mid Head of Production  F-FoP  
33 Head of Quality control F-HoQC  
34 G High CEO G-CEO This company is small so do not 
have many high-level managers  
35 Mid Head of R&D depart. G-HoR&D Serve as Chief Engineer 
36 Head of Assembly division  G-HoA  
37 Head of product servicing department G-HoPS This department maintain 
products for customers  
      
      







Appendix D: Flow Chart of Proposal Systems in Seven Cases 
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